Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

276. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the French Ambassador (Alphand), French Embassy, Washington, September 27, 1956¹

Washington, September 27, 1956

After dinner at the French Embassy last night, Mr. Alphand took me aside and discussed the Suez matter. He emphasized the importance that the US, UK, and France should be working together and that we should have plans in common. He said he thought the forthcoming visit of Pineau and Lloyd to the UN would provide an opportunity for this.

I said that the US would like it very much if our policies were concerted but that in fact we had been very much left out in the planning. I pointed out that the decision to go to the UN had been taken while I was in flight from London to Washington. Alphand indicated that the French too had been disconcerted by the rapidity of the British action in this matter. I asked what was the purpose? Was it to bring about a negotiation? Alphand indicated that he felt his Government was very strongly opposed to negotiation.

I said of course it was natural that the French should want to bring in the British in military action because in effect the French already had an Arab war on their hands and this would give them a powerful ally. Alphand said he did not think that was a primary motivation. They were more concerned lest there arise another dictator like Hitler and he should be dealt with at an early stage.

Alphand asked whether I could get together with Pineau and Lloyd when they were here, with a view to concerting a course of action not just for a week or two but the next year or even three years.

I said I would be glad to have such a meeting if the other two wanted it. He suggested Saturday or Sunday, October 6 or 7. I said I had a speaking engagement at Williams College on Saturday but that I could be available on Sunday. I said that the US accepted “in principle” the idea he suggested but I said laughingly that acceptance in principle did not mean much until the details had been worked out. He laughingly agreed.

Alphand said that he had been speaking in a “personal” capacity.

1. Source: Department of State, UNP Files: Lot 58 D 244, Suez–1956. Secret. Drafted by Dulles on September 28. Copies were distributed to Hoover, Wilcox, Rountree, and Phleger. The source text is the copy sent to Wilcox.