Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

659. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, December 16, 1956—8 p.m.

1926. Reference: Department Telegram 1912.² Talked with Nasser for three hours yesterday afternoon at government rest house at barrage outside Cairo where he has been in semi-seclusion past 10 days in order, he said, rest and formulate plans for future. I observed that in these circumstances my visit would seem well timed because it was of matters I desired speak under instructions from Washington and I thereupon presented substance reference telegram as instructed using original telegram to talk from in order to assure accuracy. Nasser listened attentively and took notes.

Taking his time and speaking deliberately and apparently thoughtfully Nasser said that he first desired make clear he shared our basic objective of assuring security and stability of area. Difficulty, based on experience past three years, had been in finding means. Said he had tried speak frankly with us in past but with indifferent success. However, would now try again and before answering specific questions raised in reference telegram wished give frank exposition of what in his mind. He then made following points:

(1) Most pressing need is to build up domestic economy of Egypt and raise living standard. This was in fact main objective in nationalizing Canal. Preoccupation with foreign affairs detracts from accomplishment essential domestic reform.

(2) Inclusion of Iraq in Baghdad Pact was, in view GOE, contrary to area security and stability. Also disturbed by activities of Turkey.

(3) Everything being done in Syria and Jordan is directed to avoidance outside domination. With such threats removed problem should not be difficult. Assertion re Communist activity in Syria is really effort to cover up Iraqi conspiracy dating back to early August of which GOE had been currently aware. Therefore, impossible assure area security and stability unless “other side”, i.e. Iraq and Turkey, plays it square.

(4) Nasser ready cooperate in taking steps toward solution area’s problems but in order do so must have period of trust and confidence. Frankly, he had feeling in past that USG trying strengthen Israel and at same time keep Egypt weak; that we were working against Egypt in area and propagating untrue assertions, especially re supposed desire Egypt establish empire over the Arab States and allegation that Egypt now Soviet tool. Also we had not understood Egyptian misgivings re certain aspect of proposed US-GOE military assistance agreement which in Egyptian eyes would have constituted infringement on their sovereignty. When he had attempted explain these matters frankly, he had not been believed and had been accused of maneuvering. He could only repeat this not true and there is consequently need to lay foundation of confidence which in turn can lead to future conversations designed reach understanding.

In this connection, Nasser said position USG certainly greatly enhanced by recent events. For instance would frankly admit he had never thought USG would really attempt restrain Israel if it attacked Egypt. He had been surprised by our action and so also had been people. Similarly Egyptian eyes had been opened re usefulness of UN, and he repeated his misgivings when President Eisenhower had originally given assurance of American support through the UN and his (Nasser’s) subsequent change of mind when such assistance had proved so effective. As consequence US position much better but, to use military term, he thought best policy for us follow now would be to consolidate our position.

(5) Reference arms purchase he said fully convinced he had taken right action in existing circumstances.

(6) Spoke at considerable length re cotton question, an unusual departure since he seldom mentions specific economic problems. To begin with said exaggerated reports being circulated re extent to which Egyptian cotton mortgaged for arms purchases. Thus payment in cotton this year only amounts to ten million Egyptian pounds which is obviously not amount to endanger Egyptian independence (Finance Minister Kaissouni told me same thing other day but avoided giving figure).

As regards trade with US, it of no major importance to GOE since imports from US greatly exceed exports and such cotton exports as being made are threatened by increasing production similar types in US.

Britain and France, however, had been important consumers Egyptian cotton but in 1953 they put on pressures by reducing cotton purchases, thus putting Egypt in difficult position, especially since it had been largely dependent on sterling bloc, including countries which had currencies tied to sterling, e.g. India and China.

As consequence Egypt forced resort to barter with Soviet bloc for which it had been greatly criticized but in reality there was alternative. Plan, however, had been to try limit apportionment cotton exports in principle to one third to Soviet bloc, one third to west and one third to Asia. However, after nationalization of Canal, situation made more difficult by freezing Egyptian assets. Difficult enough re American freezing but at least proceeds such rent transactions exempt whereas British and French freezing total. Thus cotton exports to Britain and France would have stopped completely except for assistance rendered by third countries acting as middle men and he specifically mentioned India, China, Germany (presumably West) and Italy.

Concluding discussion cotton, Nasser said must be realized Egypt cannot stockpile like we do but must sell currently since cotton main producer foreign exchange.

