Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

411. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 29, 1956, 7:15 p.m.¹

Washington, October 29, 1956, 7:15 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary Dulles
• Under Secretary Hoover
• Secretary Wilson
• Admiral Radford
• Mr. Allen Dulles
• Governor Adams
• General Persons
• Mr. Hagerty (after first five minutes)
• Colonel Goodpaster

The meeting was called to discuss the situation arising out of the reports of Israeli invasion of the Sinai Peninsula.²

Secretary Dulles referred to French actions in providing, apparently, a sizeable number of Mysteres to the Israelis in excess of agreed figures and without the notifications called for in US–UK–French agreements on arms to the Middle East. He also referred to a very large number of messages between Paris and Israel yesterday.

Several of those present reviewed the reports on Israeli movements to positions seventy-five miles within Egyptian territory, and—by air drop—to positions approximately twenty miles from Suez. There was next a review of intelligence reports regarding Egyptian force dispositions, particularly Egyptian forces in and near the Gaza strip.

The President asked whether the very first thing that Egypt should do should not be to counterattack and hold the Israeli forces in the desert where they would have difficulty maintaining themselves. Admiral Radford doubted the Egyptians could do this.

The President recalled that in 1950 and later we have said we would support the victim of aggressions in the Middle East. The question now is, how shall we do this. Admiral Radford said the 6th Fleet is in the area. The President asked if blockade would be effective. Admiral Radford said the affair will be “all over” in a few days; when the President challenged him on how it could be ended in that time, he said he meant that the Israelis would be to the Suez within two or three days. He thought Israel simply wants to seize the Sinai Peninsula.

Mr. Allen Dulles suggested that the Israelis might still be planning to withdraw—that the operations thus far have been in the nature of probing action. Admiral Radford thought that the operation has gone too far to pull back, and thought that the Israelis may attack Egyptian fields tonight. The President asked what Egyptian air forces would be doing at that time, and Admiral Radford said that their quality is not of the best, and they probably could not attack Israel in night operations. He thought that Israel is counting on the operations not running more than three days.

Secretary Dulles said the operation goes further than that. The Canal is likely to be disrupted, and pipe lines are likely to be broken. In those circumstances British and French intervention must be foreseen. They appear to be ready for it, and may in fact have concerted their action with the Israelis. (At this point Mr. Hagerty joined the meeting.) Admiral Radford said that there are rumors that the British, French and Israelis have made a deal with Iraq to carve up Jordan.

Admiral Radford thought we are confronted with a question whether Egypt will ask for help from the Russians, or throw Nasser out and ask the British for help. He commented that Israel has obtained thirty to fifty Mystéres from France that we had not heard of—and perhaps more. Secretary Dulles recalled that the supply of these aircraft must have been in violation of our agreement whereby we were supposed to be notified.

Secretary Dulles said that in his opinion there is a basic issue that must be considered. The French and British may think that—whatever we may think of what they have done—we have to go along with them. The President asked what they would think if we were to go in to aid Egypt to fulfill our pledge. Secretary Wilson asked whether we are committed so tightly as this by our statement, and Secretary Dulles recalled that the Tri-Partite statement, and then the U.S. statement last April, called for exactly such action. Mr. Wilson said the Israelis must be figuring on French and British support, thinking that we are stymied at this pre-election period, and the USSR also because of difficulties in Eastern Europe.

The President queried whether Mr. Hagerty should not make a statement letting the information out that we are considering what steps we could take to support Egypt and redeem our pledge in this matter—including consideration of calling Congress back. Secretary Dulles recalled that Senator George today had referred to the possibility of calling Congress into session. The President thought that in these circumstances perhaps we cannot be bound by our traditional alliances, but must instead face the question how to make good on our pledge. He thought the UN might be the most valuable course to follow. Secretary Dulles pointed out that the USSR may beat us to the jump in the UN. He added that we have had no news from the British and French in nearly ten days. He suggested that we might plan to go to the UN, with the British and French if they wish to join us, but otherwise alone. He felt it imperative to get in ahead of the USSR.

