320. Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, October 10, 1956, 11:30 a.m.1
SUBJECT
- Meeting with the Secretary-General on Suez Problems
PARTICIPATION
-
US Side:
- The Secretary
- Ambassador Lodge
- Mr. Herman Phleger
- Mr. Francis Wilcox
-
United Nations:
- The Secretary-General
We met with the Secretary-General in his office at 11:30. The Secretary explained that he planned to go to Washington tonight and would see the President in the morning. He thought in making his report to the President he should have the benefit of the Secretary-General’s ideas as to how things were proceeding.
The SYG expressed guarded optimism about the progress of discussions so far. He said he had talked with Dr. Fawzi after the first Security Council Meeting2 and had gotten the impression that he (Fawzi) had a considerable margin within which to negotiate although he was not in a position to accept “this or that plan”. He believed that the use of the term “system of cooperation” in Fawzi’s speech was an indication of that fact. He interpreted these words to mean cooperation with the organized users of the canal. The Secretary pointed out that Fawzi drew away from any definition of this term in the speech during the secret Council meeting yesterday.
The SYG quoted Fawzi as saying that it was a pity Menon was coming to New York. He (Fawzi) could speak for the Egyptians himself. The SYG then commented upon his role in encouraging the British and French to establish direct contact with Egypt. He said he believed all along that the technique of secret meetings coupled with two or three days of private negotiations would prove most fruitful.
He then reported on the meeting he had had with the British, French and Egypt yesterday afternoon.3 He said that Fawzi had suggested it might be helpful not to refer to the “national” or [Page 679] “international” administration of the canal but to speak instead of “a system of cooperation”. Moreover, Fawzi accepted the Secretary’s principle that the canal should be insulated from the political influences of any country.
In general the SYG felt that there were sufficient constructive elements in Fawzi’s position to give some notion of direction to the negotiations and to lend some degree of hope for a positive outcome. He said Fawzi seemed to be willing to accept the idea of an arbitrarial [sic] court, some kind of enforcement procedures, and that he would not say “no” to the idea of the users collecting fees, paying a portion of the fees to Egypt for services rendered. He also referred to some type of United Nations recruitment for certain high authorities in the canal system.
The Secretary reminded the SYG that Fawzi does not enjoy the confidence of Nasser and that Sabry was presumably in a better position to reflect Nasser’s views. He expressed general approval of the three parties meeting with the SYG but suggested that the SYG’s role was really not one of a chaperon (as the latter had suggested) because a chaperon is one whose function is to keep people apart and he thought the SYG’s function in this case was that of bringing countries together. He said there was a great deal to be done within the next day and that something concrete ought to be put down in writing very soon. The time might come, he added, when the Secretary-General would want to play a more active role. He might, for example, set down the areas of agreement among the parties.
The Secretary added that the United States was anxious to see a peaceful solution of the situation. He said he was being prepared as a lamb for slaughter in England and in France but that was all right with him if a peaceful solution emerged. He also pointed out that our ability [to] moderate the United Kingdom and France position was pretty well exhausted since we had used our influence upon them from the time of the first London conference. He believed further that the situation had reached such a stage that Egypt should be expected to make the next contribution. She had made none so far.
The heart of the thing, said the Secretary, is that we must have a system which will reasonably protect the users of the canal against the capacity of Egypt to use the canal as an instrument of its own policy—to delay or to tie up or to obstruct the shipping of other countries. If the situation is such that when Egypt disagrees with another country on a matter of policy it would be in a position to interfere with shipping from that country, that would be bad. We need not concern ourselves so much about overt acts. Covert acts and acts of sabotage or deliberate delay are more to be feared. In this connection we were prepared to back the United Kingdom and [Page 680] France. The job would be to get Egypt to accept their point of view in this regard.
The Secretary also pointed out that we must have efficient machinery which could act quickly with respect to any complaints filed by the users countries. Action by the World Court or the General Assembly would not be fast enough.
The Secretary said he wanted the Secretary-General to feel that the United States will stand ready to do anything we can although we would stand firm on this one point. He went on to add that our goodwill with France and Britain was not really exhausted and that we might be able to help in some way. He then referred to the French and British position in the Middle East pointing out that the French and British people do not want to get involved in hostilities. Even so, while the danger of war had abated, we could not overlook the possibility that conflict might break out. The canal problem itself is difficult enough but recent developments in North Africa make it much more complex. In addition, he said, the United Kingdom is afraid of losing its position in a number of the Arab countries.
If a plan can be evolved that makes sense and meets the major principle we have stated, said the Secretary, then it would be very difficult for any country not to take it.
Mr. Phleger pointed out that it is not a sufficient remedy for mistreatment of the users ships to be able to take such cases to arbitration. What is needed he said is a method of preventing difficulties from arising. You can’t run a canal or a railroad by arbitration he said. The Secretary admitted that we would not be able to set up a system that would be 100% effective and he was not clear in his own mind what precise role the United Nations could play in such a system. The SYG commented that if there were two bodies cooperating with each other, with another body or agency above to which appeals might be taken, a workable system could perhaps be devised.
Mr. Wilcox inquired about the role of the United Nations in the appointment of officials in the Canal Company—whether Fawzi had suggested such appointments were to be made by the United Nations with the approval of Egypt or vice versa. The SYG replied that Fawzi had been unclear on this point and he did not know what the precise lines of authority would be. He thought that Fawzi had in mind more the possibility of securing officials from United Nations sources—presumably in the more technical aspects of canal administration. These would be on loan from the UN, but paid by Egypt and subject to its order, but they could quit if they thought matters were not being run properly. These would be selected by the UN Secretariat. It had provided UN personnel to Morocco and Tangier on this basis.