Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

658. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, December 15/16, 1956—midnight.

Delga 358. 1. Suez Clearance; 2. French-British Nationals in Egypt. Early this evening Hammarskjold requested Barco call on him at his office. He said a very delicate situation had arisen which he wanted us to know fully. He did not request any action but simply wanted us have all information which he had.

On arrival SYG’s office, Barco found Hammarskjold with Bunche, Cordier and Katzin. Hammarskjold appeared be in rather grim mood and spoke more deliberately than is his custom and with considerable show of discouragement. His comments follow:

1. Suez clearance. Hammarskjold said he had been informed earlier today by McCloy that there had apparently been agreement between the Secretary, Lloyd and Pineau in Paris to use British crews on six vessels to be retained by UN for clearance operation. McCloy also reported Black (president IBRD) had made démarche to this effect to Fawzi in Washington. Hammarskjold’s manner and tone indicated considerable concern at this development which had occurred without consultation with him and when, as he said, he had just yesterday sent to Lloyd and US a full report on his position with respect use British crews.² He had been maintaining his position in interest of a prompt and successful clearance operation only to find contrary action vis-à-vis the Egyptians had been taken without his knowledge. Hammarskjold said he had, however, put as good a face on it as he could with Fawzi, who had indicated his willingness to recommend acceptance to Egyptian government on basis this was last compromise needed for British to save face. Number of British crew had been given to Fawzi as 90 and this figure had been referred to by Fawzi in his report to Cairo.

Next step, Hammarskjold said, in this “curious picture” was an ultimatum to him at 4 pm this afternoon by Dixon (UK) adding additional conditions. Ultimatum was British would withdraw all their ships unless by 12 noon Monday New York time Egyptians agreed to retention British crews under following conditions for their protection:

• “1. Armed UN sentries in each vessel authorized to open fire not only in their defense (which is said to be existing UN rule), but to resist any hostile action towards ships’ crews;
• “2. UN land forces to cover ships from one Canal bank;
• “3. UN patrols to protect road convoy of stores, etc.”

Dixon also said number of British crew was not 90, but 162. Hammarskjold said he had told Dixon he did not see how it was possible to have an answer by Monday noon and Dixon had replied he would try to have deadline extended 24 hours.

Hammarskjold said he would be seeing Fawzi tonight and as yet simply did not know what he could say which might be helpful in getting Egyptian agreement. He would have to report the latest figure on crews and conditions which meant, in effect, UNEF would have to extend itself along 100 miles of Canal. He feared answer from Egypt would probably be that no British crews would, in these circumstances, be permitted to be retained. Hammarskjold pointed out that in his original agreement with Egypt for UN to undertake clearance operation, formula had been that Egypt requested UN to undertake job. Fawzi’s reference to “last compromise” to save British face made him fear new conditions would prove too much. Hammarskjold said as clearance operation by UN proceeded, protection measures British were now demanding would in fact have been worked out along similar lines. He feared British, by using method of ultimatum, were working up to point where they could say UN was not capable of doing the job if Egyptians now rejected their demands. British statement on their intention withdraw all ships if conditions not met by Monday noon implied sunken ships now being lifted would be dropped and it was mainly to avoid interrupting this operation that the six ships had been requested. Hammarskjold also said, throughout his discussions with British, there had been one shift after another in their position, always in direction of new conditions. He said attitudes being taken by British and French on the one hand, and Israelis on the other, had caused definite turn away from progress toward settlement larger issues.

Hammarskjold said he no longer knew when E-day for withdrawal of British-French forces would be in these circumstances. He told Dixon during their discussion this afternoon, that if things went on as they had been, there would be another withdrawal, and that would be his own.

2. Treatment of British-French nationals in Egypt. Hammarskjold said Broustra (France) had also called on him today and had maintained French insistence on GA debate Monday afternoon on treatment their nationals in Egypt. Hammarskjold said he had pointed out they could not expect a debate limited to statement by British and French and reply by Fawzi. Debate would not end there, Israelis would have their say, and Arabs and others in GA would take the matter further. He expected there would be demand for new resolutions on withdrawals and probably war damages. Broustra had stated, however, French “were not concerned about the consequences.” Broustra had admitted their demand for meeting Monday was because of debate in French Assembly on Tuesday. At same time that British were making an ultimatum on clearance operation and French were demanding debate in GA, both French and British had insisted on his going to Cairo immediately. French had said if he went today, they could then avoid debate in French Assembly. Hammarskjold said they were obviously trying to use him as a scapegoat while British based their request that he go to Cairo on the necessity of dealing with clearing problem. He had asked how they could expect him to go to Cairo on clearing problem when at same time they were demanding agreement by Monday noon, which was before he could get there. British had then referred to necessity seeking a “settlement.” Hammarskjold said he had replied that settlement was more in their hands than in anyone else’s at present time and, if he were to go anywhere for that purpose, it would be to London.

Broustra had returned later with request from Paris that SYG should announce he was going to Cairo to discuss treatment of British and French nationals in Egypt. Hammarskjold said he could certainly not make such an announcement on basis of what he now knew with respect to situation in Egypt of British-French nationals.

As to his actually going to Cairo, whatever reason the British and French might have for wanting him to do so, he had told them he would not go unless Fawzi thought it would be helpful.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/12–1556. Secret; Priority. Received at 2:09 a.m., December 16.
2. On December 14, Hammarskjöld provided the U.S. Mission in New York with a copy of a six-page memorandum which he had sent to Lloyd that day. The memorandum, written in the form of a General Assembly document, reaffirmed Hammarskjöld’s position that only three British crew members per vessel would be allowed to remain as instructors. The text was forwarded to the Department of State in Delga 348, December 14. (Ibid., 974.7301/12–1456) Delga 348 also noted that unless the United Kingdom agreed to Hammarskjöld’s position on the use of non-British/French crews, the Secretary-General planned to issue the memorandum as a U.N. document. Also, Cordier had requested on behalf of Hammarskjöld that a copy of the memorandum be forwarded to Secretary Dulles.