Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

409. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 29, 1956, 4:50 p.m.¹

Washington, October 29, 1956, 4:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Applicability of the Tripartite Declaration to Present Situation in Near East

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. J.E. Coulson, Minister, British Embassy
• Mr. Ronald W. Bailey, Counselor, British Embassy
• Mr. Charles Lucet, Minister, French Embassy
• Mr. Francois de Laboulaye, Counselor, French Embassy
• The Secretary
• The Under Secretary
• C—Douglas MacArthur 2nd
• NEA—William M. Rountree
• EUR—Burke C. Elbrick
• NE—Fraser Wilkins

The Secretary consulted late this afternoon with British Minister Coulson and French Minister Lucet on the question of the applicability of the Tripartite Declaration to the present situation in the Near East. The Secretary noted that each of the representatives of the three countries had suggested the consultations.² Mr. Coulson said that he welcomed them.

The Secretary said all three countries ought immediately to bring to the Security Council the question of the reported movement of Israeli forces into Egypt. He thought the psychological effect would be very good if action could be taken this evening. He handed Mr. Coulson and Mr. Lucet copies of a working group draft of a proposed Security Council Resolution calling for the cessation of hostilities (Tab A). The Secretary stressed that this was a working group draft which had been prepared approximately a year ago in the event of an emergency. He said that we were now thinking of moving along these lines. It was his belief that as parties to the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 the three powers should act quickly in order to have maximum effect in Israel and the Arab states.

Mr. Coulson said that he was without instructions. He had been planning on the basis of word from the British Foreign Office in London following his conversation with the Secretary on October 28 to discuss the applicability of the Tripartite Declaration to the general situation in the Near East. He said that as these instructions had been written prior to the Israeli move into Egypt they might be outdated. He wished, however, to note that London thought that for all practical purposes the Tripartite Declaration would be inoperative. The Egyptian authorities had said with specific reference to the Tripartite Declaration that it gave no rights to any of these powers. None of them had any right to station troops in Egypt. Mr. Coulson continued it was almost impossible for Great Britain under these circumstances to take military action against Israel. French Minister Lucet said that he shared British Minister Coulson’s view regarding the impossibility of military action against Israel.

The Secretary replied that the United States was not in a position to take military action under its own constitutional procedures without reference to Congress. The Secretary said that at this stage we were thinking only in terms of action within the Security Council under the Tripartite Declaration. He observed that the United States contemplated some form of economic sanctions under the working draft of the proposed Security Council Resolution. The Secretary thought that a stoppage of United States Government aid might be useful in present circumstances. The Secretary made it clear, however, that this general question was still being discussed within the United States Government and that no final decision had been reached.

Mr. Coulson said there was a stronger case for action within the Security Council rather than outside it. Mr. Lucet said he had no instructions on this point.

Mr. Coulson continued that he thought it would be awkward to make reference to the Security Council this evening since instructions from London were lacking as was also the case with the French. Mr. Coulson suggested that the Secretary might make a statement indicating the possibility of reference to the Security Council tomorrow. The Secretary said he would make a statement to this effect.³ Meanwhile, he would endeavor to get in touch with London. After the British and French received their instructions the proposed Resolution in the Security Council could be discussed and changed as desirable.

Tab A

Draft Security Council Resolution

The Security Council

Noting the report on the outbreak of hostilities between Israel and (the Arab state concerned);

Expressing its grave concern regarding the effect of this renewal of fighting upon the maintenance of international peace and security in the area;

1. Determines that a breach of the peace has occurred; (If possible, this paragraph would also identify the aggressor.)

2. Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities;

3. Calls upon Israel immediately to withdraw its armed forces behind the established armistice lines;

4. Calls upon all Members to render prompt assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving any military, economic or financial assistance to Israel.

5. Requests the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to keep the Security Council informed on the compliance given this resolution and to make whatever recommendations he deems appropriate respecting further action by the United Nations to assist in the implementation of this resolution.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/10–2956. Secret. Drafted by Wilkins on October 31. The time of the meeting is from Dulles’ Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)
2. A memorandum for the files by Rockwell, dated October 29, indicates that Bailey of the British Embassy called during the afternoon to say that the British and French desired to see either Dulles or Rountree for further discussions on the Israeli mobilization. After consulting the Secretary’s office, Rockwell informed Bailey that a 5 p.m. appointment had been made. Macomber subsequently called Rockwell and told him that the Secretary had moved the appointment to 4:30 p.m. and that he specifically desired to be assured that the ranking officers of the British and French Embassies would attend. Rockwell then informed Bailey of the new hour for the appointment and learned that French Minister Lucet would be attending and not the Ambassador. (Ibid., 784A.54/10–2956)
3. See footnote 6, Document 411.