Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

626. Memorandum of Discussion at the 305th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, November 30, 1956¹

Washington, November 30, 1956

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting. Vice President Nixon presided over the meeting.]

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

[Here follows a report by Allen Dulles concerning the situation in Hungary.]

Mr. [Allen] Dulles then referred to the receipt of a series of dramatic cables from Great Britain and France, describing the acute rise of anti-Americanism in these two countries in recent days. In Great Britain this sentiment was largely confined to the ranks of the Conservative Party. Obviously, however, both Britain and France were in a highly psychopathic state which promised to become worse with the onset of cold weather. The British and French will naturally tend to blame the United States, rather than themselves, for the situation in which they will find themselves. Mr. Dulles thought that Premier Mollet’s position was possibly threatened, except for the fact that no one seemed anxious at the moment to take over from him. Mendes-France was, of course, the most likely successor, but he will probably bide his time before trying to upset Mollet. The prospect of a French Government headed by Mendes-France could not be very appealing to the United States.

Feeling in most of the other NATO countries has been, up to now, strongly in favor of the policy of the United States. Of late, however, this approbation has been mixed with anxiety over the evident decline in Britain’s prestige, which many of these people believe can not but impair the prestige of Western Europe as a whole. Mr. Dulles added the parenthetical thought that our recent strong statement in support of the Baghdad Pact² seems to have had a very salubrious effect.

[Here follows discussion of Syria; for text, see volume XIII, page 606.]

With respect to the situation in Egypt, Mr. Dulles pointed out that it was apparently the intention of the British to push their operations for clearing the Suez Canal at least as far as Qantara. In fact, they have already cleared the Canal for the use of small vessels as far as this point. Meanwhile, Nasser was still playing both sides against the middle, to the considerable confusion of the Egyptian people. Outwardly, Nasser seems now to be playing down the threat of inviting in “volunteers” from the USSR. The economic situation in Egypt had deteriorated to a grave point, and Nasser has now gone far in his effort to drive out all Western and Jewish commercial interests. World reaction to these moves has been such that Nasser may well feel inclined to play them down, but he will nevertheless proceed less ostentatiously to get rid of the Jewish population of Egypt.

Nasser was still likewise negotiating for new arms from the Soviet bloc. There was very hard evidence on this point. On the other hand, his talks with the USSR in the political field have lately tended to be routine and general in character.

Mr. Dulles concluded his remarks on the situation in the Near East by a summary of the latest Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE 11–10–56, on “Soviet Actions in the Middle East”, dated November 29, 1956;³ copy filed in the minutes of the meeting).

As to the reports that the Soviet Union was prepared to supply oil from bloc sources for Europe, Mr. Dulles stated that the present indications were that the USSR is supplying approximately 90,000 barrels of oil a day to the free world. Of this total, some 50,000 barrels a day were going to Scandinavia, Finland and Iceland. The Soviet Union has indicated its willingness to supply in addition some 20,000 barrels a day to France—a rather surprising offer, in view of the existing situation. Mr. Dulles indicated that the Soviet bloc could supply considerably more crude oil to the free world if Western tankers were made available to haul the oil.

The National Security Council:⁴

Noted an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to the situation in Hungary; possible unrest in the USSR; the rise of anti-Americanism in Great Britain and France; and the situation in the Near East, including an estimate of Soviet objectives in that area.

2. Developments With Respect to the Near East Situation and Their Implications for U.S. Security (NSC Actions Nos. 1629, 1630 and 1632)⁵

Acting Secretary of State Hoover said he believed that the Council’s focus of interest at the moment centered on the United Kingdom and France. He did not believe that he could add anything to the report already made on Hungary by the Director of Central Intelligence.

