478. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 3, 19561
SUBJECT
- Visit of Group of Arab Ambassadors to Under Secretary
PARTICIPANTS
- Dr. Moussa Al-Shabandar, Ambassador of Iraq
- Dr. Victor A. Khouri, Ambassador of Lebanon
- Sheikh Abdullah Al-Khayyal, Ambassador of Saudi Arabia
- Dr. Mongi Slim, Ambassador of Tunisia
- The Under Secretary
- NEA—Mr. Rountree
- O—Mr. Henderson
- NE—Mr. Rockwell
The Under Secretary received the group of Arab Ambassadors, who had requested an appointment with him. He began by expressing his regret that the Secretary himself was not there. He had just been operated upon for what had been diagnosed as acute appendicitis and was resting as comfortably as could be expected under the circumstances.
The Lebanese Ambassador expressed the sympathy of the group for the Secretary in his illness. He added the deep thanks of the Arab World for the attitude of the United States Government in the current crisis. This, he said, was based on principles accepted by all peace-loving nations, as revealed by the overwhelming November 2 GA vote in favor of the United States resolution. Dr. Khouri added that if nations did not abide by the principles of the UN Charter, there was no hope for a better world. He also wished on behalf of the group to thank the President for the American position. Now that the GA resolution had been adopted, said Dr. Khouri, what steps did the United States Government contemplate taking next?
[Page 950]Mr. Hoover began by expressing appreciation for what the Lebanese Ambassador had said about the United States position. The United States believed in acting according to principle, although sometimes this was very difficult. The Ambassadors were aware of the special problems facing the United States in connection with the current crisis. The United States was at present devoting its principal efforts to bringing about a cessation of hostilities. At the same time, however, the United States was thinking of steps to resolve the basic problems which had brought the hostilities on. This afternoon the White House was announcing that the United States would introduce two new resolutions in the UN.2 These had been fully discussed with the Secretary prior to his illness. The Under Secretary asked Mr. Rountree to describe the two resolutions.
Mr. Rountree said that these resolutions were the natural outcome of the GA resolution itself. We realize that this November 2 resolution did not embody a final solution of the problem. It was designed to establish an atmosphere of peace in which the basic problems could be dealt with. Of these there were two principal ones—to discover a new approach to the Arab-Israel problem, and a new approach to the Suez problem. The resolutions would show what mechanics we believed should be instituted to handle these problems. Once the basic November 2 resolution was adhered to, we had to get busy in resolving the basic issues which led to the outbreak of hostilities. The Lebanese Ambassador asked if Mr. Rountree meant that the United States envisaged a return to the status quo as the first necessary step. Mr. Rountree replied in the affirmative. Mr. Hoover commented that we should treat the basic disease in the area, not just the symptoms.
The Iraqi Ambassador asked what would happen if the parties to the hostilities did not obey the November 2 resolution. He said the Arab countries could not wait indefinitely. The whole Arab world was boiling. The Under Secretary replied that we did not know ourselves what was going to happen. We did not know whether British and French troops would actually invade Egypt. We were living minute by minute, and it was difficult to foresee the future. We did not know what the future plans of the French and the British and the Israelis were.
The Lebanese Ambassador repeated the question about what the United States would do if the November 2 resolution were not implemented. The Under Secretary said that we could not see all the way down that road now. Only events could tell One thing was [Page 951] certain—the decision rested with the UN. The United States was not going to enter the conflict unilaterally.
Mr. Henderson asked if the Arab Ambassadors had any suggestions as to what the United States should do. The Iraqi Ambassador said that the Arab States were not strong enough to stop the invasion, but that the UN could apply diplomatic and economic sanctions. There was danger of revolutions all over the Arab world. The Arab Governments were now restraining their populations, giving the United States time to bring about a just solution. If nothing was done, the Arab Governments would be in a terrible position. The United States was the world leader for peace, having now removed all possible claim by the USSR to that title. The United States position was never stronger. The Arabs wanted stronger United States action through the UN. They were ready to work with the United States and were waiting for the United States to follow up its first step.
The Lebanese Ambassador commented that the United States had saved the honor of the UN, but now must take stronger steps. Was there any tendency to strengthen the stated United States position against aggression? Mr. Hoover said that there were three ways to solve this problem—military, economic and moral. The moral way through the UN was the overriding one. The United States did not think that any country could long ignore the moral force of the overwhelming GA majority.
Mr. Rountree commented that in the procedure so far followed there had been avoided a situation in which it would be progressively more difficult for this moral force to be effective. Should the hostilities be enlarged, it would be much harder to apply moral pressures. All nations should refrain from expanding the conflict. The Under Secretary said that great self-restraint—especially by nations in the position of the Arab States—was necessary. He believed that the self-restraint that they were now exercising added to the moral pressure building up against the British, French and Israelis. The Lebanese Ambassador commented that restraint could come to an end if nothing happened.
Mr. Henderson stated that both in the UK and France, but especially in the UK, there were strong forces condemning the hostilities as much as the United States did. Public opinion in these countries was pressing increasingly hard for a halt in the hostilities. This public opinion would be strengthened by the new resolutions being tabled by the United States, since it would become apparent that progress was planned away from the previous sterile status quo. Both the Lebanese and Iraqi Ambassadors replied that they could not depend upon the slow process of public opinion.
[Page 952]Mr. Hoover said that we must keep moving through the UN so as not to lose momentum. Mr. Henderson expressed the hope that the Arab Governments would be successful in restraining their populations. The situation could become ten times worse if any additional NE countries became involved. The Iraqi Ambassador speculated that the Israelis would welcome such a development, so that they could grab the rest of Palestine. Mr. Henderson said that while he did not know what the Israeli Government might have in mind, no doubt the entry of additional Arab States in the hostilities would give Israeli extremists a pretext for seizing more territory. Israel could cause great damage to any Arab country which might intervene, and might overrun parts of the Arab world. The Under Secretary commented that the restraint so far exhibited by the Arabs had put Israel in a bad position, from the point of view of world opinion, with regard to the possibility of unprovoked aggression by Israel against other neighboring countries.
The Lebanese Ambassador called for strong pressure by the United States on the UK and France. Mr. Hoover said that the United States initiative in the UN and the profound difference on this problem with our two oldest allies revealed the pressure we had already put on the UK and France. Mr. Henderson added that if the United States were to apply military sanctions against the French and the British, an extremely explosive situation would be created. The world structure as it now existed might well be destroyed. He was sure the Ambassadors could appreciate this.
After thanking the Under Secretary for receiving them, the Arab Ambassadors took their leave. Before they left it was agreed that if they should be questioned regarding the meeting by the press they would say that they had come to express their deep concern over the NE crisis and to review developments with the Department of State.