445. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles’ Office, Department of State, Washington, October 31, 1956, 11:30 a.m.1
PRESENT WERE
- The Secretary
- The Under Secretary
- Mr. Murphy
- Mr. Phleger
- Mr. MacArthur
- Mr. McCardle
- Mr. Rountree
- Mr. Elbrick
- Mr. Wilcox
- Mr. Bowie
- Mr. Henderson
- Mr. Wilkins
- Mr. De Palma
- Mr. Macomber
- Mr. Greene
The Secretary said that Mr. Lodge reported to him that Mr. Hammarskjold had said he would rather like an expression of confidence from the Security Council and that if the Security Council were unhappy with his conduct he would resign. The Secretary said we can express our confidence in the Secretary-General if an appropriate occasion arises.
[Page 889]Mr. Wilcox propounded the questions of the Yugoslavian proposal for a Special Session of the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace resolution; and the Egyptian letter to the President of the Security Council about the British-French ultimata. The Security Council would be meeting at 3:00 o’clock and Ambassador Lodge would need guidance.
Mr. Wilcox understood that the Egyptians would not press for consideration of their letter if the Uniting for Peace procedure were adopted.
The Secretary said he had discussed with the President2 the matter of a Special Session under the Uniting for Peace resolution and that the President thought we should probably go along with the idea if the Security Council continued to be unable to act. While he thought it would be a mistake to finalize this at the meeting today, he thought that it would be difficult to stop the growing sentiment in the UN for a Special Session and that we should, therefore, remain in a position to use our considerable influence to guide the course of such a Session. He felt that while the General Assembly would be unlikely to deter the British and French from carrying out their military plans, action in the General Assembly might keep the hostilities from spreading. Moreover, we do not want the Russians to be able to run with the ball in a Special Session. Thus he thought the matter should be kept active in the Security Council, at least today, until it can be shown that the Security Council has really exhausted all courses available to it; this would amount to a stalling operation short of stultifying the sound position of moral principle which we have so far held.
Mr. Hoover came in to report that the British Admiralty has warned all shippers to keep away from the Suez Canal. This has led among other things to the oil people in Europe, including Britain, asking that the stand-by plans originally developed for the event that Egypt blocked the Canal now be put into effect. Among other consequences this means that the Western European countries who have a maximum oil reserve of 15 to 30 days will soon come to us for help and this will confront us with the problem of whether we want to help them, including the British and French, or hold off in hopes of deterring continuation of hostilities.
The Secretary said that we must notify American shippers of the British Admiralty warning and for safety’s sake advise them to [Page 890] comply. Mr. Rountree said his people and the Navy could take care of this.
The meeting adjourned until 2:00 o’clock when it resumed consideration of the Security Council problem. It was noted that the British and French have asked us not to press in the Security Council for a Special Session of the GA, but would not object to such a Session being called by petition of the members. It was also noted that the Egyptians were understood to be willing, at least before Cairo was bombed, to forego Security Council action if the petition procedure would result in a Special Session. The Secretary said he would prefer that the matter not be discussed in the Security Council, but that the U.S. could subscribe to a petition.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/10–3156. Secret. Drafted by Greene. The source text indicates this is an informal record of the meeting.↩
- According to the record of the President’s Daily Appointments, Dulles and Hagerty met with the President at the White House between 10:08 and 10:43 that morning. No account of this conversation has been found in Department of State files or the Eisenhower Library.↩