653. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State1
Dulte 16. Eyes only Acting Secretary and Rountree, information only Ambassador Cairo. Distribution to be made at Acting Secretary’s [Page 1301] discretion. I have had discussions with Selwyn Lloyd re rapid clearance of canal, importance of which cannot be over-exaggerated in terms of whole European economic situation. As result these conversations I had MacArthur put to Lloyd orally following proposition, on which I said we would use our maximum influence to gain acceptance if British Government concurred. This included our influence with Secretary General Hammarskjold and Nasser because we believed proposition was both reasonable and desirable in terms speeding clearing canal. Following is proposition:
- 1.
- We agreed six of UK-French salvage vessels presently working on clearance of canal north of armistice line could be most useful in rapid clearing of canal. We believed these were UK vessels.
- 2.
- These six vessels would fly UN flag. They would be operated by present captains and crews but captains and crews would be in non-military uniforms.
- 3.
- Guns and armaments these vessels would be rendered inoperable.
- 4.
- There would be handful UN personnel on each vessel. This would give further UN color to character of vessels while engaging in clearing operation, and in sense UN personnel would be observers. They would not engage in operation of vessels but could transmit general instructions from General Wheeler as to tasks vessels were to accomplish in canal.
- 5.
- Vessels would operate under General Wheeler’s general direction in that they would carry out clearing tasks at various points in canal as directed by General Wheeler.
Lloyd said elements above proposition were not too dissimilar from what UK Government had already offered and said he accepted proposition in name of British Government.
He then asked whether six salvage vessels in question were those Wheeler had indicated he could use. We replied we could not answer specifically but would seek information this point. This however Lloyd said did not affect acceptance of proposal. He added that while he accepted proposal on basis six salvage vessels he wanted us to know he felt it was desirable to use entire UK-French salvage fleet. We replied we could not give him any encouragement on this. We also informed him we would let McCloy and our key people in Washington know of British acceptance this proposal and that while we would use our best influence to gain its acceptance, we could not of course guarantee it would be accepted.
Lloyd inquired when ships would be placed under UN control if above proposition accepted. We replied that in our view the sooner the better and if we could do this in next several days and before final British withdrawal, the better.
I believe important thing now is for us to use our maximum influence to gain acceptance of above proposal. Secretary Humphrey, [Page 1302] who is fully informed, is telephoning McCloy this evening that message is being sent you on this problem and that we want him fully to support it with Hammarskjold. (Therefore important you get substance this message to McCloy.)
I will leave it to your discretion how to press Hammarskjold on this matter. I have in mind it might be useful for Phleger to go to New York tomorrow, and with Lodge, press above proposal on Hammarskjold. When we know Hammarskjold’s reaction, on assumption he will be willing to press this strongly on Nasser, we should also be prepared have Hare urge Nasser to accept. (It also very important General Wheeler know our thinking and use all his influence with Egyptians to support this proposal).
I hope we are not crossing wires. If so, I leave decision to you.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–1456. Secret; Priority. Drafted by MacArthur. Received at 6:56 a.m. Repeated to Cairo.↩