Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

472. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, November 2, 1956—3 p.m.

1279. New York for Secretary. Re Deptel 1368.² Delivered President’s message to Nasser this morning. He listened attentively and took notes. Then asked I convey his appreciation to President and also to say that, come what may, he and Egyptian people are resolved to fight to end in order maintain their honor. He asked that special mention be made of continuing heavy air attacks and report they are now to be extended to radio stations as well as military objectives.

Speaking then in a more personal vein he said he would adopt technique of frankness which I had used in our last conversation (Embtel 1240)³ and admit that Egyptians had never really believed us when we had indicated possibility that British and French might embark on an independent policy which did not have our approval. Now he recognized he had been wrong. Our action had been clear-cut and doubt had been removed.

Turning to the military situation Nasser said he had been very worried two days ago regarding Egyptian armor in Sinai which was fighting without air cover. Furthermore whole aspect of hostilities had been altered by Anglo-French intervention and it had therefore been decided withdraw armor from Sinai as well as Egyptian forces at Rafa, El Arish and El Agheila to west of canal in pursuance of new plan of not defending canal but rather using canal as line of defense. He had consequently been very relieved when large part of armor got safely back across canal yesterday and some scattered units arrived during night. However, small “suicide units” would remain east of canal.

Regarding type of campaign he would fight, Nasser indicated it would be a people’s war; fighting town by town and house by house. There would be no evacuations. For instance his own family would remain in Cairo.

As to air activity, Nasser said his problem was shortage of pilots and he had decided would be wasteful to commit them against superior force. He preferred keep them in reserve for defense of Egypt proper, i.e. Delta. As consequence Egyptian planes have been kept on ground and heavy losses have been suffered.

Queried on Egyptian force at Gaza, Nasser said had been instructed remain.⁴ There had been some negotiations with Burns regarding situation and question of jurisdiction of Gaza strip had been raised. He now understood Israelis not pursuing idea of asserting jurisdiction, presumably for reason they did not wish assume responsibility for 300,000 refugees.

Nasser looked tired but he was calm, relaxed and friendly, and although I could well be mistaken, I for the first time gained impression of sincerity when he admitted he had been unduly suspicious our attitude.

Hare

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–256. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Received at 4:30 p.m. Repeated to USUN.
2. Document 464.
3. Document 451.
4. At dawn on November 2, Israeli forces began their march on Sharm al Sheikh and commenced operations to secure control of the Gaza Strip. By the following morning, Gaza had been secured. Sharm al Sheikh fell to Israeli forces on November 5. (Moshe Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), pp. 145, 153, 200–201)