(7) Re Egyptian foreign policy it is basically one of non-alignment. This question had been debated by RCC at beginning and had been adopted on ground that any other policy would isolate government from people and probably result in popular movement to left. This was not a hostile policy but a defensive one.

(8) Re other Arab countries GOE does not give orders or exert pressure. Actually, action normally is initiated in other Arab countries as result of disagreement of people with their own political leadership and agreement with policies of Egypt. When this happens GOE feels it is appropriate to support as for example in case opposition of Jordanian people to Baghdad Pact when “we” offered assume responsibility for British subsidy. However, there is nothing covert about this policy; it is entirely straightforward.

Nasser added that only exception to his policy of letting initiative come from other Arab governments was Saudi Arabia. There he has type of relationship with King Saud where he feels he can exchange views freely without running danger of being misunderstood. Key to problem is that Saud is master in his own house whereas ideas advanced to other Arab governments inevitably become subject of contentious debate.

(9) There had been much commotion, especially emanating from Paris re the three circles of Egypt interest mentioned in his “philosophy of the revolution”, i.e., Arab countries, Muslim world and Africa, to which he had subsequently added Asia. He had not been thinking in any sense in terms of hegemony but rather of strategy, to use military term, but meaning areas with which Egypt can work without encountering serious problems. For example, countries in these areas generally supported GOE when it nationalized Canal. Also he had found he could easily find common ground with Nehru in discussing such matters as colonialism and non-alignment, although true they had differed on Israel.

(10) He had also mentioned Middle East oil in his book, but here again he had been talking in strategic terms; in terms of necessary cooperation with Western Europe, not domination by it; in terms of defense.

(11) Re Soviet Union, Egypt has no secret agreement with it and never even asked what it would do if Egypt were attacked for fear Soviets would impose conditions. Also there was [no?] consultation with Soviets before nationalization of Canal. There were, however, discussions at time of London conference.

Furthermore, there is no mutual policy with Soviets re Near East since Egypt desires maintain its complete independence of action. True that both opposed to Baghdad Pact but for different reasons.

(12) Although GOE in general policy agreement with Syria and Saudi Arabia they were not consulted re recognition Communist China nor purchase Soviet arms.

(13) Re supply Soviet arms to Syria, “Russians don’t give arms free like you Americans do”. Consequently, amount of arms Syria receiving related to Syrian financial capacity to pay. Re technicians, training, et cetera, Syria sent its trainees (air and tank) here for training by Egyptians trained in Czechoslovakia and Syrian planes also sent to Egypt for assembling by Egyptian and Soviet technicians. But before October 29 there were no Soviet technicians in Syria. He wished have this known because Turks had been putting out false information in that regard in order, he had been informed, to build up case for certain radar and anti-aircraft material which they wanted get from US.

As regards Sarraj³ he is not a Communist but a Nationalist who may well have pro-Egyptian leanings.

(14) Concerning Jordan, new Prime Minister⁴ is Nationalist who merely wants independence. Only three Communists in Parliament. Problem is that Jordan really dominated by Palestinians who violently anti-Israel and therefore put pressure on King Hussein to take same line.

(15) Re Israel, fact is that until 1955 Egypt was only country in Arab world where people were not particularly interested in Israeli problem. But today popular indifference has given way to hate and reason is Ben Gurion’s policy from Gaza attack⁵ to present. Re future he finds it difficult to see road ahead clearly. He had discussed question with us⁶ but he would now have to think over ideas he had previously expressed; situation more complicated. As he had previously told me present alternatives would seem to be continued tension, peace without a settlement, or settlement. He was inclined believe settlement now out of question but, as between continued tension and peace without settlement, he would be prepared cooperate to achieve latter. To try now for a settlement would only make things worse. Perhaps a few Arab politicians might speak to us more reassuringly but he could not do so in good faith. Who ever tried to force settlement now, even in UN, would, he believed, end up by losing out with both Arabs and Israelis. Recalling suggestion of meeting with Ben Gurion he also thought latter more interested in meeting than in bona fide effort reach agreement.

Furthermore, he did not see how Israeli problem can be settled unless related to settlement problems among Arabs themselves. Thus, as long as trouble with Iraq exists, Egypt could not take lead for fear of Iraqi exploitation and he mentioned in this connection recent anti-Israeli line of Nuri. Problem is one of fear of taking advantage. And surely neither Syria nor Lebanon could take lead despite what certain Lebanese might say confidentially.

