596. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, November 20, 1956, 5:30 p.m.1
OTHERS PRESENT
- Secretary Humphrey
- Secretary Hoover
- Colonel Goodpaster
Mr. Humphrey referred to cables from the United Kingdom indicating the possibility of a Cabinet change,2 and commented that, in his opinion, Butler would be the stronger of the two men being mentioned. The President said he has always thought most highly of Macmillan, who is a straight, fine man, and so far as he is concerned the outstanding one of the British he served with during the war.
Mr. Hoover showed the President a memorandum3 that had been drafted in State concerning the next steps in the Suez matter affecting Britain. He and the President thought the United States might say that the day the British agree to start withdrawing at once, Under Secretary Burgess will be over to see how the financial and economic problems can be faced.
Mr. Humphrey said he had made a study of what could be done to help financially if we were to decide to do so. The French can, through taking out their money in the World Bank and borrowing the same amount in addition, obtain about $260 million. The UK can obtain $560 million by the same method. The Export-Import Bank could establish a credit of $600 million with which the British could pay for exports from the United States to Britain. He said the British should definitely not go to U.S. banks to try to obtain the $600 million they want. There is not that much free money, and their attempt would simply throw the financial community into disorder. He indicated that the other countries in Western Europe (except for Italy to which some help could be given), are in good shape dollar-wise.
Mr. Hoover said that Ambassador Brosio had been in to see him, and had asked for the oil coming through the Tapline for Italy. Mr. Hoover had told him he understood the OEEC was working on the basis of share and share alike, both as regards oil and dollar burden.
Mr. Humphrey said that the key point in his mind was that we are in position to supply the “fig leaf” which the British say they [Page 1167] need to cover their nakedness in withdrawing from the Suez. We can furnish dollars to meet stringent needs, providing they start to get out of the Suez at once.
The President thought that if we have confirmed that such help on our part would be acceptable to the Saudi-Arabians and to the Egyptians, we could say publicly that we would help out as soon as the French and the British agree to start getting out of Suez at once. Mr. Humphrey thought we should simply indicate this in an informal way to the British now, rather than publicly. The President thought we should say to Saud that as soon as the British and French start getting out, we would like to know that he is agreeable to our trying to restore the situation (including restoring his European markets). Mr. Hoover said we had better wait for the start of the British and French out-movement. To approach Saud now may be too early. He said that the problem is now one of delicate timing, and the President and Mr. Humphrey strongly agreed.
The President thought that Mr. Hoover should tell Aldrich of the sequence that is shaping up in our mind, and suggested that he advise Butler or Macmillan to get on the phone with Humphrey or Hoover tomorrow, and that the latter tell what could be done if the United States so decides—and if the British and French promptly move to settle the Suez situation. Mr. Humphrey said we could say generally that we will be glad to supply the fig leaf and to support them financially.
The President said the sequence as he saw it was as follows: First, we are ready to talk about help as soon as the pre-condition (French and British initiation of withdrawal) is established; second, on knowing that the British and French forces will comply with a withdrawal undertaking at once, we would talk to the Arabs to obtain the removal of any objections they may have regarding the provision of oil to Western Europe; third, we will then talk the details of money assistance with the British.
Mr. Hoover questioned whether the British might not have another idea in mind when they speak of the “fig leaf.” They might want us to take the responsibility for obtaining some satisfaction internationally which they can then offer as their reason for leaving the Canal. Mr. Humphrey thought that if they have the idea we are receptive to a request for help that is all they are looking for. The President said we can simply couch our statement along the lines “on the assumption stated by Macmillan (that is, that they will announce at once an immediate withdrawal) they can be assured of our sympathetic consultation and help.” Also that Macmillan can meet with him on that assumption. There was discussion as to how this could be conveyed to the British, considering the unknown relationship as between Butler and Macmillan at the present time. [Page 1168] The President thought we could, through Aldrich, ask the Foreign Office to present the matter to the Government. The possibility of having Aldrich advise Macmillan and Butler together, privately, was also discussed. Mr. Humphrey thought we should try to find out from Aldrich whether he could meet with both without embarrassment. The President thought we could simply tell Aldrich we would assume that he could give the message to Butler and Macmillan. At this point the President put in a phone call for Aldrich. In further discussion, the President said we must keep the whole development on the basis of “their assumptions,” not introducing conditions of our own. He saw merit in Burgess making the trip, and Mr. Hoover agreed.
The President and the others saw the possibility of some blessings in disguise coming to Britain out of this affair, in the form of impelling them to accept the common market. The President said that Bech of Luxemburg, for whom he has the highest regard of any European statesman, said that if the EDC had come into existence when planned he felt sure there would have been no Suez problem, and no European problem now.
At this point the President’s phone call to Aldrich came through, and the President asked him if he could talk to Butler and Macmillan, (Aldrich apparently said he could) and mentioned the possibility of Burgess making a trip in the next day or two.4
After the phone call Mr. Humphrey said that we must talk to the Arabs soon, and tell them that we are putting great pressure on trying to get the troops out of Suez and we need their agreement to actions to bolster up Europe after this is done—a selling job needs to be done, in which we would point out that the effect of our action is to re-establish their oil markets. He also wondered whether we could not approach Nasser and tell him that he will not get value out of the Canal as long as it cannot be used in confidence. Great efforts will be made to circumvent its use. He must re-establish confidence, and this can only be done through some acceptable form of international control. He could then increase his tolls and improve his income. Mr. Hoover said that the Canal income will be taken up in paying off the Canal Company, and in widening and deepening it. He did not think Nasser could be relied upon in any way. He said in fact that before this attack occurred the other Arab leaders were [Page 1169] beginning to turn against him. The President recalled how he has stressed the importance of building up King Saud.
Mr. Hoover finally pointed out that if the British and French withdraw, Nasser must then come to an agreement with the UN, or the whole world would turn on him.
Colonel, CE, US Army
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on November 21.↩
- See telegrams 2791 and 2814, Documents 588 and 593.↩
- Not printed. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series) Much of the contents of the memorandum were sent to London in telegram 3631, infra.↩
- In this conversation, which began at 6:15 p.m., Eisenhower instructed Aldrich to bring Butler and Macmillan together informally and to tell them that “we are interested and sympathetic, and, as soon as things happen that we anticipate, we can furnish ‘a lot of fig leaves.’” Eisenhower also asked whether this approach would “be enough to get the boys moving?” Aldrich responded that he thought it would be. (Transcript of telephone conversation prepared in the Office of the President; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)↩