Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

443. Tentative Notes of the Secretary’s Staff Meeting, Department of State, Washington, October 31, 1956, 9:15 a.m.¹

Washington, October 31, 1956, 9:15 a.m.

1. Murphy in the Chair.

[Here follows items 2–4.]

5. Aid to French and UK—Mr. Elbrick said that Defense is asking what we should do about military aid and, notably deliveries coming out of the pipeline, including whether there should be now raised a condition that such material not be used in the Middle East troubles. It was pointed out that there already is a condition that aid material cannot be used in aggression. The Secretary indicated that he saw no reason why pipeline deliveries could not be continued unchanged. He asked Mr. Elbrick to try and find out where the Israeli received the added group of Mysteres.

[Here follows item 6.]

7. Suez—UN—Mr. Wilcox indicated a growing sentiment to call the GA under the Uniting for Peace Resolution² which would require either 7 members of the Security Council or a majority of total members. He noted that the Asian-African Group and the Jugs were moving in this direction. The Secretary noted that if we seem to oppose we would appear insincere. He also thought that if it is probable that the GA would be called it is better to lead. He inclined toward Mr. Rountree’s recommendation, however, that we should vote for but not initiate. Mr. Wilcox reported that the Egyptian resolution³ put in last night will probably be discussed today and they may supplement it with a resolution. In this connection the Secretary noted that the UK-French ultimatum had not been published and he thought it was in our interest that they did become available to the press. The inaccuracy of the New York Times account of various information on this subject going to Ambassador Aldrich was also mentioned. Mr. Henderson reminded the Secretary that although Nasser is the object of aggression he is still a villain. Discussion followed on the legal basis on which the British and French have taken this action. The Secretary noted that under the 1954 treaty with Egypt⁴ the UK is not justified to move in in response to action by the Israeli. On the other hand they could be justifying it, although he does not believe they have as yet, by the 1954 treaty on the basis that the nationalization of the Canal is a breach of the 1888 treaty which is a condition of the 1954 treaty.

8. Eisenhower-Eden Correspondence—The Secretary mentioned that the President had received from Eden last night a request to be free to use the correspondence which they had carried on during the day since there had been considerable public reference to it; and the President had acceded.

9. Israel Aid—Mr. Rountree noted that an early decision will be needed as to whether we will apply sanctions on Israel in the form of holding aid (pipeline) shipments. The Secretary asked Mr. Rountree to consider getting the Israeli Ambassador to declare more clearly the current Israeli purposes. The Secretary noted that the question of cutting off aid is a matter of degree and of abruptness because of the pipeline. The Secretary asked that a status report on our aid shipments should be requested of ICA and a comparable report on licensing.

10. US Forces—Mr. Rountree also indicated decision was needed on Secretary Wilson’s letter on the disposition of US forces in the area.⁵ Mr. MacArthur said that he and Mr. Rountree have a recommendation on this subject.

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75. Secret. Prepared by Howe.
2. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 377 (V), which provided for emergency sessions of the General Assembly.
3. Reference is to the letter from the Egyptian Foreign Minister to the President of the Security Council, dated October 30. (U.N. doc. S/3712) See Document 439.
4. Anglo-Egyptian Agreement Regarding the Suez Canal Base, October 19, 1954.
5. See footnote 2, Document 428. Later on October 31, Hoover telephoned Wilson and told him that Dulles believed that it would not be wise to appear to be moving combat military forces into the area. (Memorandum from Hoover to Dulles, October 31; ibid.)