Turning to specific points in reftel, Nasser made following comments:

(a) Cooperation in urgent clearance of Canal: He agreed and thought satisfactory progress being made. Only hitch brought to his attention had been statement by Gen. Wheeler that Ferdan Bridge had been destroyed by “explosives”. Without specifiying exactly how bridge had been destroyed, said it was Egyptian position that all destruction or sinking of ships in Canal had been result of Anglo-French attack on ground of foreseeable application of principle of action and reaction. Consequently any finding of Egyptian responsibility was a political judgment which not proper for Wheeler to make. I told him Wheeler had mentioned matter to me and he had no such intent. I had no hesitance in giving assurance Wheeler only interested in getting job done which UN had given him.

Nasser also mentioned that for public relations reasons it was desirable avoid impression UN acting entirely on its own. Canal closed and obviously should be opened soonest but GOE would like have appear it is doing its share with UN assistance. Re salvage ships he said GOE had agreed to use of British and French ships but that it could not assume responsibility for security of British and French personnel. He put it in such way that I gathered he was not necessarily putting complete prohibition on use British and French crews but rather expressing general disapproval on security grounds. I thought it prefereable, however, not attempt probe matter further in knowledge this is subject delicate negotiate for which Hammarskjold responsible.

(b) Cooperation in renewed negotiations on future Canal regime: Nasser said this was one of main points he was now studying. SC resolution prescribing 6 points had foreseen peaceful solution which GOE had looked forward to furthering at proposed October 29 meeting. But peaceful concept destroyed by Anglo-French attack and now question how proceed. Could not foresee possibility direct negotiations with British and French. He mentioned had agreed generally on Indian plan but situation now changed.

I then inquired whether correct assume GOE prepared proceed on basis SC resolution and that only difficulty one of procedure. Nasser replied position in brief is GOE ready proceed on 6 points and convention of 1888 but not by direct negotiations with British and French. Meanwhile GOE prepared observe 1888 convention.

I then asked as personal suggestion if GOE might not find it possible relax prohibition on Israeli ships in connection with Suez settlement. It is really small matter from practical standpoint but looms large in public eye. Nasser replied doubtful if this feasible since in GOE view such relaxation regarded as part of Israeli problem as whole.

(c) Place no obstacle in way fulfillment by UN force of its responsibilities: Nasser said policy is to cooperate fully as long as force not used as instrument to further bonds of colonial power as demanded by Paris and London. In that case would not cooperate. However, wants to see UNEF successful since he sees inauguration of force as possible turning point in history and GOE wants make its contribution to its success. So far he had been impressed by correct way in which UNEF had been functioning.

(d) Measures to correct Fedayeen operations: Nasser observed should differentiate between three types of forces. First is army of Palestine under Egyptian and Arab officers which responsible for defense of Gaza Strip. Second force is Fedayeen who are regularly organized and paid force of commandos who are familiar with Palestine terrain and usually operate by night. Their function is to operate inside Israel as required because of difficulty in operating directly against Israel from outside by land or air. They are normally used in order to counter Israeli border attacks such as when they were called into action last August following an Israeli attack and when the Israelis then counter-attacked at Khan Younes. Similarly they were ordered into action after the Israeli attack on Gaza. The third type composed of unorganized Arab refugees who for past ten years have been involved in struggle with Israelis, are armed, often familiar with sabotage and operate on their own initiative with personal vengeance usually being motive. These irregulars are often confused with regulars Fedayeen, most of whom escaped to Israel or Jordan during recent hostilities.

I argued strongly for curtailment of such activity as step toward easing tension but I am not sure with how much effect.

(e) Operations by Egyptian agents in violation sovereignty and authority of neighboring states: This was only point in three-hour discussion on which Nasser was overtly evasive, remarking that this was matter we had discussed before and which would not seem to require further comment. I demurred, observing that this was point which we regarded as especially important and wished that understood. Furthermore, reports reaching us from all sides indicated problem was one of real magnitude, not just few isolated incidents. Nasser then went over familiar grounds re Libya and Lebanon and said as far as Kuwait oil sabotage concerned (which I had not mentioned) first he had heard of it was in papers although he understood being attributed to him. Realizing, of course, that Nasser could not actually admit to responsibility for clandestine operations, for which he might be responsible either directly or indirectly, I took tack of emphasizing that such activities obviously contrary to policy he supported for area security and stability and that furthermore his own reputation being prejudiced by personal attribution to him. Could not he therefore use his influence to stop? Again he was evasive, asserting difficult for him go to other Arab governments with list of criticism such as I was delivering to him. Only person with whom he could talk freely on such matters was King Saud.

