398. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, October 28, 1956, 5:38 p.m.1
Secy. Dulles.
In his office, discussion being held by Hoover, Murphy, Phleger & Rountree on question of evacuation. Substantial agreement reached that Dulles recommend we inaugurate the evacuation.2
President asked by what means?
Dulles replied probably use commercial means as far as possible, & military or naval craft as necessary. President thought of troop ships, but added that we probably have no good ones out there.
Mr. Dulles said President’s statement earlier today gives a good cover now for doing this. If we don’t do it after that statement, & then things go wrong, then people will think we are very remiss. President asked who they will take—Dulles said Syria, Israel, Jordan & Egypt. In first instance, would take them to Rome or Athens; at that time, they would have choice of coming home or going to some other post. There are about 350 in Jordan; considerably larger number in Egypt (about 3,000); & 2 or 3 thousand in Israel.
President asked if Dulles thought that, by starting this, would we exacerbate the situation?
Dulles replied that he does not think so. It may lead to some anti-American demonstrations; & if the British strike, it will lead to inference that we knew about it. But he thinks it will not basically make the situation more serious.
President said our statement today would take care of that one, because obviously we don’t know anything about the British.
Mr. Dulles asked if President got the information about the build-up around Cyprus—30 to 63 in the last 48 hours; the other country’s3 transport had been increased from 3 to 21.
[Page 807]President said he just cannot believe Britain would be dragged into this.
Mr. Dulles said 2 important French ships have been moved to the Mediterranean.
President said in sending this message,4 we said we would ask both Britain & France to do something—have we taken any steps?
Mr. Dulles said he has just talked to French Ambassador & French [British] Chargé. They profess to know nothing about this at all. The Britisher said he had some information that they had acted to warn the Israeli against attacking Jordan. But, he said, their ignorance is almost a sign of guilty conscience, in his opinion.
President’s thought is to wait till morning, to see if there’s an attack. Asked when State proposed to issue this.5
Mr. Dulles said today; because if there is an attack, it would really be too late afterwards.
President does not see why it would be too late. An attack would not mean a city occupied; the rights of neutrals ought to be respected.
Secy. Dulles mentioned Joint Chiefs of Staff position.6 Then President said okay, go ahead. Added that, of course, it will be a world-shocking thing. To which Dulles commented: “But not much more than your statement. I think that it will tend to reinforce your statement, perhaps. Of course the British & French have done this a long time ago. They have gotten all their people out.”
The President said we probably can’t expect to get any answer from Ben Gurion now.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Prepared in the Office of the President. Another memorandum of this conversation by Bernau indicates that Dulles placed the call to the President. (Ibid., Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)↩
- Reference is to the evacuation of American citizens from certain parts of the Middle East.↩
- Reference is to France.↩
- Reference is to Eisenhower’s message to Ben Gurion, Document 394.↩
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Reference presumably is to the Department of State statement issued later that day (Press Release No. 563) indicating that “as a matter of prudence” measures were being instituted to reduce the number of Americans in several Middle Eastern countries. The statement noted that while a full scale evacuation was not contemplated, U.S. personnel not performing essential functions would be asked to leave until conditions improved and urged U.S. citizens to defer plans for visiting the area. It also emphasized that these measures “were of a precautionary nature” and expressed confidence that Middle Eastern governments would afford full protection to American lives and property in accordance with international law. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, November 5, 1956, p. 700, and United States Policy in the Middle East, September 1956–June 1957, p. 135.
At 6:04 p.m., October 28, the Department of State transmitted instructions to the Embassies in Amman, Cairo, Damascus, and Tel Aviv, and the Consulate General at Jerusalem telling them to begin immediately Phase Three evacuation procedures and reduce the number of U.S. citizens in their countries. All other Middle Eastern posts were to continue a 24-hour security watch. (Telegram 447 to Amman; October 28; Department of State, Central Files, October 28, 280.1122/10–2856)
↩ - For a summary of the JCS position concerning evacuation, see telegram 1107, Document 325.↩