The President said, in this matter, he does not care in the slightest whether he is re-elected or not. He feels we must make good on our word. He added that he did not really think the American people would throw him out in the midst of a situation like this, but if they did, so be it. Mr. Dulles said that one adverse result of this action may be a wave of anti-Semitism through the country, and general agreement was indicated.

The President next asked whether we should call Congress back into session, and specifically whether we could call them for the day following the election. He said that referral to the United Nations was not enough. We must take more definite action, since we are the only people the British and the French will listen to. Admiral Radford thought that we should take our action tonight, inasmuch as the situation may develop in a major way overnight.

Mr. Wilson asked what the Russians are likely to do in the circumstances (without any answer).

The President thought the British are calculating that we must go along with them (he thought they were not banking too heavily on our being tied up in the election, but are thinking in longer range terms.) He thought we should let them know at once of our position, telling them that we recognize that much is on their side in the dispute with the Egyptians, but that nothing justifies double-crossing us. He did not conceive that the United States would gain if we permitted it to be justly said that we are a nation without honor. Admiral Radford thought that this matter must be handled on the basis of principle, and the President agreed. Secretary Dulles said that tomorrow there may well be fighting along the Canal, with the pipe lines broken, and with the British and French moving in.

The President asked what the group thought of telling the British that we know the strain the French have been under and they may be playing us false—they have given extra Mysteres to Israel and there has been a sudden rise in their messages to and from Israel. We are, however, moved to help Egypt at once in order to honor our commitments. We know the French are already involved in war, which is being indirectly supported by the Egyptians, and all things are legitimate. If, however, the British get into this operation, they may open a deep rift between us. The President said we might indicate we are considering ways and means of redeeming our pledge to the Middle Eastern countries. If the British back the Israelis they may find us in opposition. He said he did not fancy helping Egypt in the present circumstances but he felt our word must be made good. Mr. Wilson again asked how clear cut our pledge is to the Middle Eastern countries, and the President recalled that we had told Israel quite recently that they did not need from us the arms they were seeking because of the assurance inherent in our pledge.

In discussion of the military situation of the two countries, including the deployment of their forces, Admiral Radford indicated Israel can take care of the Egyptian bombers, in all likelihood, with their fighters including the Mysteres.

Mr. Hoover pointed out that if we were to side with the French and British we would find the USSR lined up with Arabs and in fact with all of Africa. Admiral Radford said we must support principle in this case, and Mr. Hoover agreed. Secretary Dulles said that the Baghdad Pact ambassadors³ were in seeing him today and pointed out that the United States is pledged to stop such aggression, and asked what we proposed to do.

The President thought it would be well to call Mr. Coulson, the British Chargé d’Affaires, in the absence of an ambassador and have him come to the White House right away. After discussion it was decided to have him come to the front gate, and Mr. Hoover called him to arrange this. Mr. Wilson recalled that Allen Dulles had said there is still a slight hope that the Israelis have sent probing forces into the desert and would back out. Admiral Radford said that the fact of the reported air drop showed that the Israelis were fully committed.

The President said he planned to say to Coulson that the French have moved fast and played a lone hand in this matter, that we propose to move as fast as we can in the United Nations, with our allies if possible, and if not then alone, and that we are going to do everything possible, even including a special session of Congress if necessary, to redeem our pledge.

Governor Adams suggested that if the situation deteriorates it might be desirable to convene the Congress before election. He saw considerable merit in putting Congress on notice to come in on a date certain. General Persons said that the purpose of the UN operation is to determine who is the aggressor and we should avoid prejudging this matter until the UN had acted. Mr. Allen Dulles reiterated that there is still a slight chance that this is a probing operation—he recognized that the chance may be very slight. The President repeated that he proposed for us to go before the United Nations, and say we are prepared to do all necessary to redeem our pledge.

Secretary Dulles said there has been a struggle between the French and ourselves to see who will have the British allied with them in the tense situations in the Middle East and North Africa. He thought there was still a bare chance to “unhook” the British from the French (who will be even more furious than they have been) and that it ought to be undertaken.

