Office of the Historian

655. Memorandum of a Conversation, Palais de Chaillot, Paris, December 14, 19561

USDel/MC/6
Paris, December 14, 1956

PARTICIPANTS

  • United States
    • The Secretary
    • Mr. MacArthur
    • Mr. Elbrick
  • United Kingdom
    • Foreign Secretary Lloyd
    • Mr. Beeley, Foreign Office
    • Mr. Dennis Laskey, Foreign Office
[Page 1305]

Mr. Lloyd said there were several matters he would like to take up with the Secretary.

1. Expulsion of French and British nationals from Egypt.

Lloyd said the Swiss had informed the French and British that the Egyptian Government intended to expel all British and French nationals by December 18. The French had informed the British that they were introducing a resolution in the General Assembly today or tomorrow, and that the British had agreed to support the French on this resolution. Lloyd said, however, that the British had made this decision reluctantly and had pointed out to the French that a debate on this subject might easily lead to a general debate on the question of withdrawal. He had, therefore, suggested that the tactics to adopt in this case would be to avoid action on the resolution for the time being, hoping that Fawzi might be induced to say something helpful in the Assembly which would obviate the necessity for such a resolution. Lloyd said he realized that nothing could be done to prevent the expulsion of French and British nationals if the Egyptians were intent upon going through with it, although they would be entitled to be indemnified by Egypt. He said that Hammarskjold had reported that Fawzi is at loggerheads with Nasser and that there were reports that Fawzi might resign. In view of the news regarding intended expulsion of French and British nationals, of the question of expropriation of British and French property, and of the complications arising in connection with the clearance of the Canal, Lloyd felt that Hammarskjold should go to Cairo as quickly as possible. The Secretary pointed out that the resolution on Hungary envisaged a visit by Hammarskjold to Moscow, but he agreed with Lloyd that Hammarskjold could probably accomplish more in Cairo. Lloyd said he hoped we would support their position on this question of expulsion and on getting Hammarskjold to Cairo quickly. The Secretary indicated sympathy for the British problem but made no commitment.

The Secretary said he thought we should not try to disguise the fact that we are going to have a difficult time with Nasser before this is over. He felt we had taken the only possible course in connection with this affair and that bad consequences were unavoidable, but he thought the time had now come when we would have to bring strong pressures to bear on Nasser. Lloyd said he thought they saw the problem the same way. However, Lloyd was concerned that sufficient account and credit had not been given to the UK and France as a result of their withdrawal.

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2. Syria.

Lloyd asked the Secretary whether the US has any influence with Syria. He said the Syrians were being “bloody” about the pipeline. He was much concerned about the effect of Syrian action on Iraq’s economy, and particularly on the position of Nuri Said. The Secretary said we are fully alive to the unsatisfactory situation in Syria and we are exerting every effort to have the pipelines in Syria repaired. There is some hope that we can accomplish this as soon as the withdrawals are complete, in view of the fact that Syria is not only short of oil under present conditions, but also money.

[Here follows discussion of matters pertaining to Libya, Jordan, the communiqué to be issued by the NATO Ministerial Meeting, and the status of the Commonwealth battalion in Korea.]

7. SCUA.

Lloyd asked if the Secretary thought SCUA could still play a useful role. The Secretary replied in the affirmative and said he had seen Bartels,2 who asked the same question. In working out a solution of the Suez problem, the Secretary thought there was a good chance of perfecting international cooperation through the Users Association, and he felt that the Association would play an essential role. He did not know, however, whether Nasser would agree, but he did feel it would be a great mistake to abandon the idea at this stage. He had told Bartels, who wanted to activate SCUA immediately, that he was not sure of the timing. Lloyd said he was glad to have the Secretary’s views and that they both saw eye to eye on the future utility of SCUA. The ways and means of using it would, however, have to be considered further.

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 828. Secret. Drafted by Elbrick.↩
  2. Dulles spoke with Bartels at 12:30 p.m. at the Embassy Residence in Paris. A memorandum of that conversation (USDel/MC/7) is ibid., CF 814.↩