Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

477. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, November 3, 1956, 11:10 a.m.¹

Washington, November 3, 1956, 11:10 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary Hoover
• Mr. Phleger
• Mr. Rountree
• Mr. Hagerty
• Colonel Goodpaster

Mr. Hoover said he would like to review the situation, in view of the Secretary’s incapacity.² The President said the first question was how the plan for the two committees (one for the Israeli-Arab question and one for the Suez question) was coming along. Mr. Hoover first commented on a message received from Eden³ (which had been put on the tickers before it was received) and handed it to the President. It suggested having the UN take over the situation once French and British forces were installed in the Canal area, and we must be careful to avoid appearing in concert with them. (Eden said that he had furnished this proposal to Washington prior to his speech in Parliament.)

Mr. Hoover discussed the possibility of mob action arising in Cairo, as Army forces from the Sinai area reach the city. Mr. Rountree had talked by phone to Cairo and things seemed quiet at the moment.

The President said that the State Department spokesman yesterday, in announcing the suspension of shipments into the Middle East, had not handled the matter very well.⁴ He could have mentioned that we have had requests from others in the area for shipments, and these too are being held up. He referred to an oral message from Nasser,⁵ and suggested that we go back to Nasser cautioning him against mob action. Mr. Rountree said that we had sent back an oral message to Nasser already, and that he was very appreciative and said that for the first time he realized that the United States was not simply playing the British game in the area.

Mr. Hoover said he is confronted with two problems at the moment. The first relates to the Hungarian resolution. The Security Council is meeting at 3 P.M. today to take up this matter. The Hungarians are asking for UN help, and the British and French want us to join them in a resolution on the matter. Mr. Phleger said Secretary Dulles did not want to join the British and French, and the President said that such a thought was almost absurd.

Mr. Hoover’s second point related to the two Middle East resolutions. The situation has been complicated by Eden’s statement. Mr. Phleger said there is now danger that Pearson, for Canada, will propose as the “sound action” of which he spoke in the UN meeting that a UN force simply take over from the British, French and Israeli forces in the Suez and Sinai areas. This is exactly what Eden is now suggesting in order to get himself off the hook.

The President said he understood the gist of the resolutions to be the formation of a Suez committee and an Israeli committee but said we must also indicate interim action, such as a neutral zone around Israel with depth of space contributed proportionately to [from] the areas of the countries concerned, and clearing the Canal and operating it.

Mr. Hagerty said we need an American position quickly, and need to announce it. Otherwise we will get ourselves mixed up in the proposals of others. The President agreed we should get in with our resolutions quickly, calling on all parties to open the Canal. The President said we should also bring out that there is no cause for the UK and the French to go into the Canal area—that the UN can put in the force and provide the select committees. It is important that we bring out that we are not waiting for or accepting the entry of the French and the British. In this way we would remove any need or basis for their landings. Mr. Phleger recalled that there should be a prompt call for the landings not to be made, and prompt withdrawal. (It was pointed out that the Egyptians would be happier to see a UN force enter the Canal area if the French and British were already there than if they were not.)

Mr. Hoover next referred to a message from Libya asking if the President’s reply could be released and the President agreed that it could.⁶

The President asked whether it was thought he should get in touch with Eden, so as to keep the channel open, and there was universal suggestion that he wait until after the resolutions had been submitted to the Secretary General.

G
Colonel, CE, US Army

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster. The time of the meeting is from the record of the President’s Daily Appointments. (Ibid.)
2. During the early morning of November 3, Dulles entered Walter Reed Hospital where he underwent surgery. He remained at Walter Reed until November 18.
3. Reference is presumably to the text of Eden’s statement delivered to the Department of State at 10:15 a.m. that morning, supra.
4. For the transcript of Lincoln White’s exchange with the press, see “Press and Radio News Conference, Friday, November 2, 1956,” Department of State Daily News Conferences, 1956.
5. Transmitted in telegram 1240, Document 451. The Department’s oral response was transmitted in telegram 1368, Document 464.
6. The Embassy in Tripoli transmitted the message from Libyan Prime Minister Mustafa Ben Halim to President Eisenhower on November 1 in telegram 272. (Department of State, Central Files, 773.00/11–156) The Department of State transmitted President Eisenhower’s response to Tripoli for delivery on November 2 in telegram 263. (Ibid., 780.00/11–256)