Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

275. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, September 27, 1956—7 p.m.

260. Suez in SC. At meeting this afternoon with Dixon (U.K.) and Ordonneau² (France) we discussed questions of: 1) Israeli request participate in SC meetings, and 2) Presidency of SC in October.

1) On Israeli request, Dixon felt would be highly prejudicial to orderly consideration of Suez question if Israelis were to participate. He feared it would confuse Suez with whole Palestine question and inevitably result in requests from all Arab states participate. As yet, there had been no decision by U.K. Foreign Office re how handle Israeli request, but trend of U.K. Delegation thinking was best solution would be have issue postponed, with statements in SC that it could be decided as debate developed when Israeli participation useful.

Ordonneau expressed general approval this proposal, although he had no instructions. He said if issue came to vote, he believed France would vote for Israeli’s participation. Dixon felt, if it impossible avoid having Israelis participate, this should be limit and no others should be invited. He thought this applied equally to Arabs, India, and any others who might seek participate. He feared India would in fact request participate, and felt they should be turned down. Argument should be there were many states interested as users of Canal, and all of them obviously could not be invited. Israelis, on other hand, did have special standing inasmuch as SC had adopted resolution concerning their exclusion from Canal, and this could be used justify differentiation Israelis from others if invitation to Israelis could not in end be avoided.

My view is that best solution is find way postpone action by SC on Israeli request. British and French agreed that, if this is to be our joint position, we should try obtain informal agreement all SC members before next meeting to avoid debate in SC.

2) On SC Presidency in October, Ordonneau stated French Delegation had recommended to Paris that Pineau step down from Presidency and Nunez-Portuondo (Cuba)³ be requested continue in chair. They recognized this was not in accordance SC rules of procedure (though SC could suspend rules by majority vote) which provide when interested party is in chair, he may pass Presidency to next month’s chairman. If rules were followed, this would mean having Iranian take over which French thought not as desirable as continuing Nunez. They had discussed problem with Blanco (Cuba)⁴ who stated Nunez would be happy continue. French Delegation did not yet have reaction from Foreign Office.

British raised question of having Ardalan (Iranian FonMin) come to SC meetings and take chair from French, having some feeling that departing from rules procedure might create bad impression and offend Iranians. They did not feel Abdoh would make good chairman because of his disposition consider himself Arab spokesman. They felt Ardalan would be much better in view of satisfactory attitude he showed in London. They recognized however superior ability Nunez. It was agreed we should all seek instructions on question having Nunez continue. It was also agreed that, if this our decision, effort should be made have matter settled informally outside SC before next meeting.

U.K. Delegation raised question whether it preferable take matter up with Abdoh in order have him take initiative step down, or to raise question directly with Iranian Foreign Office. Theory Abdoh and Iranian Government would have to follow in stepping aside would be they were interested party as member 18.

We all agreed that, if we reached common accord on how deal with Presidency and Israeli participation, a preliminary meeting of SC next week prior participation Foreign Ministers, should be held to dispose officially of these questions. Dixon felt strongly that, at their first meeting, FonMins should not have deal with these matters, even though agreement already reached informally and SC action pro forma.

Continuing Nunez-Portuondo in chair seems to me be best solution to Presidency question. He is able chairman and can do much to aid us in reaching favorable outcome. He can be helpful in avoiding procedural pitfalls. Ordonneau said French Delegation had recommended French take initiative with Iranians and I suggest we assist U.K. and French this respect.

Re date SC meeting with FonMins, Dixon said he had asked latitude agree on either 10/4 or 10/5. If we are to have preliminary meeting, it should be called by Monday (10/1) and held on Wednesday (10/3).

Please instruct on:

(1) Postponement Israeli invitation;

(2) Invitations to any other would-be participants;

(3) What efforts we should make on Presidency (a) with Abdoh, (b) with other SC members;

(4) Whether have preliminary SC meeting on these questions;

(5) Date of SC meeting with FonMins (in this connection, Nunez-Portuondo has just requested all members state preference by tomorrow morning in view French request matter be determined in 24 hours).⁵

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/9–2756. Confidential; Priority. Received at 7:51 p.m.
2. Pierre Ordonneau, Adviser for Security Council Affairs on the French Delegation.
3. Dr. Emilio Nunez-Portuondo, Cuban Representative to the U.N. Security Council.
4. Carlos Blanco, Alternate Representative of Cuba.
5. In telegram 121 to USUN, September 28, the Department indicated agreement that USUN should seek a temporary postponement of the vote on the Israeli invitation; that other interested states not be invited, even if Israel were invited at a later date; and that it was advisable to settle outstanding questions in a preliminary Security Council meeting to as to avoid a procedural wrangle when the foreign ministers were present. On the question of the Presidency, telegram 121 noted a preference to leave it to the French. It also noted that Dulles wished to defer the meeting to October 8, but doubted whether the other foreign ministers would be agreeable to wait that long and so would be available on October 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/9–2756)