625. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State1
Delga 231. Re Palestine/Suez. Eban, Rafael and Kidron (Israel) called on me at their request. They came to inform me of conversation with SYG concerning expediting arrangements for “agreed withdrawal”. [Page 1216] Eban said it was their aim to do everything possible to use UNEF to assure that UNEF, not Nasser, came into certain sensitive areas, and in order avoid Nasser’s laying basis for future hostile activities against Israel. Eban had asked SYG what his plans were concerning phasing of withdrawal and functioning of UNEF.
- 1.
- First problem area was Gulf of Aqaba, islands at mouth, and strip on Peninsula overlooking them. By having UNEF take over in islands and mainland strip it would be possible for waterway to be kept open so long as UNEF remained. Eban asked SYG what chances were of getting agreement to have UNEF take over there, pending some arrangement to assure open waterway through Gulf of Aqaba. He said SYG felt something might later be worked out. Now it would not be possible, UNEF not now in sufficient strength to go there. Hence SYG favored accelerating Israeli withdrawal elsewhere and coming back to this later. Eban pointed out, in this connection, that Israel did not share UK view that there has to be numerical relationship between UNEF and Anglo-French forces. He also said Israel not concerned about evacuating two islands if UNEF can take over in strip dominating entrance to gulf. Eban said Hammarskjold took position that wherever UNEF went Egyptian forces were not to follow. Thus, if UNEF can take over at entrance to gulf, there will be no Egyptian forces, and consequently no firing upon Israeli shipping. Hammarskjold was reported to have told Eban that he would make a proposal regarding this area in last stages of withdrawal operation.
- 2.
- Situation in Gaza. Eban admitted that conditions there had been bad in first week Israeli occupation. He said present emphasis was now on civilian services, and that Israelis had linked up electricity and water in Gaza with supply lines from Israel. They were establishing “local based” civilian authority—using local Arabs. Eban said Hammarskjold had agreed, in view of complexities of Gaza situation, that it would be wise defer question withdrawal from Gaza to later stage also. He had urged Israelis to refrain from making statements concerning their long range ambitions re Gaza. He had pointed out there were very serious legal problems connected with status of Gaza.
- 3.
- Sinai. Eban said their aim was to get out of Sinai quickly. It was “bleak, hot and waterless”—“thoroughly unpleasant” to keep an army there and consequently understandable why Egyptians had not put up better fight. He said it was Israel’s aim to avoid reconstruction of Soviet base in Sinai as well as underground depot. They favored ultimate establishment of buffer zone between Israel and Egypt. Hammarskjold had in mind establishing UNEF only in key positions in Sinai and having Egyptian and Israeli troops out completely. This was satisfactory to Eban.
Eban said Hammarskjold had in mind working on Sinai situation after Port Said had been completely taken care of. UNEF could then move into Sinai and, under Hammarskjold’s theory, Egypt could not. UNEF would thus act as shield between two countries. This, however, raised in Eban’s mind question of duration of UNEF. He feared that once Nasser was satisfied British and French forces completely withdrawn, he would turn upon UNEF to try to get them out. Eban strongly argued that control of duration of UNEF in Egypt must not be left in Nasser’s hands, but was matter for UNGA to decide.
I interrupted at that point to ask whether Israel really feared Egyptian offensive capabilities. Eban answered: “Frankly no, as far as Egypt alone is concerned.” What Israel does fear is Soviet role, particularly in developing Syrian situation.
Continuing, Eban reported Hammarskjold as stating, in view delicacy present situation, certain amount of “calculated ambiguity” had to be accepted. Over next several months while UNEF was functioning, there would be opportunity work out future arrangements.
Eban then came to specific request Hammarskjold made of them. He said Israel planned to take out equivalent of one more brigade shortly, leaving their forces in Sinai “very thin”. Hammarskjold had requested that they announce “very soon” that there were no Israeli forces at all near Canal. Hammarskjold had in mind that, as soon as Port Said situation clarified, and Israeli forces were then considerable way back into Sinai from Canal, UNEF could be moved into area between Canal and westernmost Israeli positions. This plan of Hammarskjold’s was linked to Canal clearance operation which could then begin in earnest. Eban said he had recommended to Foreign Office Israel agree to announcement requested.
Hammarskjold had also asked them not to say anything regarding nature of their discussions with him. All of above Eban wanted us to know confidentially.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–2956. Secret; Priority. Received at 10:43 p.m.↩