Office of the Historian

325. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt1

Washington, October 10, 1956—7:53 p.m.

1107. Re Cirtel 1062 and 183.3 Dept discussed with Defense4 military operations plan for Middle East and status evacuation plans and action taken to date. Defense stressed 1) its over-all responsibilities in Europe and Middle East, 2) fact US does not have sufficient forces or equipment Europe and Middle East available meet simultaneous tactical and evacuation needs present number US nationals in area nor enough airlift cover entire area at one time and 3) fact normal commercial means cannot be depended upon if evacuation has to take place after start hostilities or serious trouble and inability military guarantee safe evacuation all US nationals this situation.

In view above Defense expressed concern its limited capability for evacuation all US nationals particularly if simultaneous action several countries necessary and requested Dept assure US official dependents and representatives American interests in area 1) understand that general situation in Middle East is such that hostilities or mob violence could commence suddenly and 2) are aware of limitations under which military would be operating if large-scale evacuation becomes necessary and impossibility evacuating all US nationals safely at such time.

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In connection general situation area Dept desires stress it has no information indicating hostilities or mob violence imminent any NEA country.

In discussions Dept pointed out 1) policy US Govt endeavor bring about peaceful settlement Suez problem and 2) relationship evacuation action to political situation including possibility large-scale withdrawal US nationals would be misinterpreted by other countries to mean US believed hostilities imminent and thereby precipitate type of action and repercussions US earnestly trying prevent.

For present Dept feels Phase I should be continued in Egypt, Syria and Jordan and general security coverage should be maintained in other NEA posts receiving this message for information. All posts addressed in further discussions situation with appropriate elements American community should, without arousing undue alarm, make sure these elements understand limitations of Defense if it should be called upon take evacuation action on short notice particularly if hostilities or mob action have already started.

Hoover
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 280.1122/10–1056. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Ryan (NEA/EX) and Wilkins; cleared with Berry and Murphy (G) and in draft with McQuaid (SCA), Henderson, MacArthur, and ISA in the Defense Department; approved by Murphy who signed for Hoover. Also sent to Amman and Damascus and repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Tel Aviv, Jidda, Dhahran, Tripoli, Paris, Rome, Kuwait, and Jerusalem.↩
  2. Circular telegram 106, August 8, informed the Embassies in Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, and the Consulates General at Dhahran and Jerusalem that it had ordered the adoption of Phase I of evacuation procedures in Egypt and that recipients should re-establish a 24-hour security watch, report any untoward developments, and discuss the situation with responsible leaders in the U.S. community. (Ibid., 274.1122/8–856)↩
  3. Circular telegram 183, September 7, cautioned the Embassies in Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Tripoli, the Consulates General at Dhahran and Jerusalem, and the Consulate at Kuwait that tension might increase in the area following the termination of Menzies’ talks in Cairo. As Arab action against oil installations was possible, recipients were instructed to advise U.S. companies to take all possible measures to guard against sabotage. (Ibid., 774.00/9–756)↩

  4. Reference is to the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting held on September 28 at 11:30 a.m. at the Pentagon. A memorandum on the substance of the discussions is ibid., State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417.

    At the Secretary of State’s 9:15 a.m. Staff Meeting on September 28, Rountree and MacArthur noted that the Department of Defense for several months had been writing extensively for the record concerning evacuation plans, in an effort to record their blamelessness, if difficulties arose. (Tentative Notes; ibid., Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

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