(f) Settlement of outstanding problems between Arab states and Israel: This covered in paragraph 15 above. Only point which Nasser added when reaching this point in his notes was to protest against scorched earth actions of Israelis in Sinai which he maintained violation of cease fire.

(g) Cessation of inflammatory radio attacks on neighboring states: Nasser said he talked about this before in discussing clandestine stations operated by British and French. I said this not point but attacks on state in area. Nasser said not aware recent attacks in any area state except Iraq and that was by way of retaliation to Iraqis who had recently put in 200 kw station for purposes; this, he admitted, real propaganda war. I observed easy start a feud of this kind but difficult stop it since necessary find something to say each day more extreme than day before although things go from bad to worse. In fact, Nasser himself had said as much to me before when, talking of setting up stations to reply to clandestine British and French transmitters, he had indicated reluctance to do so for fear of not being able foresee where would end. Without replying to this, Nasser noted that Turk radio had been launching venomous attacks on Egypt recently and that when Egyptian Chargé had sought protest Turkish Foreign Office he had not even been received. Similarly “Zafar”, a Turkish Government paper had been conducting heavy anti-Egyptian campaign. GOE did not want have trouble with Turkey but Turks apparently felt differently and GOE had therefore decided retaliate in kind. I endeavored counsel moderation.

I regret burden Department with telegram of this length, especially since much of it repetitive of previous reports, but seemed desirable do so because Nasser was obviously in thoughtful mood and foregoing is present impromptu synthesis of problems confronting him which he is now endeavoring to rethink. Also, making allowances for sensitiveness of some of questions discussed and for deviousness of Nasser’s thinking as well as his admittedly suspicious nature, his exposition believed to be just about as frank as we could expect and doubtless in his own view he felt going very far. In fact whole trend conversation, despite evasiveness on certain points, seemed indicate that in soulsearching which he is now going through importance of relationship with USG looms large. As consequence his attitude was no longer that of man on horse as when we last met but rather of one seeking to be understood even to extent at times of being actually deferential.

Incidentally, just as I was leaving Nasser said someone had recommended Washington’s Farewell Address as being interesting reading. I observed that if I remembered correctly that was the one in which reference was made to no entangling alliances. Nasser laughed (not his chronic nervous giggle) and said “Yes, that is the one.”

Distribution this telegram left to Department’s discretion but suggested be treated as noforn since possible may lead to further and more important discussions which we would not wish prejudice.⁷

Hare

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.00/12–1656. Secret; Priority. Received at 2:09 a.m., December 17. On December 18, Greene transmitted a copy of telegrams 1926, 1927 (see footnote 6 below), and 1946 (see footnote 7 below) to Goodpaster at the White House under cover of a note which reads: “The Secretary thought the President would be interested to read the attached telegrams if he has time.” (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–1856) Copies of the three telegrams are in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Eisenhower initialed the first page of telegram 1926.
2. Document 649.
3. Lieutenant Colonel ‘Abd al-Hamid Sarraj, chief of the military intelligence bureau in the Syrian Army.
4. Sulayman Nabulsi, leader of the Jordanian National Socialist Party, whose government assumed power on October 29.
5. Reference is to the Israeli attack of February 28, 1955.
6. Reported in telegram 1927, December 16, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 684a.86/12–1656)

7. In telegram 1946 from Cairo, December 18, Hare provided the Department with the following supplementary report concerning the evacuation of Port Said in his December 15 conversation with Nasser:

   “Nasser said did not know who involved on Egyptian side and GOE unable assume responsibility or intervene effectively as long as denied access to city. Said GOE would like send in an official representative as well as police reinforcements and had made request of Burns to that effect three days before.

   “I suggested that, irrespective of this jurisdictional difficulty, there must be means available GOE to get authoritative word to Port Said inhabitants preserve calm. Nasser said had endeavored use radio but was jammed. He would, however, look into further.” (Ibid., 684A.86/12–1856)