479. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 3, 1956, 6:15 p.m.1
SUBJECT
- General Assembly Consideration of the Middle East Situation
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. Heeney, Canadian Ambassador
- Mr. Gray, Canadian Embassy
- Mr. Murphy, G
- Mr. Phleger, L
- Mr. Elbrick, EUR
- Mr. Bennett, G
Ambassador Heeney came in to present Canadian thinking regarding the introduction of a resolution on the Middle East crisis at tonight’s special session of the General Assembly. He commented that the declaration made by Prime Minister Eden this morning could be perhaps described as a qualified acceptance for the Assembly’s call for a cease-fire. At least it was not a flat “no” to the Assembly call. Canadian Foreign Minister Pearson did not think that Canada and the United States could support the British declaration as a solution, because such support would be sure to be considered to be collusion of the members of the UN. He felt, however, if some other resolution which included a concept of police action, if it could get sufficient support from the Afro-Asian group, would be all to the good. The Canadians are thinking of a resolution which would provide for the immediate appointment of a committee of five members to report within forty-eight hours on the composition of a UN police force to take over the situation at the Suez. Prior soundings would have to be taken, of course, and the resolution would only be adopted if there were an understanding with the British and French that their troop landings would be held up pending the committee’s report. He suggested India, Brazil, Yugoslavia, and Sweden as four members for the committee. The fifth member might be Canada, if that were desired, or the United States, if it were willing; or some other power, such as Belgium or The Netherlands.
Mr. Murphy agreed on the importance of having a prior understanding with the British and French but inquired whether Egypt would also accept. Ambassador Heeney replied that he frankly did not know; but that Egypt was, in his opinion, already badly beaten up and might be presumed ready to accept such a solution. He [Page 954] realized the value of exploring the matter with Egypt but wondered if there were time in view of the growing pressure at the Assembly by the Afro-Asians and others for a very strong condemnation of our oldest allies.
Mr. Phleger suggested that there should be added to the language of the resolution a statement to indicate that any measures proposed by the committee would be taken only with the consent of the parties concerned, i.e. Egypt, the United Kingdom, and France. Otherwise, without Egypt’s approval it would just be a question of substituting the UN for the United Kingdom and France. From the Egyptian national point of view, that would be no less an aggression if it did not have Egypt’s consent. He pointed out that what we want to arrange is a committee which will be able to achieve a cease-fire under UN auspices. Mr. Phleger suggested that for tactical reasons in getting the resolution adopted by the Assembly it would be better not to emphasize the police action concept. Ambassador Heeney then emphasized that the Canadian desire is to obtain a UN mechanism which will “hold the ring” as regards the Suez problem, and will prevent further deterioration in the situation. Such a step will be helpful in holding off the pressure building up for a strong condemnation of the UK and France, an action which would raise many problems for the United States as well as Canada.
Mr. Elbrick raised the question as to whether the UK and France would support such a resolution. Mr. Phleger thought they would, so long as the resolution made it clear that their consent was being requested. Mr. Murphy brought out that the type of resolution being discussed would fit in very well with the British declaration this morning.
Ambassador Heeney said that time was of the essence and that Foreign Minister Pearson was in New York with “pencil in the air.” He will be having urgent conversations with other delegations to line up support. There was general agreement that India’s support was fundamental, even though it might be hard to persuade the Indians to come along. Ambassador Heeney added that there was also the problem of arranging the landings to be held up, and Mr. Murphy commented that it would seem to him that a decision between landing with casualties or a twenty-four hour delay of troop action should be an easy one to make. Ambassador Heeney said that the Canadians have done nothing on the resolution with Paris; and there was general agreement that this was wise, if the British could be persuaded to come along and the French to follow.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5774/11–356. Confidential. Drafted by Bennett on November 4.↩