Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

444. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State in Washington and the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) in New York, October 31, 1956, 10:50 a.m.¹

New York, October 31, 1956, 10:50 a.m.

TELEPHONE CALL FROM AMB. LODGE

The Sec. returned the call, and congratulated L. on last night etc. etc.

L. said the acclaim the Sec’s policy is receiving at the UN is something unprecedented and deeply gratifying. 21 Latin American nations are behind us as never before. He is sending it all in writing. The Sec. said it would be nice if L. sent a message or called the Pres. He was blue this a.m. L. will call.² L. read the statement Hammarskjold intends to make at 3 today. L. asked what he should say. The Sec. said he thinks we should give him a vote of confidence. Has there been criticism? L. said no but he said his study of the way nations start going to hell is when we don’t speak and act when we should but then there comes a point when you have to speak out. The Sec. would be inclined to say as far as the US is concerned if there is a question of a vote of confidence in the Sec Gen we would strongly express that confidence.

The Sec. mentioned there would be decisions today—The Sec. thinks we should favor a special meeting of the GA—under the Uniting for Peace Resolution. L. said when and the Sec. said right away. We will talk about it today. L. thinks it is logical—you start it and have to go through with it. The Sec. said we have to exhaust all UN possibilities. This is not a decision but wanted L’s reaction. There will be a big demand for it and it may happen at any rate. L. said the Indian Rep.³ suggested the Pres. and Nehru call for it together. If you don’t, you will have to say why. The Sec. thinks from a political standpoint it is important to keep it going. We will let you know. L. thinks the Russians would not agree to the res. but the Egyptians think they will. If you can get 7 votes you can always get a majority of the GA. L. said a note was just handed him and the USSR agrees. H.⁴ said re SC action if the event of real warfare the res can be drawn in such a way they cannot use the veto. L. read Higgins’ story.⁵ Does the Sec. have proof they did it without our knowledge? The Sec. said the accumulation of facts is such but not proof for a court of law but there is not the slightest doubt in his mind. L. said the Asian-African group has gone on record for a special session. The Sec. said if you have it you may want to bring in the Hungarian thing. The Soviets would try to block that. L. said Lloyd wants to get together on the Hungarian thing.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Bernau.
2. Lodge telephoned President Eisenhower at 11:45 a.m. and told him that there had never been such a tremendous acclaim for the President’s policy. A memorandum of that conversation, prepared in the Office of the President, is ibid., Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries.
3. Krishna Menon.
4. Reference is presumably to Hammarskjöld.
5. A story under Marguerite Higgins’ byline in the New York Herald Tribune reported that Dulles had accused the British and French of cooperating with Israel to play “a giant international trick on the United States designed to lead to British and French reoccupation of the Suez Canal”.