Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

143. Memorandum from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

Washington, August 28, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Military Capabilities of Israel and the Arab States

1. In a memorandum for you, dated 25 April 1956,² subject: “Arms for Israel”, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed you that if Israel initiated hostilities before mid-summer 1956 she could, in less than a month, defeat the Egyptian army in the Sinai and contain the ground forces of the other Arab States. It was further estimated that after mid-summer, the balance of ground force superiority would begin to shift to the Arabs and a stand-off position in the air would be reached.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff now consider that Israel has a degree of military superiority, which it will retain for about the next three months. At the end of this period and until about April 1957, the military power of the two sides will be roughly in balance. After the spring of 1957, a margin of Arab military superiority will become manifest and, if present trends continue, will gradually increase.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5/9–656. Top Secret. A copy was forwarded to the Department of State under cover of a letter, dated September 6, from Gordon Gray to Hoover.
2. Forwarded to the Department of State on May 4; for text, see vol. XV, p. 610.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.