The President said that before Mr. Coulson came the group should go down to have their picture taken—he asked whether all present should not be in the picture, and there was agreement. Mr. Hagerty asked if there would be any statement, and the President thought that there might be one later. (Mr. Dulles was drafting a few notes as this discussion proceeded.) Admiral Radford said that Israel is too far committed to back out.

General Persons suggested the desirability of having a bi-partisan leadership meeting late this week. Others commented that our position must be very clear inasmuch as there would be a great deal of political activity in connection with any such meeting.

Mr. Wilson thought we should make clear tonight that we are going to the UN tomorrow, and the President recalled that Mr. Hagerty might state that we are considering whether to call a special session. Governor Adams suggested that the consideration be hinged on the developments in the next day or two.

I raised with the President and the group the question of the position of the Soviet Union in this matter, suggesting that consideration be given to the possibility that they might take radical action, and hence to what we might do to forestall this. The President asked what we could do, and others pointed out that the announcement of our plan to go to the UN, and of our general stand in the matter, might help in this. It was observed that we and the Russians might find ourselves on the same side in this matter.

At this point Mr. Coulson was brought in and the group went down to have pictures taken.⁴ I stayed with Mr. Coulson. The President and Secretary Dulles returned in a few minutes. I was absent from their meeting for five minutes or so, and then joined it until Mr. Coulson left.⁵

I then returned to the meeting in the Red Room of those who had left the Oval Room, and Secretary Dulles joined this meeting shortly. A press release was drafted and reviewed with all those present by Mr. Hagerty and Secretary Dulles. The group dispersed and Mr. Hagerty returned to the West Wing to make an announcement to the press.⁶

Secretary Dulles said he would call Ambassador Lodge to put the matter before the UN at the opening of business tomorrow. After further discussion he said he would call Lodge tonight and ask that Lodge call Hammarskjold tonight in order that we may be “on record” first.

G
Colonel CE, U S Army

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster.

2. The Dulles Papers at the Eisenhower Library contain memoranda of several telephone conversations which preceded this meeting. At 5:45 p.m., Admiral Radford returned Dulles’ call. According to Bernau’s transcript, “Sec. asked him to be at the WH—via the back way about 6:30. R. said their assessment is it is going to get bigger as soon as daylight comes if not tonight. They don’t think it can be stopped.”

   At 6 p.m. White House Press Secretary Hagerty telephoned Dulles from Richmond, Virginia, and said that he had been asked by Eisenhower to tell Dulles that the President’s party would return to Washington as quickly as it could. Dulles then briefly reported to Hagerty on various developments of the day.

   Twenty minutes later Eisenhower telephoned Dulles from Richmond and asked if Dulles wanted to see him. The Secretary answered yes and informed Eisenhower that he had asked Allen Dulles and Admiral Radford to attend the meeting. Eisenhower and Dulles then agreed that the meeting should begin at 7:15 that evening.

3. At 6:05 p.m. Dulles, Rountree, and Burdett met with Ambassador Mohammed Ali of Pakistan, Ambassador Haydar Gork of Turkey, Ambassador Ali Amini of Iran, and Hashim Khalil, Counselor and Chargé d’Affaires of the Iraqi Embassy. A memorandum of the conversation by Burdett is in Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/10–2956.
4. Copies of the AP wire photos are in the Eisenhower Library.
5. See infra.

6. The press release reads as follows:

   “At the meeting the President recalled that the United States, under this and prior Administrations, has pledged itself to assist the victim of any aggression in the Middle East.

   “We shall honor our pledge.

   “The United States is in consultation with the British and French Governments, parties with us to the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, and the United States plans, as contemplated by that Declaration, that the situation shall be taken to the United Nations Security Council tomorrow morning.

   “The question of whether and when the President will call a special session of the Congress will be decided in the light of the unfolding situation.” (Department of State Bulletin, November 12, 1956, p. 749; United States Policy in the Middle East, September 1956–June 1957, p. 137)