451. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
1240. Nasser asked me come see him today to say he had yesterday explained his determination to resist aggression (Embassy telegram 1226),2 and now wished to have message delivered to President. Following is slightly edited text of rough oral English translation which he dictated from Arabic draft.
“The Anglo-French ultimatum regarding aggressive action against Egypt at a time when Egypt was defending itself against Israeli aggression has resulted in a very serious situation affecting the freedom of the Egyptian people and the United Nations Charter. Egypt decided to defend her sovereignty and territory against Anglo-French aggression in addition to defending her sovereignty and territory against Israeli aggression. The Egyptian Government has decided to ask for United States support against Anglo-French aggression.”
Nasser asked what I thought would be reaction to message. I replied that, as he of course knew, the American Government had already made an exceptional effort in this matter in attempting to arrive at a just solution. In particular the President had intervened personally and, as long as hostilities remain averted, there was still hope that his efforts to promote a peaceful settlement would prevail. (Nasser had remarked that as of time of our conversation at 1:15 p.m.3 there had been no reports of Anglo-French action despite fact no change in time expiration of ultimatum). We had thus gone far, and would doubtless continue to do what we could. Against this [Page 899] background what did Nasser have in mind in making this particular request for support.
Nasser replied that the kind of support would depend on the circumstances. Specifically it would mean military support in case of military aggression. Some people might have expected Egyptian Government to turn to USSR for such aid but GOE had thought matter over carefully and decided appeal to USG. He also hoped to refer publicly to this appeal in a speech he intended making so that Egyptian people could know what he had done. What was my reaction?
I observed that as far as military support concerned this would obviously be question which could only be answered by my government. However, I felt justified in expressing personal opinion that unable foresee possibility our going that far. Not only would this involve a policy decision of utmost gravity but would also require Congressional action. We had gone far, very far, but I just couldn’t see our becoming embattled with old allies on this issue. Nasser indicated understanding.
Regarding publication I would think subject too sensitive for public airing. Nasser thereupon agreed not mention except by mutual agreement but insisted that if decided publish would first be done in Cairo or simultaneously in Cairo and Washington but not initially in Washington. He indicated strong desire publish and gave as reason possible deterrent effect it would have on British and French.
I then observed understood Nasser liked frankness and would venture ask frank question in hope it would be received in spirit intended.
Sometimes in field of foreign affairs questions are put more or less expecting negative answer and with object of clearing way for another line of action which otherwise might be regarded as objectionable. Specifically, it would seem tragic if, after our having done so much in this particular matter, we should be confronted with request going beyond our ability to comply and then have this taken as justification for turning to the Russians. All the good would be undone and only bitterness would remain.
At first Nasser seemed somewhat taken aback by this admittedly not too delicate approach but he quickly regained composure and said that Egyptian request was entirely sincere and had been reached after careful consideration and there had been no discussion of turning to Russians. In fact Egyptians had always depended on selves and this was first time foreign aid had been requested. Khrushchev had suggested furnishing volunteers but Egyptians had never replied either way.
As regards seriousness with which USG has worked on this problem, he fully recognized and appreciated but, if matter important [Page 900] to us it is life or death to Egypt. As far as Nasser himself concerned, will not surrender but neither will he run away.
In taking leave he said would be glad to have me come see him in any hour of day or night to receive reply.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 641.74/10–3156. Secret; Niact. Received at 11:25 p.m.↩
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In telegram 1226, October 31, Hare informed the Department that Nasser had summoned him the evening of October 30 to discuss the Anglo-French ultimatum. Nasser said that the British had been informed of Egypt’s refusal to accept the ultimatum and that Egyptian territory would be defended against aggression. At the end of the conversation, Nasser was reminded by Fawzi, who was also present, that he had intended to send a message to President Eisenhower. According to Hare, Nasser had been unable to collect his thoughts and merely asked that the President be informed that Egypt was facing a threat of force and would defend itself. (Ibid.)
Nasser did send a message to Eisenhower that reached the Department of State at 9:30 a.m., October 31. It noted that Nasser intended to request U.S. assistance if Great Britain and France invaded Egypt, wished to know President Eisenhower’s reaction, and did not intend for the present to request Soviet assistance. (Memorandum for the record by Higgs, October 31; Eisenhower Library, White House Central Files (Confidential File)). A marginal notation by Goodpaster on that document indicates that Eisenhower was informed of Nasser’s message.
↩ - Cairo time, October 31.↩