473. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 2, 1956, 4:51 p.m.1
SUBJECT
- General Assembly Action on Middle East Issue
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Mr. Arnold Heeney, Canadian Ambassador
- Mr. Saul Rae, Canadian Counselor
- Mr. Phleger—L
- Mr. Elbrick—EUR
Ambassador Heeney said that Foreign Minister Pearson was returning immediately from New York to Ottawa and that a Cabinet meeting was scheduled for tomorrow to consider the Middle East situation, with particular reference to the role that Canada might play in response to the suggestion made by the Secretary at the emergency General Assembly meeting. Prime Minister St. Laurent is expecting to address the nation by radio on Sunday when he will [Page 941] explain the broad lines of the Canadian Government’s thinking on this matter. The Canadian Government is at present thinking of another resolution to be presented to the General Assembly although St. Laurent will not refer to such a resolution in his broadcast.
The Secretary said that we had been studying this matter and had decided that it would be wise to introduce two separate resolutions in the Assembly, one concerning the Suez Canal and the other concerning the solution of the Palestine question. It seems essential to take action quickly before the Anglo-French military operations in Egypt precipitate matters to such an extent that a rash of resolutions calling for sanctions against the British and French are introduced.
Ambassador Heeney said that Pearson’s objective is to help get the British and French “off the hook” but he wishes to be sure that the United States and the United Kingdom will agree to whatever proposal he may make. He said that Selwyn Lloyd’s reaction to the general idea as presented to him by the Canadian High Commissioner in London seemed to be favorable. Pearson is thinking of providing for a United Nations police force, in the first instance, and a political settlement. He thought that both of these matters could be handled at a 24-nation conference, although his ideas about such a conference were still somewhat vague. His main objective is to restore as quickly as possible the US–UK alignment. With this in mind he thought a resolution might be prepared for circulation on Monday and for debate on Tuesday of next week.
The Secretary pointed out that there is a great danger that the situation may deteriorate rapidly. The United States controlled the situation in the General Assembly last night and if we had not done so the action taken by the General Assembly might have been much more severe in condemning the British and the French. We must direct our efforts to get people to think along constructive lines very quickly because if the Egyptian situation does deteriorate rapidly, the Russians may well move in and demand immediate sanctions. We hope to keep up the momentum generated last night in the General Assembly. We had always considered that a solution of the basic problems in the Middle East should be part of any program dealing with this question but we felt that the inclusion of such a program in the resolution presented to the General Assembly might have jeopardized its passage. We must now follow up on our action in the General Assembly. Ambassador Heeney said that he hoped that we could hold the matter in abeyance until Pearson could get some assurance from the British that his intervention has British approval. Pearson was thinking of a conference which would not only study the Suez problem but also the Arab-Israeli problem and the North African problem. The Secretary said he felt we should not mix the Canal problem with the others. We have already had a [Page 942] conference on the Suez Canal and we came very close to an agreement in the United Nations. The British and French felt, however, that something had to be done quickly to destroy Nasser and had not followed through on the proposal that they reach an agreement with the Egyptians because they felt that that would only serve to build up Nasser’s prestige. Prior to that we had almost reached a solution and it seemed to us that it would only require a small committee to work out a solution now. We feel it would only be turning the clock back to have another conference on the Suez problem. If the Egyptian Army and Air Force are destroyed the British and French may feel they have done enough to prepare the way for a settlement of the Canal problem. If Egypt would support such an idea the Secretary felt there would be unanimous agreement in the General Assembly.
As for the Palestine problem, the question is whether the Arabs really want peace or not and they should be confronted with that problem. Certainly the only alternative is war since the situation cannot drag on much longer midway between war and peace. Our resolution on the Palestine question envisages the constitution of a committee which would take up all aspects of the problem. For example, we understand that the 300,000 Palestinian Arabs in the Gaza strip who are now cut off from Egypt will shortly be dying of starvation if aid does not reach them from outside.
The Ambassador referred again to the question of the constitution of a United Nations police force. The Secretary said that this raises many complications and that while such a force might ultimately be a good thing he did not think it possible to give effect to this idea in time to meet the present situation. The Ambassador said that he felt that General Burns’ hand should be strengthened and the Secretary agreed, particularly since the Israeli had done nothing to facilitate his task so far.
The Secretary said that while we would welcome support from the Canadians on our two resolutions he wanted it clearly understood that we could not tie our hands in this matter and that we might possibly have to take urgent action tomorrow, depending on developments. We would, therefore, have to reserve complete liberty of action in sponsoring and presenting these resolutions.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5774/11–256. Secret. Drafted by Elbrick. The time of the meeting is from Dulles’ Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)↩