326. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge), Two Park Avenue, New York, October 10, 1956, 10 p.m.1
SUBJECT
- Suez in the Security Council
At 10:00 p.m. Wednesday, October 10, I called on Hammarskjold to get his account of the afternoon meeting with Pineau, Lloyd and Fawzi.2 Hammarskjold’s report was as follows:
[Page 690]Pineau appeared to feel trapped. Lloyd was seriously looking for a way to make progress. In a skillful and consistent manner he put questions to Fawzi. Pineau got “greener and greener” at the picture of the split between him and Lloyd in the presence of Fawzi. He also didn’t understand English so an interpreter had to be brought in.
Lloyd put questions to Fawzi that put him “right up against the wall and yet he did it in such a way as not to break any bridges”.
Positive replies by Fawzi made Pineau feel that we were getting closer to a sensible solution, but, of course, a sensible solution is not what Prime Minister Mollet wants.
Hammarskjold said the real worry is what is Fawzi’s power. He knows Fawzi well and says he is an extremely prudent man who has survived three changes of Government and that he is not binding himself. Moreover, Fawzi told Hammarskjold that he had “checked matters with his colleagues”. When Lloyd got to the crucial points Fawzi replied honestly but preliminarily, and on the basis of referring it back to his Government. Fawzi was eager to get something on paper—not a record, but a summary of the stands that had been taken and he suggested that Hammarskjold do it. Hammarskjold said Nasser may let Fawzi down but Fawzi is not bluffing.
Lloyd was very constructive and able and Pineau was very worried.
There were two elements in the conversation.
The first was when Fawzi began by asking Hammarskjold: “Will you now give us the picture of where we stand?” Hammarskjold did this along the lines of the statement that he made to Dulles yesterday.3 Lloyd and Fawzi agreed on Hammarskjold’s summation but Pineau evinced no reaction.
Secondly, Lloyd directed his questions along the line: “What is Egypt’s attitude toward SCUA?”
Pineau said: “Yesterday you told us you were willing to cooperate, now the press says you condemn it, how about it?”
Fawzi’s answer was that the SCUA construction was none of Egypt’s business—but it must be a serious and manageable organization and those who have ships and those who have cargo should be treated equitably. In the statute itself of SCUA there is an unacceptable provision, that is that the Users’ Association should levy the tolls. That is something which must be negotiated.
Hammarskjold asked: “Does this mean that SCUA, if these adjustments are made till [will still] be acceptable?”
[Page 691]Fawzi: “Yes, but I don’t want to put it that way. I prefer to talk about SCUA as it would be following an arrangement after the arrangement [agreement] was reached”.
Fawzi also raised two further questions: (1) Will the Users’ Association be entitled to pay tolls and charges from ships of nations which are not members?
Lloyd and Pineau said no—only for their own members. Lloyd added only to the extent that their own members agreed. In other words, the Users’ Association has no monopolistic character.
(2) Fawzi said he wanted to raise a practical difficulty as follows: If a ship comes in, the officer must pay the toll. How is it paid?
Lloyd said the ship pays the tolls directly or the Captain gets it paid by an agent, it doesn’t matter to you.
Fawzi said yes, the main thing is no discrimination. We will not raise legal difficulties as between the agent and the ship owner.
Pineau appeared very upset at this and said it was a crucial point of prestige.
Hammarskjold said that with what was already on the table—that is the Egyptian board, the Users’ Association, the Administrative Tribunal, there was enough to make a pretty good piece of paper. He said that the plan was to meet tomorrow in the morning (this morning, October 11) to discuss guarantees, checks and controls, then to meet after the Security Council session Thursday afternoon and “sit until the end”.
Lloyd said he would not make up his mind until the end as to whether or not he would press the resolution4 to a vote in the Security Council.
Pineau said he wanted to raise in the secret meeting on Thursday5 afternoon whether, on Friday, to hear Israel and one Arab state publicly.
Hammarskjold said this was unrealistic. You could not hear one Arab state, you had to hear them all. Moreover, he said, it was a very bad idea to have that whole performance out in public.
Lloyd said you couldn’t decide the Friday meeting until later.
Hammarskjold thought Pineau had been very unwise with the press. He had said that there would be a short meeting tomorrow and he gave the press the impression that the talks had broken down, and notably in his statement that “Fawzi was more precise but did not change my opinion”.
[Page 692]The essence of it all is that Lloyd is working realistically for a practical arrangement with the Egyptians and Pineau feels he has been left in the lurch.
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 797. Secret. Drafted by Lodge.↩
- At 8 a.m. the following morning the British Embassy in Washington delivered to the Department of State a copy of a report by Foreign Secretary Lloyd of the conversation among Lloyd, Pineau, and Fawzi, which took place in Hammarskjöld’s office during the afternoon of October 10, and requested that the report be brought to the attention of Secretary Dulles. The report, not printed, is ibid., Central Files, 974.7301/10–1056.↩
- See Document 320.↩
- Reference is to the U.K.-French resolution submitted on October 5; see Document 299.↩
- October 11.↩