Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

419. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 30, 1956, 10:06–10:55 a.m.¹

Washington, October 30, 1956, 10:06–10:55 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary Dulles
• Under Secretary Hoover
• Mr. Herman Phleger
• Governor Adams
• Mr. Hagerty (for part of meeting)
• Colonel Goodpaster

Mr. Dulles opened the meeting with a report that Ambassador Lodge had initially given notice last night to the President of the Security Council regarding our desire to inscribe an item on the Israeli attack. Inasmuch as the British had not had a chance to join in, and Mr. Coulson had indicated the British might wish to join us, Ambassador Lodge withdrew his request in an effort to enable Dixon to join.² Mr. Dulles indicated that, at the meeting at 11 this morning, we still hoped that the British would join with us, although if they did not we would submit the item alone.

The President asked if the French had been given the opportunity to join with us, and Secretary Dulles said that they had been given that opportunity yesterday. Neither yesterday nor this morning had they shown any evidence of desire to act rapidly on the matter. Mr. Dulles commented that according to radio reports Mollet has gone up to London today. He also pointed out that, with reference to our NATO partners, we may have to decide whether to go along with our partners who are colonial powers.

The President at this point read aloud a message which he had been drafting to Eden. At the close of this he read an INS report of imminent French and British landing which had just been received. The President suggested that Mr. Dulles take his draft message and edit it. The Secretary asked if it would not be possible to get it off immediately, and he said the President revised it to their satisfaction and sent it to State for immediate dispatch.³

Mr. Phleger said that the British and French might take their action under the authority of the 1950 declaration, as a measure for protecting Egypt by establishing a “front” on the Canal area. The President pointed out that this action would have the French opposing the Israelis, whom they have supported in this action. Mr. Hoover said the thinking might be that the French and the British might simply take over the Canal, after which the Israelis could withdraw from the Canal area. The President asked if this action would not amount to repudiation by the French and British of their agreement with us in the 1950 Declaration and subsequent statements. Mr. Hoover said they might say it is not, but is simply an effort to achieve the purposes of the Declaration.

Mr. Dulles said he had talked to Secretary Humphrey regarding Israeli bank balances in the United States.⁴ Initially Mr. Humphrey thought these could be held up informally today; after further study, however, he reported that they are widely scattered, the only concentration being in a single bank in New York, regarding which informal action did not seem practicable. Secretary Dulles said that if there were any attempt to stop the flow of charity money, a great outcry must be expected. The President asked whether such a flow could be permitted, however, if sanctions are imposed.

At this point Secretary Dulles took a call on the President’s phone from Ambassador Lodge who reported that the British had suggested changing the title of the agenda item to “The Palestine Question,” removing all reference to measures to bring to an end the operations of Israeli forces in Egypt. If this were done, they indicated they would join with us; otherwise they would not. The French had indicated they would not join with us at all.⁵ The President suggested a wording which would avoid apparent prejudgment to the effect that the aggressor in the matter is Israel. Secretary Dulles then advised Ambassador Lodge to submit the item as revised, without British or French association.

Secretary Dulles next asked whether steps should be taken to keep American flagships out of the Suez Canal. The President thought the decision should be up to ship owners; he doubted whether the British and French, if they seize the Canal, would bar us. Mr. Dulles thought that the British and French might move in and operate the Canal, that Egypt would then attack them, and that U.S. ships would be damaged or sunk. The President thought U.S. ships would have to take their chances.

Mr. Dulles pointed to the danger of our being drawn into the hostilities as we were in World Wars I and II with the difference that this time it appears that the British and French might well be considered the aggressors in the eyes of the world, engaged in an anti-Arab, anti-Asian war.

The President said that in his judgment the French and the British do not have an adequate cause for war. Egyptian action in nationalizing the Canal was not enough to justify this. Mr. Dulles recalled that the British were practically in agreement with Egypt on a resolution of the Suez dispute at the recent UN meeting, but have been delaying any solution since then. He added that this is not a question of the Suez, but is really a question of Algeria for the French and position in the Persian Gulf for the British. He thought that the odds are high that the British may be evicted from Iraq, and that the pipelines may be blown up. He suggested that it may be necessary for us to make major adjustments in our oil situation soon.

The President said it may be that the British think they can settle the matter quickly, and thus have their oil supply continue without interruption. Unless they have reached some secret agreement with the Saudi-Arabians, however (such as possibly on Buraimi), there seems little chance that the flow of oil would continue. Mr. Hoover doubted that they could have reached an agreement regarding Buraimi.