Secretary Hoover stated that the current situation in London could best be grasped if he simply read portions of some of the private cables which he had received from Ambassador Aldrich. In general these cables pointed up the extreme disorganization of the British Government at the present time. As an example, Secretary Hoover then read from a cable from Ambassador Aldrich describing his appearance at No. 10 Downing Street just at the end of a meeting of the British Cabinet which decided on a withdrawal of British forces from the Suez Canal Zone.⁶ The members of the Cabinet had expressed to Aldrich their very great fear that the Conservative Government would fall as a result of the decision to comply with the demands of the United Nations on the withdrawal of British forces. Nevertheless, the decision to do so was to be made public in a statement next Monday. Butler had expressed to Aldrich his great hope that, immediately after the British Cabinet statement on Monday, a strong U.S. statement of support would be issued. Secretary Hoover added that the State Department was currently engaged in drafting such a statement of support, but it was not yet possible to present it in its final form.

The situation in Paris was also extremely difficult. The French had abruptly changed their tactics in a fashion which it was difficult for us to understand. A few days ago the French were eagerly urging the British to agree to withdraw the allied forces from the Canal Zone; but now they have suddenly become very intractable in the opposite direction. As an illustration of the state of mind in Paris, Secretary Hoover read from a fairly lengthy and highly pessimistic cable sent by Ambassador Dillon just before he left Paris.⁷ Secretary Hoover speculated that Ambassador Dillon might have been a little too alarmist in this message.

Secretary Hoover observed that Secretary Dulles, in his conversations on this matter, tended to feel that while it was unfortunate that the British and French seemed to be turning so bitterly against us, such an attitude was perfectly natural and logical. It was simply the result of complete and utter frustration. While this was regrettable, Secretary Dulles did not believe the development was alarming or that it foreshadowed any basic split between the United States on the one hand and Britain and France on the other. On the contrary, what was going on was essentially a violent family squabble, but not one which was likely to end in a divorce. Secretary Hoover commented that this view of Secretary Dulles was one which was apparently shared by practically everyone in the U.S. Government. He added further that the people of Great Britain were obviously very “rattled”. This was not only true of British officials at home, but in Washington and in the United Nations, where all kinds of charges and accusations were constantly springing up. Evidence of the unsettled state of British officialdom was the approach of Kirkpatrick, the Permanent Under Secretary of the British Foreign Office, to Donald Cook, the representative of the New York Herald Tribune in London. In a conversation on Wednesday, Kirkpatrick had stated to Cook that the Conservative Government would almost certainly fall on Monday if it agreed to the UN demand for withdrawal, and that a general election in Great Britain would take place about the first of January. Other statements were made of an equally pessimistic and threatening nature. Secretary Hoover said that while he thought this might well be simply a means of trying to get U.S. support for the Conservative Government, Cook himself was so shaken by what Kirkpatrick had told him, that he had decided not to write for his newspaper the story based on this conversation.

Secretary Hoover went on to say that what we were witnessing at the present time was a very rare phenomenon for the United Kingdom. It was nothing less than a decision for complete reversal of a disastrous policy in the very middle of a crisis and without involving any change of the party at the head of the Government. If this reversal actually works, it will be a masterful stroke by Butler. Secretary Hoover asked Secretary Humphrey if he did not agree with this appraisal, and Secretary Humphrey said he did.

Secretary Hoover then pointed out that a delegation would be going to the NATO meeting in Paris which opened on December 10. Secretary Dulles has been preparing for this meeting, which will be perhaps the most important one ever held. He was hopeful that by this time the situation in the United Kingdom and in France would have been clarified if not actually resolved.

Turning to the Middle East, Secretary Hoover indicated that the immediate problems facing the United States in that area were three. First, to provide oil and financial support to the Western European states. This subject he said he would leave for later comment by Secretary Humphrey and Dr. Flemming. The second immediate problem was to get the Suez Canal cleared of its obstructions and the oil pipelines repaired. The third problem was to find ways and means, once the British and French have committed themselves to withdrawal from the Canal Zone, to support the Western position in the Middle East. Once our hands are freed by an Anglo-French withdrawal, we will be able to proceed to measures to this end which we have not been able to use up to now. We have a great many things in mind to propose when the time for action is at hand. For example, Ambassador Lodge has been considering several UN resolutions designed to deal with the serious threat in Syria. One such resolution calls for the admission of UN forces into Syria to oversee the restoration of the pipelines. There were also a variety of longer-term U.S. proposals which Secretary Hoover said he would not go into at this meeting. He then indicated that this was the substance of his report.

