Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

408. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, October 29, 1956—4 p.m.

1193. Have just returned from call on Nasser to deliver copy President’s statement² and to express President’s concern and request [to refrain] from any action which could lead to hostilities (Deptel 1289).³

Nasser was friendly and relaxed and said unable understand what all the turmoil was about. He had just taken vacation of four days and something seemed to have happened during that time of which he was completely unaware. President’s statement had come as surprise. As far as border incidents concerned, he confirmed his efforts to keep them quiet and said he had recently sent message to King Hussein enjoining redoubled vigilance in stopping infiltration. Could it be that Israel really wanted war? If so, he could not see why. It is true that in monitoring Israeli radio a certain change in tone had been detected about five days ago but he had not attached any particular significance to it. What is it all about?

I then informed Nasser of our instructions to evacuate non-essential Americans and said I hoped GOE would facilitate our task (1) by arranging for rights, as required, for military transport planes and ships; (2) by expediting exit formalities and (3) by taking any measures which might be required to assure security. Nasser replied he was still at a loss to understand why such action on our part should be felt necessary but GOE would do all it could to be helpful and he specifically gave informal assurance on landing rights for planes and ships on understanding formal request be made. Regarding security, he said we could be assured of that regardless of what may happen. At my request he also designated the Minister of Interior as clearing house for evacuation problems.

Was unable see Fawzi this morning but have appointment do so this afternoon, when I shall go over much same ground and deliver formal note re landing rights.

Decision see Nasser taken due delay in Fawzi appointment and also in knowledge that action by Foreign Office usually slow unless specially stimulated. Also wished get first hand impression of Nasser’s reaction who, if he was not genuinely puzzled, put on good act.

Hare

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/10–2956. Secret; Priority. Received at 4:51 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Damascus, Beirut, and Tel Aviv.
2. Document 395.
3. Telegram 1289 to Cairo, also sent to Amman, Damascus, and Beirut, October 28, instructed the Embassies to approach the host governments, express Eisenhower’s concern over the situation in the Middle East, and request that the government refrain from any action that could lead to hostilities. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/10–2856)