Mr. Hoover added that the British and French may feel that they have forced us to a choice—between themselves and the Arabs. They may in fact have felt that they have forced us into a position where we must go against the Arabs. The President wondered if the hand of Churchill might not be behind this—inasmuch as this action is in the mid-Victorian style. If oil is cut off and American ships take the route around the Cape, the oil supplies to Western Europe will be greatly cut down. Mr. Hoover thought the British may be estimating that we would have no choice but to take extraordinary means to get oil to them.

Secretary Dulles said their thinking might be that they will confront us with a de facto situation, in which they might acknowledge that they have been rash but would say that the U.S. could not sit by and let them go under economically.

The President said he did not see much value in an unworthy and unreliable ally and that the necessity to support them might not be as great as they believed.

Secretary Dulles commented that he had been greatly worried for two or three years over our identification with countries pursuing colonial policies not compatible with our own. He has had several study groups working on this. Recently he made a statement on this matter which provoked violent comment by the French and the British. At this point the President was informed that a message from Sir Anthony Eden to him had been received by the British Embassy and would be sent over promptly.⁶ The meeting adjourned until its arrival.

The meeting resumed in about fifteen minutes. The President, after reading Eden’s message, commented that Eden says the attitude of Egypt over the past years has relieved the signatories of the three-power declaration from any obligation. The President commented further that the British case would be improved if the Egyptians had not simply nationalized the Canal, and then operated it effectively afterward.

The State Department group left at this point to work on the UN resolution needed this afternoon.

About twenty minutes later the Secretary called the President⁷ to advise him of reports through the British Embassy here that Eden was announcing in Commons the landing of British and French forces in the Suez Canal area. The President commented that a “hands off” attitude by the United States might well be indicated. He thought that it would probably be necessary today to make clear publicly that we have not been, and are not now, associated with the French and the British in their activities. He expressed concern over the possibility of Russian intervention on the side of Egypt, and thought that a blockade by the British (who have the forces to make it effective) might be the only way to prevent Russian entry into the area. He said he was not too sure now that Congress should be called into session—that he had a great deal of question over any idea of asking Congress for $600 to $800 million to support oil deliveries and other economic aid to Britain and France when the full impact of their action begins to be felt.

G
Colonel CE, US Army

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster. The time of the meeting is from the record of the President’s Daily Appointments. (Ibid.)
2. Prior to this meeting with Eisenhower, Dulles arranged for the withdrawal of the request during a series of telephone conversations with Coulson and Lodge. During the final conversation with Lodge, which began at 9:41 a.m., Dulles emphasized the importance of obtaining British cooperation with U.S. efforts. According to Bernau’s transcript, the Secretary “said we are anxious to carry the Br—it is basic and goes to the heart of our relations all over the world and we have to give them a reasonable time.” (Ibid., Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)
3. Supra. A typed draft with handwritten changes is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Eisenhower to Eden Correspondence 1955–1956 Vol I.
4. Memoranda of these telephone conversations, which took place at 9:15 and 9:46 a.m., are in the Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.
5. According to the memorandum of this telephone conversation Lodge also said that he thought that the French and British were both bluffing. Dulles disagreed with this statement and told Lodge that, according to information received, the British and French military units would have control of the Suez Canal by that afternoon. (Ibid., Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)
6. Document 421.

7. The transcript of this conversation, which began at 11:37 a.m., reads as follows:

   “The Sec. said Eden is on the air making a statement which presumably will announce their landings. The Pres. said because he sent an impatient message, he is acknowledging this one from Eden—something to the effect that apparently the difference is the way we regard the tripartite statement and since we have made no statement limiting ourselves he does not see how we can avoid fulfilling our word. The Sec. said the focus will be shifting. He said the Israelis will be out and back in a few hours. They have accomplished their mission and now the question is how to handle the British and French business. The Pres. said his offhand judgment is hands off—he does not think we should help them and let them stew in their own juice for a while. He does not see how we can go before our people and say they are our friends and we have to rescue them etc. etc. The Sec. thinks Eden will give the impression we have been kept informed. The Pres. said maybe that is the reason for his hurried telegram. He will send it over. The Sec. is not sure it is relevant because he thinks things will shift from the 1950 Declaration. The Pres. wants to get over to him that we are a government of honor and stick by what we say.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations.)

   A memorandum of this conversation, prepared in the Office of the President, incorrectly indicates that the conversation began at 3:40 p.m. (Ibid., Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)