627. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Israeli Ambassador (Eban) in New York and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) in Washington, November 30, 19561
Ambassador Eban telephoned me from New York to say that he was seriously concerned over the implications which were being drawn from our statement on the Baghdad Pact,2 which included a declaration that any threat to the members of the Pact would be viewed by the United States with the utmost gravity. The assumption was being made widely by members of the press and in the U.N. that this statement, having excluded any reference to Israel, connoted a different attitude with respect to that country.
On the other hand, the Ambassador said, Israel was being subjected to most alarming threats by several countries, particularly the Soviet Union. The Soviet threats included the very extinction of Israel. The U.S. had stated its policy regarding Israel on various occasions in the past, but Israel most earnestly desired a renewed statement in the context of the present situation which would leave no doubt regarding our attitude. He thought that “not many hours” could be allowed to elapse before such a statement was made. He was considering how this might be handled procedurally. He had thought of sending a formal communication to the Department asking for clarification of its position and attitude regarding the security of Israel. He was also considering taking the Soviet threat immediately to the Security Council, where the U.S. representative would have an opportunity to state the American position regarding Israel’s security. However it was handled, he must insist that our attitude be made known publicly with the least possible delay.
I told the Ambassador that the statement which we had made yesterday was confined to the Baghdad Pact and its specific purpose was to set forth the U.S. attitude toward the Pact and its members. As he knew, the U.S. had been urged to join the Pact and a number of public statements had been made in this regard by members of the Pact. The statement did not intend nor could it be construed as intending to set forth the U.S. attitude toward the security of any countries which were not members of the Pact itself. The question of the U.S. attitude toward Israel was therefore an entirely separate matter. I would of course take the request under advisement but I could not comment further at this time.
[Page 1231](Note: It should be noted in this connection that a primary objective of Israeli policy at the present time appears to be to elicit a statement of U.S. support for Israel; every conceivable pressure will be applied by the Israelis to obtain such a statement.3 This is of course a matter with which we will have to deal with utmost caution, not because there is any doubt regarding our general support for the State of Israel but because we cannot permit ourselves to be maneuvered into a position of appearing to support Israel in the context of current situation which it has brought about for itself in Egypt. Mishandling of this matter could do irreparable damage to the whole American position in the current controversy and seriously diminish our effectiveness in dealing with the problem.)
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–3056. Secret. Drafted by Rountree.↩
- See footnote 2, supra.↩
- Also on November 30, Reuven Shiloah handed Rountree a note to Dulles from Eban requesting urgent public clarification of the U.S. Government attitude on the question of the preservation of Israeli independence against any possible aggression. (Memorandum of conversation by Rockwell, November 30; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–3056) On December 3, Eban wrote to Dulles concerning the Israeli request for a U.S. statement and attached a copy of the November 30 note. (Ibid., 611.84A/12–356)↩