Secretary Wilson said it seemed clear enough to him that the time was at hand when somebody would have to tell Nasser to quit throwing his weight around. Particularly, we have got to insist that the Suez Canal be cleared of obstructions and opened up at once. Somehow or other we here do not seem to realize fully what is going to happen in Western Europe this winter.

Secretary Humphrey commented that the possibilities, for good and for evil, which could come out of the present situation were such that they could scarcely be exaggerated. The range was complete from great success to genuine disaster. In Britain, he pointed out, there was now going on a terrific fight between the two wings of the Conservative Party. It was touch-and-go whether the Victorians or the Moderns would end up in control of the Tory Party. If the Modern Conservative element did not win out over the old-fashioned element, the Conservative Government was likely to fall and we would be facing a meeting of the NATO Council in December under the shadow of a general election in England in January. What would happen to NATO under these circumstances was certainly impossible to predict. Thus anything that the United States can do to help the Conservatives through their difficulties and to work out an acceptable Middle East settlement, we certainly ought to be prepared to do. In short, the minute that the British Cabinet acts next Monday and states its compliance with the UN order to withdraw, this Government should be prepared to give Butler everything that he asks of us in the statement he makes on Monday. Similarly, we should make crystal clear our own attitude toward Nasser. We should make it plain that we will be just as tough with him, if he remains unreasonable, as we have been with the British and the French. He must be made aware that he is obliged, as were the British and the French, to comply fully with the terms of the UN Resolution. The UN Resolution prepares the groundwork for a fair settlement of the problems of the Middle East. To secure compliance with it we should be prepared to use our whips on both sides.

Secretary Hoover said that he had long felt that once the British and French had clearly made a commitment to withdraw from the Suez Canal Zone, the whole world could be expected to turn against Nasser if he did not change his tactics. Secretary Humphrey said that he was in 100% agreement with Secretary Hoover, and that he believed we should tolerate no monkey-business from Nasser once the British and French had complied with the UN Resolution.

Secretary Wilson warned that in all essentials the monkey was presently going to come off the back of the British and be put on our own back. It would be our job, in short—not the Anglo-French job—to compel Nasser to behave himself and to comply with the wishes of the United Nations.

The Vice President inquired whether this Government could not do anything to assist the Conservatives prior to Monday. He expressed himself as scared to death at the prospect of Nye Bevan in a position of power in a future British Government.

Dr. Flemming said that with respect to the oil situation most of the discussion in his Committee of late had turned upon the timing as to when to put the Middle East emergency plan into action. Messrs. Hoover, Humphrey, Admiral Radford, Governor Adams, himself, and others, had had a meeting late yesterday.⁸ The result was a decision to recommend to the President that we announce at noon today that we were putting our emergency plan into action to get oil to Europe. Within 48 to 72 hours thereafter, Dr. Flemming predicted, we would begin to see considerable results from the pooling of resources and tankers by the oil companies. Great improvements in the shipping of oil to Europe would be visible a week or two thereafter. In fact, the oil companies believe that by thus pooling their resources, shipping efficiency will be increased some 25%. Dr. Flemming then provided the National Security Council with other details of the work of his Committee, including its work with the State Commissions, especially Louisiana and Texas. He concluded by stating that once the green light is given, much more oil will be made available to the Western European countries.

The Vice President inquired whether Dr. Flemming proposed to announce the implementation of the Middle East emergency plan at a press conference. Dr. Flemming replied that the announcement would be made through a press release to be made at noon today. Secretary Wilson asked to be cut in on the conference with the public relations people which would follow the press release. Secretary Hoover pointed out that only ODM and State were to comment on the contents of the press release. Dr. Flemming then summarized the statement which would be given out at 12 noon.⁹

Governor Adams broke in to state that the President had been talking with Secretary Dulles, and that Secretary Hoover would be asked to listen to a statement which it was proposed that the President would make. The Presidential statement would deal with the situation in the general context of the continued validity of our alliance with Great Britain and France. Accordingly, there may be this Presidential statement in addition to the statement issued by Dr. Flemming.

