139. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
2670. In call on Ali Sabry yesterday originally intended as followup on Nasser talk last week (Embassy telegram 2625)2 discussion naturally centered on President’s address on Israeli withdrawal.
I said had no instructions on subject and believed speech spoke for itself. However, there were several personal comments I wished make. For some time past Arabs in general and Egyptians in particular have emphasized their concern and sensitivity regarding so-called imperialist problem and Palestine issue and, in stressing transcendant importance these matters, have maintained that Arab-American relations turn essentially around these questions. Central theme of criticism American policy in these connections has been that United States [Page 248] Government operating in proper [prior?] collusion with British and French and Israel and Egyptian press has been especially vicious propagating such erroneous assertions.
There have now been two occasions when our basic attitude on these issues has been clearly demonstrated. First was on occasion attack on Egypt when as matter principle we took stand in opposition to action of our British and French friends and allies. Second is President’s address where again as matter of principle (not as anti-Israel or pro-Egyptian move) stand taken in opposition Israeli withdrawal policy and raises problem not only in relations with Israel but between administration and segments of our own Congress.
What I wished emphasize especially was that these decisions of principle have been taken only after soul-searching deliberation and with utmost gravity and seriousness, and that in circumstances we would be receptive to indications that our Arab friends are disposed ponder these matters with similar sobriety and act constructively. Same token, we could not be expected be tolerant of strident agitation and of obstructionism to constructive action. Time is one for responsible reasonableness. To extent others share that view, the road ahead could be much more promising. In brief, what we would hope for is indication of understanding and constructive leadership.
Sabry had just read speech and was obviously hesitant discuss it specifically at the time. He did however make some comments regarding imperialists and Palestine questions.
Regarding imperialism he said Arabs convinced only safeguard lies in close cooperation of Arab countries and with Arab nationalism as their creed. This has raised problem with Communists who, after first opposing Egyptian resolution, subsequently adopted classic tactic of attempting usurp nationalist cause by infiltration. Originally Commies were kept under tight curb but recent British-French attack gave them opportunity to intensify efforts and no doubt their activity and influence are considerably greater. GOE is concerned by this development but feels unable crack down in present highly charged atmosphere. However, once political temperature is reduced GOE anticipates moving in on Communists and believes has capability handle.
Regarding Israel, Sabry recalled efforts which had been made several years ago, including secret meetings with Israelis in Paris, to improve situation and said he dated reverse of this trend to return of Ben Gurion to power two years ago, which in turn had led to aggressive Israeli policy, to arousing of Egyptian fears, to Czech arms deal and all unfortunate series of events which had followed. As President Nasser had told me, GOE still foresees moving ahead by stages in this matter but what he (Sabry) would wish emphasize is danger of trying to push ahead too far, too fast, at risk of doing more harm than good.
[Page 249]Sabry also mentioned problem of Egyptian-American relations which he said found very baffling. He could not but feel Egypt much misunderstood in Washington where it seemed to him small matters were magnified far beyond their real importance. He felt it necessary talk this problem out. I replied along line taken with Nasser’s gripping importance of basic attitude [sic].
Despite serious nature of conversation Sabry, who normally correct but somewhat reserved, gave indication of trying be friendly and understanding. Obviously his comments on imperialist and Palestine questions were of holding operation type, except possibly forewarning against trying move ahead too fast on Palestine which could well have been stimulated by certain intimation in President’s address. In broaching basic relations question however he appeared be voicing ideas in forefront his mind.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/2–2357. Confidential. Received at 3:12 a.m.; the source does not indicate the time of transmission. Repeated to Amman, Paris, Moscow, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Tel Aviv, and London.↩
- Document 101.↩