142. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State1
1131. Suez—From Henderson. At PriMin’s request I saw him this afternoon at six o’clock. He obviously worried and perplexed. He said he glad that Committee was finally leaving Thursday (August 30).2 When I told him we had decided to depart Friday morning he clasped his head and groaned “Oh these delays. They are working against us. Every day’s postponement is to Nasser’s gain and our loss.” I explained Committee’s reasons for leaving Friday. He admitted they sound but still found them exasperating.
He asked re size mission, expressed concern when I told him possibly 40 persons would be involved. He said he failed understand why it so large since it his understanding there would be no negotiations. I pointed out our terms of reference called for explanations and preparation of explanations sometimes required considerable staff. He asked how long our conversations in Cairo would last. I said difficult give accurate answer. They might last only two hours, they might last two or more days. He said he would not mind two hours or even two days but protracted negotiations could be disastrous. Their very length might frustrate purpose of Committee. I told him I thought members of Committee understood urgency their mission and had no intention remain in Cairo indefinitely. It was my hope and I thought hope other members of Committee it would not require protracted period to extract answer from Nasser sufficiently clear to justify termination of mission.
PriMin said Suez problem vital to Great Britain. He hoped it could be settled peaceably. He could tell me confidentially, as he had already told Mr. Dulles, consideration being given to presentation matter to Security Council if Nasser should reply in negative. It therefore important that reply be clear and prompt.
I said that if this matter submitted to Security Council it might be dragged out almost indefinitely. Resolutions might be presented by members such as Yugoslavia calling upon both parties exercise restraint. There could be many debates. Sov Representative would veto. PriMin said he recognized danger but it would be advantageous to UK to show world that it had exhausted all peaceable methods before resorting to other methods. It was clear Soviet Union [Page 313] would undoubtedly veto any kind of constructive resolution Security Council. Such veto however, would give UK needed freedom of action.
I said I recoiled at idea use of force. Forceful methods might release chain of events which could be disastrous to whole world. I had some concern for instance lest Soviet Union might move into Iran in case Great Britain and France should become involved in armed struggle with Egypt. I had no grounds for this concern other than feelings derived from my experiences re Soviet Union and Iran. Prime Minister said he realized that employment of force would involve risks. On other hand if UK and France should capitulate to Nasser there were other serious risks. I admitted that if Nasser should “get away with” his nationalization actions re Canal there could also follow chain events disastrous to free world.
Eden indicated, although he did not use precise words to that effect, that if UK was to meet disaster it preferable it should come as result action rather than inaction.
In final words to me before my departure, Eden again said that he was depending on Committee to bring back with minimum amount of delay clear-cut answer from Nasser.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/8–2856. Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 9:53 p.m.↩
- Reference is to the planned departure of the Menzies mission to Egypt; see Document 138.↩