418. Message From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden1
Dear Anthony: I address you in this note not only as head of Her Majesty’s Government but as my long time friend who has, with me, believed in and worked for real Anglo-American understanding.
Last night I invited Mr. Coulson, currently your Washington representative, to come to my house to talk over the worsening [Page 849] situation in the Mid East. I have no doubt that the gist of our conversation has already been communicated to you. But it seemed to me desirable that I should give you my impressions concerning certain phases of this whole affair that are disturbing me very much.
Without bothering here to discuss the military movements themselves and their possible grave consequences, I should like to ask your help in clearing up my understanding as to exactly what is happening between us and our European allies—especially between us, the French and yourselves.
We have learned that the French had provided Israel with a considerable amount of equipment, including airplanes, in excess of the amounts of which we were officially informed. This action was, as you know, in violation of agreements now existing between our three countries. We know also that this process has continued in other items of equipment.
Quite naturally we began watching with increased interest the affairs in the Eastern Mediterranean. Late last week we became convinced that the Israel mobilization was proceeding to a point where something more than mere defense was contemplated, and found the situation serious enough to send a precautionary note to Ben Gurion. On Sunday we repeated this note of caution and made a public statement of our actions, informing both you and the French of our concern. On that day we discovered that the volume of communication traffic between Paris and Tel Aviv jumped enormously; alerting us to the probability that France and Israel were concerting detailed plans of some kind.
When on Monday actual military moves began, we quickly decided that the matter had to go immediately to the United Nations, in view of our Agreement of May, 1950,2 subscribed to by our three governments.
Last evening our Ambassador to the United Nations met with your Ambassador, Pierson Dixon, to request him to join us in presenting the case to the United Nations this morning. We were astonished to find that he was completely unsympathetic, stating frankly that his government would not agree to any action whatsoever to be taken against Israel. He further argued that the tri-partite statement of May, 1950, was ancient history and without current validity.
Without arguing the point as to whether or not the tri-partite statement is or should be outmoded, I feel very seriously that whenever any agreement or pact of this kind is in spirit renounced by one of its signatories, it is only fair that the other signatories should be notified. Since the United States has continued to look [Page 850] upon that statement as representing the policies and determination of our three governments, I have not only publicly announced several times that it represents our policy, but many of our actions in the Mid East have been based upon it. For example, we have in the past denied arms both to Egypt and to Israel on the ground that the 1950 statement was their surest guarantee of national security. We have had no thought of repudiating that statement and we have none now.
All of this development, with its possible consequences, including the possible involvement of you and the French in a general Arab war, seems to me to leave your government and ours in a very sad state of confusion, so far as any possibility of unified understanding and action are concerned. It is true that Egypt has not yet formally asked this government for aid. But the fact is that if the United Nations finds Israel to be an aggressor, Egypt could very well ask the Soviets for help—and then the Mid East fat would really be in the fire. It is this latter possibility that has led us to insist that the West must ask for a United Nations examination and possible intervention, for we may shortly find ourselves not only at odds concerning what we should do, but confronted with a de facto situation that would make all our present troubles look puny indeed.
Because of all these possibilities, it seems to me of first importance that the UK and the US quickly and clearly lay out their present views and intentions before each other, and that, come what may, we find some way of concerting our ideas and plans so that we may not, in any real crisis be powerless to act in concert because of misunderstanding of each other. I think it important that our two peoples, as well as the French, have this clear understanding of our common or several viewpoints.
With warm personal regard.
As ever
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/10–3056. Top Secret. Transmitted in Niact telegram 3081 to London, October 30, 10:50 a.m., which is the source text, with the instruction: “Please deliver immediately following message from the President to Eden. Confirm time delivery.’ Upon receipt of telegram 3081 at 4:30 p.m. London time, Aldrich telephoned Eden and learned that he was already speaking before the House of Commons. He arranged for the immediate delivery of this message to Eden at Commons. (Ibid.)↩
- The Tripartite Declaration.↩
- Telegram 3081 bears this typed signature.↩