140. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 23, 1957, 10:57 a.m.1
SUBJECT
- Israeli Withdrawal and Suez Canal Problems
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Ambassador Hervé Alphand
- Mr. Francois de Laboulaye, Counselor, French Embassy
- C. Burke Elbrick, EUR
The Secretary said that he thought it might be useful to have an exchange of views regarding the Israeli situation prior to a meeting which he expected to have with Ambassador Eban on Sunday. He pointed out that the statement issued by the White House yesterday2 made it clear that the door was not closed to further negotiations and that this should offer some encouragement to the Israeli Government. He felt that the White House statement had gone very far in the direction that Ben Gurion seemed to want. In reply to a question by the Ambassador the Secretary said that we had in mind the possibility of a resolution in the General Assembly which would pick up the [Page 250] resolution of February 2 which would commit the United Nations to the maintenance of justice and international law in the area once Israeli forces have withdrawn. The Secretary said that it also appeared desirable to give more authority to the UNEF Advisory Committee which was set up to make recommendations to the Secretary General. In reply to a further question, the Secretary said that it would seem necessary to include in this package something in the nature of sanctions in the event of non-compliance by Israel with previous General Assembly resolutions.
The Ambassador said that he appreciated the opportunity of discussing these matters with the Secretary prior to the forthcoming meeting with Eban. He said that he had several suggestions that he would like to put forward on a personal basis for the Secretary’s consideration. He felt that it was most important to retain the idea of a statement by the maritime powers regarding freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran. He wondered if it would not be possible for Israel to make a unilateral declaration stating that it is prepared to refrain from any act of belligerency and to observe the terms of the armistice but that if Egypt resorts to acts of belligerency itself to block passage of Israeli ships through the Strait, Israel would reserve freedom of action to retaliate. The maritime powers could then declare that they have taken note of the Israeli declaration as conforming with international law and justice and with the right of legitimate self-defense under the United Nations Charter. This, he felt, would give Israel the assurances that it requires. He asked whether the United States Senate could not support Israel in this case by the passage of a resolution guaranteeing freedom of navigation. The Secretary said that this had been discussed at the meeting with the Congressional leaders the previous morning and it had been agreed that any attempt to bring about the passage of such a resolution would only serve to start a long debate and would result in undesirable delay.
The Ambassador asked if the United States Government had been in touch with the other maritime powers and the Secretary answered in the negative. However, we had an indication yesterday from the United Kingdom that it was prepared to join in a declaration regarding passage through the Gulf of Aqaba. There was some discussion regarding the possibility of obtaining the participation of an Asiatic maritime power in such a declaration and Japan was mentioned particularly. The Secretary asked Alphand to try to obtain his Government’s reaction to the idea of a declaration by the maritime powers.
In connection with the Gaza Strip Alphand wondered whether it would not be possible to establish an “international military government” and charge UNEF not only with military responsibilities but also with the civil administration in Gaza. Presumably, if this were done, UNEF would continue to employ the individuals now administering [Page 251] the Strip, although it would be done under international auspices and the administration would be neither Egyptian nor Israeli. The Secretary said that he thought the Ambassador’s ideas might be helpful.
The Ambassador said that he hoped the next day’s conversation with Eban would produce positive results. As the Secretary was aware, the French Government had already taken a stand against imposing sanctions on Israel. The Secretary said that if the United Nations takes a reasonable stand it would be difficult to avoid bringing pressure to bear on Israel. Alphand said that pressure should also be brought to bear on Egypt. He thought that something should be done about the passage of Israeli vessels through the Suez Canal. The Secretary observed that Ben Gurion had not emphasized this point in the recent communication to the President, but had confined himself to the problems of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza Strip. He pointed out to the Ambassador that if Israel does not withdraw its forces the cease-fire would come to an end and fighting might easily break out again, in which case the Canal would not be opened to traffic. He inquired whether this presented serious problems for France. The Ambassador said that with the increase in the allowables recently made by the Texas Railroad Commission (some 200 thousand barrels a day) France was no longer under the same kind of pressure and can afford to wait a little longer for a solution. The Secretary felt that if we can show that the world can get along without the Canal, the Western countries would not be subject to blackmail on the part of Egypt. He felt that the closure of the Canal was hurting the Arab-Asian countries more than it is the Western countries and that continued blockage of the Canal will result in Nasser’s becoming increasingly unpopular. However, the Secretary said that we cannot afford to make the present situation permanent since it would result in an unacceptable depletion of our oil resources in the United States.
The Ambassador asked what the Secretary thought Nasser’s reaction would be to the four-power plan for interim operation of the Canal. The Secretary said that he felt that Nasser would probably not accept the plan as it now stands but would make counter proposals.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/2–2357. Confidential. Drafted by Elbrick. The time of the meeting is from Dulles’ Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)↩
- See footnote 1, Document 131.↩