Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

654. Memorandum of a Conversation, Palais de Chaillot, Paris, December 14, 1956, 10 a.m.¹

USDel/MC/12

Paris , December 14, 1956, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Dillon
  • Mr. Elbrick
  • Mr. Tyler
• France
  • Foreign Minister Pineau
  • Mr. Joxe, Foreign Office
  • Ambassador Parodi

1. Mr. Pineau said that he had been informed by the Swiss that the Egyptian Government has been notifying French citizens in Egypt individually that they must leave the country by December 18.² The Egyptian Government has been careful not to publish any decree of general expulsion, but the result is the same as if it had. Mr. Pineau said that about 3,600 French citizens had already left of their own accord or been forced out. (Subsequently, Mr. Pineau told Mr. Tyler that the number of French citizens affected would come to over 12,000.)

Mr. Pineau said his Government takes a very grave view of this matter. He said that the French Government has introduced a resolution in the UN GA ³ which will come up for debate on Saturday, December 15. The French Permanent Representative, Mr. Broustra, has had a talk with the Secretary General, who showed very great concern. At this point, Mr. Pineau read from a cable he had received from New York describing the fatigue and depression of Secretary General Hammarskjold at the news of this measure by the Egyptian Government. He seemed fully aware of its gravity and reportedly said that he personally had no reason to doubt Fawzi’s good faith, but that this latest move was the result of Nasser’s “primitive character” and of the unhealthy influences at work on him. Hammarskjold is also reported to have said he would not be surprised if Mr. Fawzi were to resign in the not-too-distant future. Mr. Pineau asked for US support in the vote on the resolution. The Secretary indicated that we would want to be helpful to the French in this matter. Mr. Pineau observed that unfortunately it was not certain that the French would be able to obtain a ⅔ majority.

2. Mr. Pineau said that General Wheeler had proposed that U.K. and French salvage ships be used in clearing of the Canal with Egyptian crews. Mr. Pineau said that this was out of the question. The Secretary said a telegram had been sent to the State Department and to Ambassador Lodge in New York to say that it seemed unreasonable not to use vessels with their customary crews.⁴ Mr. Pineau said that the French would be glad to fly the UN flag on their salvage ships and that all that was necessary was to have a few UN troops on board each one. He said that the French government would even be willing to have a UN Captain for each ship, if this would help.

3. Mr. Pineau said that Prime Minister Mollet had received a personal message from Mr. Ben Gurion and had asked Pineau to show it to him confidentially. (Mr. Pineau handed the text to the Secretary of State and asked to have it back later. It has been translated separately and the original was returned to Mr. Pineau.)⁵

4. Mr. Pineau said that a Soviet trade delegation had been in Paris for about the last six months negotiating a renewal of the Franco-Soviet commercial agreements. He said that the French are very desirous of concluding the agreement which involves the importation of anthracite, manganese, and chromium. He said that the Soviet Union wanted to place an order in France for equipment for television relay stations. Mr. Pineau said that this material is on the COCOM list of strategic items. He said that there was a COCOM rule that not more than 33% of any agreement should consist of strategic materials. He said that under the present negotiations, the Soviet television order would amount to about 40% of the total agreement. He hoped that the United States would not object to this, and added that the French had tried to increase the non-strategic percentage but had not been able to do so. The Secretary said that he was not familiar with this subject and that Mr. Pineau’s request would be taken under consideration.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 828. Secret. Drafted by Tyler.

2. On December 14 in Washington, French Minister Lucet called at the Department of State to emphasize French concern on this matter. U.S. officials assured Lucet that the United States had informed Nasser of U.S. concern about this situation and the treatment of Jews in Egypt. (Gadel 67 to USUN, December 14; ibid., Central Files, 684A.86/12–1456) Also on December 14, USUN reported in Delga 347 that according to Andrew Cordier of the U.N. Secretariat, the Egyptian Government had assured U.N. officials in Egypt that further action against British and French nationals remaining in Egypt (approximately 13,000 people) was not contemplated, and consequently Hammarskjöld had advised Great Britain and France not to bring the matter before the General Assembly at this time. Cordier also maintained that facts available to the U.N. Secretariat did not substantiate rather lurid Israeli reports regarding the treatment of Jews in Egypt. (Ibid.)

   On December 15, the Embassy in Cairo in telegram 1907 forwarded a Swiss Embassy report that while the Egyptian Government had not issued a formal general order to expel British and French nationals, the Egyptian Ministry of Interior in numerous cases had refused to extend exit visas beyond December 18 and had sent remaining nationals letters advising them to leave Egypt as soon as possible. (Ibid., 684A.86/12–1556)

3. The Official Record of the General Assembly records no such draft resolution. The General Assembly did not meet on Saturday, December 15.
4. Supra .
5. Not printed. A copy of the English translation is attached to the source text. In his letter, among other points, Ben Gurion urged Mollet that he and Pineau convince Dulles that it was not too late to act to curb Nasser and to explain to Dulles the necessity of fulfilling Israeli requests concerning the U.N. forces.