Secretary Hoover said that the proposal for the additional Presidential statement gave him some concern. At the very least, it was a calculated risk. A strong statement by the President on the alliance could be taken by the British and French as an indication that they need not get out of Egypt too quickly, and also might alienate the Arab world. Secretary Hoover said he believed that the President ought therefore to save his fire for the period after the British Cabinet made its announcement of withdrawal next Monday.

Secretary Humphrey commented that, as Admiral Radford had stated yesterday, we are all taking a risk on this statement to be issued by Dr. Flemming. If Dr. Flemming issues his statement at noon and the Arabs blow up the Tapline at six o’clock in the evening, we shall be in a terrible position. Indeed, the United States might find itself obliged to invade Syria in order to restore the sabotaged Tapline. Secretary Hoover replied that the United States was scarcely in a position to invade any Arab country in the light of the position that we had taken on the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt. Secretary Humphrey said that in any case he agreed with Secretary Hoover that the proposed Presidential statement should not be issued until after Monday. Governor Adams pointed out that the President’s statement addressed itself not so much to the specific situation in the Suez Canal as it did to the general situation and the validity of the alliance. Actually, he added, he had not been in on the discussion of this statement between the President and the Secretary of State, and had not seen the text. He said, however, that we would know what the text contained very shortly.¹⁰

Admiral Radford said he wished to give expression to his very great concern about the situation of Britain and France. The blocking of the Canal was a matter of the gravest import to these countries. While we did not actually know the precise extent to which the Canal had been damaged, we feel that it could probably be cleared a good deal faster than many of the current estimates. Unfortunately, as yet Nasser has not permitted anyone to survey the situation in the Canal as a whole. Accordingly, Admiral Radford recommended that if the President did make the proposed statement, he should add to it a statement that he was sending our top U.S. salvage men to survey the entire Suez Canal. Such a statement would have a very salutary effect, not only in Britain and France, but on Nasser himself. Essentially, the opening of the Canal is being blocked by the Russians. The Canal is the key to the situation both of Europe and of the Far East. A prompt move to open the Canal would have the support of the entire United Nations once the British and French were out. Accordingly, we should force Nasser to permit representatives of U.S. salvage concerns to survey the entire Canal.

Secretary Wilson said he would go even further than Admiral Radford. He believed that we could not permit Nasser to take a single additional negative position or action. We had been more than a little naive in our appraisal of Nasser and his objectives. Our position with respect to the British and the French had been “pure”, but the time had now come when we must take over the burden of the British and the French in dealing with Nasser. Mr. Allen Dulles interrupted to warn that Nasser would be hard to deal with, and that if we pushed him he might threaten to turn to the Soviets. Secretary Wilson went on to say that, nevertheless, the time had come to take a strong position with Nasser and to force him to quit his obstructionist tactics. Admiral Radford added his conviction that Nasser was currently engaged in giving the United States and the West the “grand double-cross”. He again called for forcing Nasser’s hand, especially in the matter of the survey of the Canal by U.S. salvage teams.

Secretary Humphrey expressed his complete agreement with Admiral Radford on the behavior of Nasser and on the need for a prompt clearing of the Suez Canal. On the other hand, he pointed out, Hammarskjöld had just gotten together a survey group which was to survey the entire reaches of the Canal. This group was about to depart for Egypt, and everything depended on how it was received there. Thus, the fat was in the fire, and perhaps our best course was to try to proceed to have the Canal surveyed under the auspices of the UN group, at least until we are sure that Nasser will refuse entry of the Hammarskjöld survey group into the Canal Zone. Admiral Radford stated that officially, in any case, the United States must lend all possible weight to a survey by salvage teams and subsequently to the prompt reopening of the Canal. With this Secretary Humphrey expressed agreement, and Admiral Radford stated that Admiral Burke believed that with a vigorous program headed by U.S. experts, the Canal could be opened up to navigation in perhaps 60 days.

Secretary Wilson observed that if the British Government backed down and withdrew their forces from the Canal, as they seemed likely to do, we should realize how very difficult this decision had been for them and how handsomely they were trying to behave. Above all, we should be clear that it will then be up to us to take over and assert the position of the West vis-à-vis Nasser and the Soviets. Admiral Radford pointed out that some sort of U.S. official call for the prompt opening of the Canal would doubtless be of great assistance to the British when they made their statement of their decision to withdraw on Monday.

