Office of the Historian

421. Message From Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower1

London, October 30, 1956.

I am sending you this hurried message to let you know at once how we regard the Israel-Egypt conflict.

We have never made any secret of our belief that justice entitled us to defend our vital interests against Nasser’s designs. But we acted with you in summoning the London Conference, in despatching the abortive Menzies Mission and in seeking to establish S.C.U.A. As you know from our secret sources, the Russians regarded the Security Council proceedings as a victory for themselves and Egypt. Nevertheless we continued through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to seek a basis for the continuation of the negotiations.

Now this has happened. When we received news of the Israel mobilisation, we instructed our Ambassador in Tel Aviv to urge restraint. Soon afterwards he sought and obtained an assurance that Israel would not attack Jordan. This seems to me important, since it means that Israel will not enlarge the area of conflict or involve us in virtue of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty. In recent months we have [Page 857] several times warned the Israel Government, both publicly and privately, that if they attacked Jordan we would honour our obligations. But we feel under no obligation to come to the aid of Egypt. Apart from the feelings of public opinion here, Nasser and his Press have relieved us of any such obligation by their attitude to the Tripartite Declaration.

Egypt has to a large extent brought this attack on herself by insisting that the state of war persists, by defying the Security Council and by declaring her intention to marshal the Arab States for the destruction of Israel. The latest example of Egyptian intentions is the announcement of a joint command between Egypt, Jordan and Syria.

We have earnestly deliberated what we should do in this serious situation. We cannot afford to see the Canal closed or to lose the shipping which is daily on passage through it. We have a responsibility for the people in these ships. We feel that decisive action should be taken at once to stop hostilities. We have agreed with you to go to the Security Council and instructions are being sent this moment. Experience shows that its procedure is unlikely to be either rapid or effective.

Selwyn saw Winthrop2 this morning. We are meeting with the French later. I will send you a further message immediately after that meeting.3

  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret. Delivered to the White House under cover of a note from Coulson to President Eisenhower which reads: “The Prime Minister has asked me to send you the enclosed message.”↩
  2. Winthrop W. Aldrich.↩
  3. Printed from an unsigned copy.↩