Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

316. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State ¹

London , October 9, 1956—5 p.m.

1932. Eyes only for Secretary. Paris eyes only for Ambassador. I agree that the Suez problem has strained US-British relations to an extent greater than any of the issues which have disturbed our alliance during my four years here and beyond the limits of divergencies which we might regard as generally normal between allies. I am making no comment on our relations with the French because I believe it is wiser to keep our thinking about Great Britain and France separate in contemplating our basic relationships.

It is clear that British thinking and action in regard to Suez have been considerably confused and indecisive, largely I think, because of the degree of emotionalism Nasser’s action has aroused. However, although it is obviously an oversimplification, I believe that the basis of the British reaction as it was and still is can be summarized as a conviction that Nasser cannot be permitted “to get away with” nationalization. It is possible that in the face of increasing opposition from labor and other quarters in the UK, the Government’s determination to administer Nasser a defeat at all costs has somewhat diminished. At the same time their conviction as to the catastrophic consequences for the Western position in the Middle East and Africa if Nasser is not brought to heel over this matter remains as firm as ever.

British confusion and US–UK divergencies over the methods by which our joint policies in the Middle East and particularly with regard to Nasser should be accomplished result, it seems to me, from a fundamental disagreement as to the time available to us. You will recall that last Spring the British were seriously concerned at the course events in the Middle East were taking and were so convinced that anti-Western developments would occur almost immediately as to suggest a number of immoderate and obviously impractical courses of Western counter-action. They still believe that various governments friendly to the West in the area are imminently threatened by Egyptian and Soviet instigated subversion. They fear violence or even assassination. This feeling is periodically fanned by intelligence reports to which they give credence. Their leaning toward the invocation of military measures is predicated to a considerable extent on these fears.

On the other hand, it appears to be our conviction that US-UK and other Western interests in the Middle East can be effectively safeguarded by measures short of war, despite the threat Nasser constitutes. The British are prepared to hope that such is the case and I believe will grasp at any concrete action that we have in mind involving specific measures of a political or economic nature which they believe will have a fair chance of achieving that result. They are floundering, however, since they believe that the various steps we have taken and have urged them to take do not point the way clearly to the results they feel are essential. At present they are clinging to your forthright espousal at the first London conference of the principle of internationalization for the Canal and your concept, expressed at the second London conference, that a solution must be obtained not only peacefully but in accordance with justice and international law. But they do not see how this is to be attained by any political or economic measures which have yet been put forward or espoused by the United States. Fundamentally also, as mentioned above, they remain firmly convinced that such political or economic measures will not take effect sufficiently rapidly to prevent Nasser from consolidating and expanding the psychological advantages his nationalization has so far obtained for him in the Arab World.

With regard to possible negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations, you know better than I what their present position is but up to the present time their position is that such negotiations must be within the framework of the principle of international operation of the Canal and with respect for justice and international law. They have been extremely skeptical that negotiation on this basis will be accepted by Nasser except after military action, but I feel certain that they would still be receptive to being shown what sort of action in the political and economic fields we believe would accomplish the desired end.

I think, for example, that if we were to put to them a policy based upon the concepts outlined in your background press conference of August 19,² namely,

1) Get on a basis of negotiation with Nasser to keep the Canal open with the best guarantees we can devise.

2) At the same time make it quite clear

a) that we are starting at once to make ourselves independent of the Canal by construction of tankers and pipelines;

b) that we are doing this not in retaliation, or as an economic sanction, but simply because we have lost confidence in Egypt as a dependable partner for the future.

3) Refrain from military or economic sanctions in the short term, and also from additional aid.

a) thus we would show clearly to the world that irresponsible seizure of property doesn’t pay;

b) that the West is not using force or economic warfare.

We have an illustration of the effectiveness of such a decision in the reaction of Lebanon to IPC’s decision to put its new pipeline through Syria because of Lebanon’s unreasonable insistence on high retroactive tax payments.

With regard to the larger issue which is pointed up by this Suez problem and on which you ask my personal and confidential reaction, I have for some time been pondering this question along the lines you set forth. The political divisions in Western Europe are of course fundamentally based on tradition and the proud nationalism of the various nations. The emotions involved go very deep and create barriers to integration which cannot be overcome easily or quickly. They are likely to persist in Europe for a long time regardless of what we do or what Europeans think we will do either in Europe or elsewhere.

The feeling of frustration among the nations of Europe, including Great Britain, is caused primarily by their economic weaknesses enhanced of course by the realization that although they are allied with us we do not see eye to eye on many major issues. Certainly the British do not feel that they have been able to count on our support “automatically and without the exercise of independent judgment” in connection with the problems of the Suez Canal base, with SEATO, with the problem of Communist China, or the questions of East-West trade, and I cannot imagine that anybody would think that we had not exercised our own independent judgment with respect to Cyprus.

[Here follow Aldrich’s comments concerning the need for increased economic integration among European nations, including Great Britain, as a means of overcoming frustration and leading toward political integration.]

Aldrich

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/10–956. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 4:41 p.m. Repeated to Paris. A copy is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series.
2. On August 19, during the first Suez Canal Conference at London, Dulles held a background briefing for selected American correspondents. The transcript of that briefing was transmitted to the Department of State in Secto 22 from London, August 19. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/8–1956)