141. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State 1

488. Position conveyed Department’s telegram 507 to Cairo2 given Yusif Yasin today. He said most grateful and thought would strengthen his position.

Yasin spoke freely about his long talk with Nasser. Said he believed he had accomplished following:

1.
Instilled more confidence on part of Nasser in attitude King Saud. Felt this important as “some parties” had been at work to undermine such confidence.
2.
Managed to convince Nasser United States really stood for peaceful settlement.
3.
Told Nasser King did not really stand for international control of Canal. In making this point clear, at same time made two points (A) King’s strong feeling that Five Power mission should be received with “broad mind and heart” and search on Nasser’s part for acceptable compromise; (B) King’s equally strong feeling that Nasser should do everything possible reduce tension and particularly see that press and radio drop attacks against West.

As regards latter, he said Nasser spoke of United States, and particularly, British press with some bitterness. He, however, promised that there would be a gradual tone down on part of Egypt. Yasin hopes if this happens there will be similar response Western press.

He said Nasser seemed willing and eager solve question amicably and is searching for compromise. He felt both sides should be willing compromise and that United States must know that Egypt could not accept true international control. He personally thought a satisfactory compromise could be found but that much depended upon United States efforts to reduce military and economic measures in order to create climate for compromise. He said that Anderson said this was most difficult, but that he felt time was now if we were to open door for real discussions.

Yasin said he had stressed upon Nasser King’s desire that there be better relations between Egypt and United States which seemed vital for interests Saudi Arabia as well. He said Nasser seemed willing to do what he could but obviously retained bitterness over manner in which High Dam, arms, et cetera had been handled.

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Yasin said he had also seen General Hakim Amer and thought he had convinced him that United States was truly against use of force and sought amicable solution.

Yasin said Nasser had asked him to stay Cairo for period of talks and he had wired King for this authority. I was surprised he thought Five Power group might get here as late as Saturday and talks start next Monday.

Yasin said Saudi Arabia attitude governed by three wider points.

1.
Egyptian question is now really Arab question. As far as Arabia concerned there was also question of alliances and treaties with Egypt.
2.
Freedom of navigation as important to Saudi Arabia as anyone else, including British.
3.
Overall danger of Russia and advantage she was getting out of present situation.

He ended statement, however, that come what may, Arabia could not afford to be enemy of Egypt.

All of above without interruption my part. Did not wish comment on substance in any event as not aware in sufficient detail what Anderson conveyed and do not wish to cross lines with what Henderson’s mission may be. However as flat statement of King’s position on international control seemed contrary to statement (Jidda 97)3 asked his understanding of United States position conveyed by Anderson. He felt we stood for international control and really believed in our plan as being best solution. He under impression however, as far as we concerned, [it] is something that could be “talked about”. I told him that United States felt some form international control necessary to reinstill lost confidence.

We promised to keep each other informed of upcoming developments.4

Byroade
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/8–2856. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 7:12 p.m. Repeated Priority to London and Cairo.
  2. See Document 136.
  3. Document 132.
  4. On August 29, Yasin visited Byroade to make a special plea that the United States lift its economic restrictions against Egypt and use its influence with others to do likewise. He said that Nasser felt strongly that he should not negotiate under military and economic duress. Also, Yasin thought that Nasser wanted to delay the opening of talks with the 5-power group until September 3 if possible, but this only meant that Nasser and his advisers were busy preparing for the talks. (Telegram 508 from Cairo, August 29; Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/8–2956)