The Vice President then inquired as to the timetable of proposed actions by the British Government. Secretary Humphrey replied that the timetable now called for the Cabinet to make the public statement of the withdrawal on Monday next. This would be followed by a vote of confidence on a movement for censure on Wednesday in Parliament. The Vice President commented that we were thus essentially engaged in trying to shore up Butler. Secretary Humphrey said that this was the case.

Mr. Jackson reminded the Council that Secretary Hoover had omitted making any reference to the British financial problem in his report, on the assumption that Secretary Humphrey would deal with this matter. Perhaps the time had now come in the discussion to hear from Secretary Humphrey on this point.

Secretary Humphrey stated that in point of fact the financial aspects of Britain’s problem were even more serious than her physical situation. The British reserves were falling very rapidly. Even some slight indication of a run on currency could spell disaster for Great Britain. We are prepared to handle the situation and to help them get themselves back in shape. We are certainly going to see them through. Secretary Wilson said that he was glad to hear this, but believed that it would be wiser for our help to be extended to the British through the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, rather than directly. Secretary Humphrey assured Secretary Wilson that this was precisely what we were proposing to do.

The Vice President said that we had been talking a great deal about public statements by this Government. Should we not also give private assurances to the British Government as to our proposed financial assistance? Such assurances would help them through their difficult situation next Monday. Secretary Humphrey said that we had already given such assurances, and went on to state that the right people in the British Government know of our plans to assist them.

Admiral Radford again called for a public statement by the United States Government assuring that the Suez Canal would promptly be cleared and open to navigation. He believed that such a pronouncement would be of real assistance to the British in carrying through with their own statement on Monday. Secretary Humphrey said he had misgivings over this proposal, as he had earlier said. If we can just keep from rocking the boat and from getting ants in our pants over the next 48 hours, we can go all out in stating what we are going to do to get the Canal back into operation. He said he still had anxiety about making such statements prior to the British statement on Monday. The Vice President then countered with the possibility of a public statement offering Hammarskjöld U.S. salvage experts. To this, likewise, Secretary Humphrey expressed uncertainty. After all, he pointed out, we are merely talking about a matter of timing—a mere matter of 48 hours. If we can hold out for 48 hours more, and the British make their statement, we can then go ahead full steam with respect to the Canal. But meanwhile, if, under UN auspices, a move is on foot to prepare the opening of the Canal, we should not complicate the development by any additional suggestions or statements.

Assistant Secretary of State Bowie, who had replaced Acting Secretary Hoover as spokesman for the State Department, expressed his support for the views of Secretary Humphrey. He believed that an American announcement with respect to the clearing of the Canal, coming immediately after the British statement on Monday, would not only be the best way to bring pressure on Nasser, but would also be timely in reinforcing Butler’s hand and keeping the Conservative rebels in check.

Governor Stassen said that he wished to give his full support to the main points made thus far in the discussion by Secretary Humphrey and Secretary Wilson as well. He was sure that we must provide quick support to Butler; that is, just as soon as the British Government issued its statement on Monday, we should be prepared to meet fully and quickly the requirements which Butler would levy upon us for our support and assistance. And, as Secretary Wilson had argued, we must follow this statement of support for Butler with strong and firm insistence that the Arab countries and Nasser behave themselves in a reasonable and constructive way. Governor Stassen then said that he had an additional point which he believed that he ought to make at this time. That is, we must be prepared to check any move by Nasser in turning toward the USSR. In order to prevent such a move, we must be ready to take the firmest possible kind of stand against Soviet intervention in either Egypt or Syria. We must say, as we had said in the matter of the Chinese Communist threat to the offshore islands, “You just can’t move into this picture.” If we did not issue as firm a warning to the Soviets now as we had issued to the Chinese Communists then, we would not end up with a livable world situation. Our vital interests were involved in the Middle East, and we should make this clear to the Soviet Union, which was, after all, the real aggressor in the existing situation.

