306. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State1
1649. Eyes only Secretary from Dillon. Eyes only Aldrich. The following are my thoughts in response to Deptel 1261.2
I feel that French purposes in Suez picture are considerably clearer than those of British Government because of greater unity of French public opinion on subject. Basically French desire a settlement which will recognize principle of international control of the operation of the Suez Canal. French would much prefer reach solution by peaceful means, but if Nasser will not accept such a solution through negotiations the French Government has been and still is prepared to impose solution by military action. France, however, is not in a position to undertake military action alone and can only do so in alliance with Great Britain. Therefore, objectives of British Government become determining in this affair. If British Government has same basic objectives as outlined above for French Government and if Nasser continues to reject 18 nation proposals, then I would think that eventual use of force is likely.
I think some of the confusion regarding French intentions arises because, for very understandable reasons, French Government is not prepared to say to anyone that they intend to use military methods to reach a solution. I continue to feel that such methods will only be used if there is further provocation, probably of a violent nature from Egypt. I also believe, as I have stated before, that it is well [Page 655] within the power of the British and French to provoke such an incident should they so desire. Outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities giving British right to reenter Canal Zone remains another possible excuse for commencement military operations.
Regarding recourse to UN, French say this decision was primarily a British one with which they went along. French basic reasoning was that Eden was committed to take the matter to the UN before undertaking any further action and therefore it was advisable to get this precondition rapidly behind them so as to restore to them their “liberty of action”. Naturally French will maintain publicly that they are going to UN in good faith in attempt to seek a solution but they will maintain equally strongly that only solution they can accept is along lines of that presented to Nasser by the Menzies committee.
What French ask of us is not military support, [but] acquiescence in such action should it be taken. They desire above all that US at this time give firm support to 18 nation proposal of international operation and indicate its concern at grave dangers which might arise if Egypt continues to reject such a solution. They feel that if US follows such a line there remains some chance that Nasser will agree rather than face the consequences of probable military action. In other words, they feel that policy of firmness at this stage may still cause Nasser to back down and is best way of avoiding war. Their judgment in this matter may not be good but that nevertheless is the general view here.
If United States does not hold firm in defense principle of international operation, and if war should then break out, French will inevitably attempt pin some portion of responsibility for war on us by saying that our attitude misled Nasser into believing he could successfully continue to defy the West. And if war should come after maintenance of firm position by US, responsibility would be thrown solely on Nasser and Soviets. French would then want us to refrain from condemning their actions and to assume a posture that would inhibit Soviet armed intervention.
Regarding SCUA French are thoroughly confused as to position of American controlled shipping operating under foreign flags. While they recognize that there are legal problems involved what they want to know is what will actually happen. They feel, rightly or wrongly, that US has means if it so desires to prevail upon great majority such ships to make payments into SCUA. If substantially all US owned shipping were to make payments to SCUA I feel certain there would be no doubt as to what French themselves would do. They would also be prepared to pay to SCUA. What they are worried about is possibility of situation arising where only a small percentage of American controlled shipping, namely, those [Page 656] ships flying American flag, would pay to SCUA and the rest would continue payments to Egypt.
Regarding your thinking on major issue of Western European union there is no doubt that development of Suez situation to date has given renewed impetus to concept of European unity in France. Unfortunately, however this impetus is based on a conception of European unity which would be fundamentally anti-American. While I have always been in favor of European unity as such, I have never conceived of it in terms of a union controlled by neutralist groups which would seek to make their own deal with the Soviet Union. Suez developments so far have tended to impair French confidence in NATO and to make them look seriously at possibilities of a strong grouping in Europe which would be able deal directly and on even terms with both US and USSR. Much as we favor principle of European unity I should think that we would view with grave concern the development of a European Union in which the leading foreign policy figures 2 or 3 years hence might well be Bevan for England, Daniel Mayer3 for France, a member of the SPD for Germany and Nenni or one of his followers for Italy. Such a Western European union however is the type toward which French opinion is tending to veer as they continue to feel let down by US either in Suez or in Algeria.
Even if such a situation should eventuate historical and cultural ties to US would remain far stronger than to USSR. But situation would certainly be more favorable to USSR than anything we have previously thought of.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/10– 656. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 3:07 p.m. Repeated to London. A copy is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series.↩
- Document 298.↩
- French journalist and politician, former Secretary-General of the SFIO.↩