399. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 28, 1956, 5:57 p.m.1
SUBJECT
- Reports of Mobilization in Israel
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
- Mr. Yohanan Meroz, First Secretary, Embassy of Israel
- The Secretary
- The Under Secretary
- Mr. Robert Murphy, G
- Mr. Herman Phleger, L
- Mr. William M. Rountree, NEA
- Mr. Fraser Wilkins, NE
The Secretary said that he asked Mr. Eban to call for the purpose of discussing reports we had been receiving regarding mobilization in Israel. The Secretary handed the Israeli Ambassador copies of the President’s letters of October 27 (Tab A) and October 28 (Tab B), and a copy of the President’s public statement of October 28 (Tab C).2 The Secretary noted that the Department was also issuing a statement regarding the evacuation of the dependents of American Government personnel and of unessential American Government employes from Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Israel (Tab D).3
Mr. Eban took a few moments to read the letters and statement the Secretary handed him after which he said that if he had had a copy of the President’s letter of October 27 before now he might have been in communication with his Government and might thus have been in a position to supply the Secretary with information on the question of mobilization. Mr. Eban said that Israel might be wrong but it had very good reason to fear that the Arab nations were concerting together in preparation for reprisal moves against Israel. As evidence of these preparations he cited the formation of a joint command by Egypt, Jordan and Syria, plans for the massive use of fedayeen activity, statements which have been made in Amman following the Jordan elections and the presence of Iraqi troops on the frontier between Iraq and Jordan. Mr. Eban thought that all of this evidence gave Israel a genuine feeling that overt aggression was being planned by the Arab nations. Israel felt that it was its [Page 809] elementary duty to be prepared. He said that some reserve battalions had been called up. If aggression was being planned by the Arab nations, mobilization in Israel might have the effect of stopping it. Mr. Eban also noted that a communiqué had been issued in Jerusalem today4 which cited increasing tension between Israel and its Arab neighbors and the possibility of an attack by them on Israel. Mr. Eban summed up by saying that in other words the situation was extremely tense and some reserve units had been called up because Israel feared attacks might be made against it. He asked the Secretary if he had any reason to believe that such attacks would not be made.
The Secretary noted that Mr. Eban had referred to “some reserve units had been called up.” The Secretary said that according to his information Israel was being totally mobilized. He added that he did not in any way question Israel’s right to call up reserves. It seemed to the Secretary, however, that Mr. Eban had minimized the extent of mobilization in making his remarks. According to the Department’s information Israel’s mobilization was on a much vaster scale and included all of Israel’s reserves. The Secretary continued that he, of course, did not know what the Government of Israel had in mind. Earlier Prime Minister Ben-Gurion had expressed concern regarding the possible movement of Iraqi troops into Jordan. Israel had described the move as dangerous. Since then Iraqi troops had not moved into Jordan. The Secretary said Israeli apprehensions might thus have been allayed by this development. Mr. Eban replied that the fact that Iraqi troops had not moved into Jordan had not allayed Israeli apprehensions. It was still possible for Iraqi troops to move because of their proximity to the Jordan frontier. He again recalled the statements made following the Jordan elections, the formation of the Egyptian-Syrian-Jordan joint command, and the possibility of increased fedayeen activities. The Secretary inquired whether Israel feared an attack from Jordan. Mr. Eban replied that Israel did and that, in the final analysis, the question was one whether Israel’s intentions could be described as defensive or offensive. He added that all of his information indicated that Israeli mobilization was for defensive purposes.
The Secretary agreed it was a question of intent. He said he did not know what the Government of Israel had in mind and that he had to form his opinions and base his judgments on the facts as he saw them. The Secretary thought that at no previous time had Israel been as safe as it was today. The situation in Jordan had deteriorated with the growing weakness of the Government of Jordan. Iraqi troops had not moved into Jordan as had previously been planned. [Page 810] Egypt was presently engaged in a dispute with Britain and France regarding the Suez Canal. For these reasons it was hard to see how Israel was endangered to such an extent as to require total mobilization. The Secretary thought, on the other hand, that Israel might calculate that this was the best moment in which Israel could move. The Secretary repeated that he was not informed regarding Israeli intentions and necessarily had to proceed on the basis of the facts in the situation as known to him. If Israeli intentions were defensive, every factor in the situation would seem to indicate that Israel should not be as concerned. On the other hand, if Israeli intentions were aggressive, Israel might calculate there were factors in the situation which would make it desirable for Israel to strike.
Mr. Eban commented that he had just returned to Washington and was not informed regarding developments in Israel. He recalled, however, that Egypt had been growing stronger militarily during the past year and stated that on the basis of the record Israel’s fears were well-founded. He asked the Secretary if Ambassador Lawson had reported.
The Secretary said Ambassador Lawson had thus far not been able to speak with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion who had been tied up in Israeli Cabinet meetings. Ambassador Lawson had, however, telegraphed that he hoped to see Prime Minister Ben-Gurion late this afternoon. Ambassador Eban again noted that the Government of Israel had issued a communiqué today and that he would supply additional information to the Secretary as soon as possible, probably tomorrow. He hoped that the Department would let him know what Ambassador Lawson reported.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.54/10–2856. Secret. Drafted by Wilkins on October 29. The time of the meeting is from Dulles’ Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)↩
- Tabs A, B, and C are printed as Documents 388, 394, and 395, respectively.↩
- Tab D is not printed. Regarding the statement, see footnote 5, supra.↩
- See Document 393.↩