Admiral Radford said that he couldn’t agree more heartily with Governor Stassen’s point, and said that we must indeed take a firm position vis-à-vis the USSR if the Soviets suggest the sending of troops to Syria or of large numbers of technicians to Egypt. Governor Stassen pointed out that the step he had in mind, with which Admiral Radford had agreed, should be accomplished under the auspices of the United Nations. In short, the United States should take a firm stand backing UN action with respect to Soviet intervention.

The Attorney General commented that the suggestion made by Governor Stassen seemed to him to call for a special session of Congress. Admiral Radford said that in his view the Congressional Resolution with respect to Formosa had actually prevented a war in the Far East. So, likewise, a Congressional Resolution conferring similar powers on the President to deal with the Soviets in the Middle East might have the similar result of preventing a world war.

Secretary Humphrey observed that we seemed to be looking a little too far ahead, perhaps, although he said he admitted that we might ultimately have to go “the whole way”. Much depended on the events of the next few days.

Governor Stassen then expressed his agreement with Secretary Humphrey that if this Government did too much in support of the British prior to the Monday statement by the British Government, the result might be to make it harder for Butler to line up the Conservative Party behind the Monday statement of British withdrawal from the Suez Canal. On the other hand, as soon as the British statement was issued on Monday, this Government should be prepared to go all out to support Butler, so that he could be sure of winning his vote of confidence in Parliament on Wednesday. Mr. Bowie expressed his agreement that, once the British and the French had announced their departure decision, all possible heat should be turned on Nasser. This should be done not only by the United States and the Western powers, but by those Arab states who have had many private complaints against Nasser but who have been unable to express their hostility to Nasser because of the Anglo-French aggression against one of their number, Egypt.

Mr. Allen Dulles stated his general agreement with Mr. Bowie’s point. He also expressed once again his extreme distrust of Nasser, and his conviction that we would need to mobilize all our resources to make the Egyptian dictator behave himself and to proceed with clearing the Canal.

The National Security Council:¹¹

Discussed current and pending developments with respect to the Near East and their implications for U.S. security, in the light of:

a. An oral report by the Acting Secretary of State on the current situation in the United Kingdom and France; and immediate problems with respect to the Near East situation, particularly the European oil supply position, the opening of the Suez Canal and the oil pipelines, and future measures in support of the Western position in the Near East.

b. An oral report by the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, on recent developments regarding the European oil supply position, and the method of putting into operation on this date the plan of action of the Middle East Emergency Committee.

c. An oral report by the Secretary of the Treasury on the financial aspects of the European oil supply position.

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on November 30.
2. For text of the statement, issued as a press release on November 29, see Department of State Bulletin, December 19, 1956, p. 918. Documentation on the Baghdad Pact is scheduled for publication in volume XII.
3. Not printed here; scheduled for publication in volume XII.
4. The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1638, approved by the President on December 5. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council, 1956)
5. Regarding NSC Action Nos. 1629 and 1630, see footnotes 3 and 9, Document 554. Regarding NSC Action No. 1632, see footnote 3, Document 577.
6. Reference is to telegram 3018, Document 622.
7. Reference is presumably to telegram 2649, November 28, not printed. In this telegram, Dillon reported that the French reaction to France’s deteriorating international position was one of frustration, humiliation, and rage and that the favorite scapegoats in France for recent adversities were the United Nations and the United States. Dillon warned that if the French were exposed to a substantial number of further “humiliations” over the coming months, they were capable of quitting the United Nations and NATO and retiring into a neutralist isolation from which they would hope to make separate deals with the Soviet Union. (Department of State, Central Files, 751.00/11–2856)
8. Sherman Adams indicates in his memoirs that he attended, as a representative of President Eisenhower, several meetings dealing with the oil question in later November 1956. For Adams’ account of the meetings which resulted in the decision presented to the NSC on November 30, see Firsthand Report, The Story of the Eisenhower Administration (New York: Harper & Brother, 1961), pp. 262–270. No accounts of these meetings have been found in Department of State files or the Eisenhower Library.
9. See circular telegram 451, Document 624.
10. The text of the White House statement, announcing activation of the MEEC plan, appeared in The New York Times, December 1.
11. The following paragraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1639, approved by the President on December 5. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council, 1956)