Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

298. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France¹

Washington, October 4, 1956—8:03 p.m.

1261. Eyes only Dillon from Secretary. It is apparent that relations with French and perhaps to slightly lesser extent with British are at difficult stage. I know British and French want us to “stand with them”. But we do not know where they stand nor are we consulted.

The decision to go to UN was taken overnight while I was flying back. We had been discussing that up to time I left London Friday evening and I had pointed to the many difficulties and possible adverse effect on SCUA membership if matter taken to UN prematurely. No decision had been reached and I had assumed there would be further discussion before any decision was reached. When I arrived Saturday I was confronted with decision already taken.

For weeks French and British have been hammering us to try to get US flagships to make toll payments to SCUA. Now that we would be ready to act jointly there is doubt as to what British and French themselves will do.

We have no real guidance as to what are purposes of British and French. British gave us a paper² which, I think, they also sent to Commonwealth countries, which said they were willing that UN move to initiate negotiations. But we cannot find out what kind of negotiation British have in mind and under what auspices. The French say they strongly oppose British position in this respect.

There are indications from some British and French quarters that UN move is genuinely designed to explore peaceful processes. But other such quarters represented move as designed quickly to put a Soviet veto “in their pocket”, thereby giving them “liberty of action” which is politically expedient for meeting of British Conservative Party and French Parliamentary debate.

Both British and French Embassies seem to be completely in dark and we cannot get guidance from them.

We deplore the growing public sentiment in Britain and France that we are at fault because we are not showing solidarity. But their positions so far as we are aware are vague to point of non-existence. We do not know and cannot find out whether they want war or peace.

There is still not much American public opinion on this matter because of preoccupation with election (upon which World Series now superimposed). But we are convinced American public opinion would not favor giving British and French blank check in this matter and go along with British and French in measures the end purpose of which is concealed from us.

We are prepared to vote for British and French resolution, although we have made some minor suggestions which we think improve it from technical standpoint. However, our vote is not conditioned on acceptance of these changes. But as I told French with President’s authority some weeks ago it would be very difficult for us to oppose an amendment calling for renunciation of force if couched in Charter language.³ We note from Paris telegrams (1580 and 1586)⁴ that French may insist that we oppose such amendments. But when they joined with British to go to UN they did so knowing our position.

I expect to see Lloyd and Pineau Friday morning and perhaps then some of these matters can be straightened out, although I am doubtful because neither seems to me to speak clearly for a united Cabinet.

This is background which you may use on your own responsibility. What follows is my thinking on a larger issue, expressed purely for your confidential information and to elicit your personal and confidential reaction.

I feel that this Suez issue points up some very basic factors.

The Western European nations have been preserving their political divisions which keep them weak, partly because they have felt that they could afford this luxury so long as they had more or less a blank check on the US for economic, military, and political support everywhere in the world. This Suez matter is bringing into the open the fact that they cannot count upon us outside the North Atlantic Treaty area automatically and without the exercise of our independent judgment. Under those circumstances they feel weak and frustrated.

I believe that their answer is to be found in increased European unity so that they will have together the strength which they need to be a powerful force in the world comparable to that of the Soviet Union and the United States, and more able to carry out their own policies. This unity movement is taking on new strength and is, I think, doing so largely because the European countries are increasingly aware that they cannot count unreservedly upon US support everywhere.

Unfortunately, it is the fact that great movements such as the federation of separate sovereignties rarely occur purely as a result of logic, but mainly as a result of emotion, largely generated by a sense of fear and of weakness. Western European unity will, I am afraid, not come about so long as each Western European country feels that it can in all respects count on US support because we are NATO “allies”. The knowledge of such countries that they cannot count on such support irrespective of our independent judgment will naturally irritate them and create a measure of anti-United States feeling. But that may be the only atmosphere in which the momentous step of European union will be advanced.

Obviously we do not want anti-Americanism, but I do not think that we can, or indeed that we should, try to buy pro-American sentiment by leading the Western European countries to feel that we will blindly support them in any course which they may wish to pursue.

Of course the historical and cultural ties which bind the British, French and ourselves so deeply together shall of course always lead us to seek to work together and to regard any sharp difference as a grave misfortune. But I feel that this process would be easier with partners who were strong and self-reliant as would be the case if they had greater organic unity among themselves.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/10–456. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Dulles and Hoover; cleared by Phleger, Bowie, Rountree, and Elbrick; and approved by Dulles. Repeated to London Priority eyes only for Aldrich. On October 10, on instructions from Dulles, Fisher Howe sent Goodpaster copies of telegram 1261 and Dillon’s and Aldrich’s responses, Documents 306 and 316. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)
2. Reference is presumably to a paper containing instructions from the British Foreign Office to certain British diplomatic posts concerning the British position in the Security Council on the Suez situation. Barbara Salt of the British Embassy showed Dulles a copy of these instructions on September 27 and later that day gave a copy to Wilcox. (Attached to the memorandum of conversation among Salt, Wilcox, and others, September 27; Department of State, Central Files, 330/9–2756)
3. Reference is possibly to Dulles’ conversation with Alphand on September 7; see Document 188.

4. Telegram 1580 from Paris, October 3, reported French journalist and politician Maurice Schumann’s concern about anti-NATO sentiment in the French Parliament and the necessity for a U.S. veto of any Security Council resolution barring the use of force. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.51/10–356)

   In telegram 1586 from Paris, October 3, Dillon emphasized that U.S. failure to support the British-French position in the Security Council would seriously affect not only Franco-American relations but also the future of NATO. He noted a resurgence of French feeling that military measures were the only satisfactory way to resolve the Suez affair in a reasonable period of time and strongly recommended that the United States obtain a definite side agreement from Lloyd and Pineau regarding the course of Franco-British action immediately following the Security Council debate. (Ibid., 974.7301/10–356)