597. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1
3631. Eyes only Ambassador from Acting Secretary. Re the President’s telephone conversation with you this evening, he suggests you should see Macmillan and Butler together tomorrow, informing them we have sincere sympathy and understanding for UK financial difficulties and would like to be of assistance. However, if we undertook commitments before UK and French forces are withdrawn, we would be in the position of going back upon a matter of major principle, which we had no alternative but to adopt. We would also feel that there should be some hope of a prompt solution to the Suez Canal problem on basis of an agreement which is both reasonable and obtainable. The purpose of your talk with them tomorrow would not be to reach an agreement but primarily to let them know we are most sympathetic with their position which you have outlined in your wires. Obviously we consider the British our close friends and allies. (It is of utmost importance that substance of your talk with Macmillan and Butler be not divulged. Any leaks could have profoundly adverse effect on our ability to help and on outcome present delicate situation in the UN.)
FYI We also have in mind possibility of sending Randolph Burgess to London so you and he could have private talk with Macmillan and Butler (in view UK domestic political situation we believe you should see Macmillan and Butler together). Since Burgess visit could not be kept secret we would have to decide what could be said in response to queries as to purpose visit. Re tactics we [Page 1170] thought you might give informal dinner following which discussions could take place. This would give appearance of informal and partly social meeting and thus perhaps avoid creating impression in minds certain Arab-Asians notably Egyptians that we preparing give financial support to UK when they and French have not complied with UN Resolution re withdrawal of troops. It would be made clear to British in advance that purpose of visit is not conduct negotiations but to discuss difficult UK financial situation and ascertain in some detail their plans for meeting it.
You and Burgess would make clear while we have sympathy for UK financial plight, our ability assist dependent upon UK and French compliance with UN Resolution as well as nature and extent UK financial requirements. Similarly it would be pointed out our ability help Britain also dependent upon working out promptly solution to Suez Canal problem so oil on which their economy so heavily dependent can flow uninterruptedly on basis of agreement which is reasonably dependable and reasonably attainable. Would say we understand Lloyd has informed Hammarskjold UK would accept as basis for agreement memo which UN SYG gave Egyptian FonMin Fawzi and was accepted by him with one reservation. This important since it clear peaceful solution Suez Canal issue on basis Menzies proposal, rejected by Egypt, is not obtainable.
To summarize, you and Burgess would make clear while we sympathetic, our ability to aid depends in final analysis on constructive action by Britain re immediate problems with which they are faced. Therefore in addition to info you would hope obtain re their financial and economic plans and problems including exposure any pertinent financial and political commitments it also of greatest importance know their plans re compliance with UN Resolution and reaching settlement Suez Canal issue.
You and Burgess would say you and he will report all British say to Washington in light of which further discussions might be arranged to consider steps leading to realistic solution. Also at such time there would obviously be other matters we would wish discuss with UK.
Finally you and Burgess would say we proceeding on assumption UK has made no commitments to either French or Israelis re settlement Suez or Arab-Israel problems, but if this assumption not correct, we must know any such commitment before proceeding.
We would like your comments on above proposal, which should of course not be discussed with other than your Deputy Chief of Mission, and which would be dependent upon Macmillan’s and Butler’s reaction to your conversation. End FYI.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 841.10/11–2056. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by MacArthur, revised by Hoover, and approved by Greene.↩