91. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
1553. Meeting with Nasser which apparently Kaissuny had intended to be a mere formality after all basic decisions made took [Page 167] different turn after Black brought up disputed point2 and asked what could be said to press since no agreement reached. Nasser finally produced aides-mémoire3 from among papers on his desk and good-naturedly stated “Mister Black, there many things in the aides-mémoire we do not like. We have no intention of accepting them as they are. We merely wanted to get our conversation with you out of the way first. This our schedule. Believe me, after you the two governments should be easy!” Black’s point prevailed that no communiqué possible indicating full agreement and at his own suggestion Nasser reluctantly agreed to use “substantial agreement” in communiqué prominently featured today’s Cairo press. Black made clear he would not submit draft letters to Bank’s board until full understanding regarding aides-mémoire had been reached.
Black stated US and UK “next in line” and must expect strong Egyptian effort to tighten assurances given in aides-mémoire as well as modify much of texts. One of attempted changes will probably be last sentence. Black in response my question suggested substitution for “extraordinary circumstances” some such phrase as he used in last sentence paragraph four draft Prime Minister’s letter (Embtel 1548 February 10).4 Black also believes GOE will seek DA for FY 1956 supplementary to subsequent grant aid for High Dam. Embassy has received no approaches yet.
Comment: Black handled these negotiations very skillfully and appears have appraised GOE intentions and temper accurately. His own high interest in project never permitted him to weaken under GOE pressures and his own bluntness and apparent willingness to break off talks or conclude meetings without full agreement was successful test of GOE’s deep interest in dealing with Bank.
Yesterday evening Fawzi told me GOE would be good neighbor of Sudan “and would generously compensate” for resettlement inhabitants Wadi Haifa area. He appeared very optimistic re possibility waters settlement with Sudan, although with what justification I do not know.
By yesterday noon Bank team reached own terms proposed letter from Prime Minister to IBRD except for paragraph three wherein Kaissuny desired change words “Government of Egypt” to read “Minister of Finance” and would not concur in insertion of reference to aides-mémoire desired by US and UK. Kaissuny had requested team to ascertain whether Embassies of US and UK authorized drop such insertion. Both Embassies immediately informed [Page 168] Bank team they not empowered drop this insertion. This relayed to Kaissuny from my office by Clark5 who endeavored elicit from Kaissuny Egyptian reasons for demanding such omission. Kaissuny evasive although in response pressing inquiry stated he fully recognized complete inter-dependence of aides-mémoire with exchange of letters and that without aides-mémoire there could be no deal with Bank. Our tentative conclusion at this point was that GOE desired avoid mention aides-mémoire in exchange of letters (which would eventually be published) in order not be forced subsequently give publicity to texts of aides-mémoire.
Later in afternoon Trevelyan called urgent meeting with Black to express UK concern GOE unwillingness make desired insertion. As IBRD had no further elucidation on possible reason why GOE desired avoid all reference to aides-mémoire it was agreed among us Trevelyan would sound out Kaissuny informally and prior to scheduled 7 pm meeting between Black and Nasser. Trevelyan later reported Kaissuny indicated GOE dissatisfied with aides-mémoire and would seek revision from US and UK after agreement on exchange of letters with Bank. On learning of this, Black while proceeding to Nasser meeting with Kaissuny informed latter he imagined reasons for GOE reluctance refer to aides-mémoire must be due to (1) desire for more money than aides-mémoire proposed and/ or (2) tighter assurances continued aid from governments. While not responding to former point, Kaissuny confirmed latter. Black then emphatically stated he felt GOE wasting its time to seek more concrete assurances from US Government which had gone as far as it possibly could. Emphasized fact aides-mémoire and exchange of letters were all part of one package and that there could be no deal with Bank unless fully understood aides-mémoire were accepted in some form. Reference to them in draft letter was one such form. GOE might find itself in box after having publicized an agreement with Bank and then be unable move US or UK. Kaissuny expressed concern over possibility that if Egypt agreed now to aides-mémoire, might fail benefit by subsequent long-term US aid legislation. Black said he could not speak for US Government but imagined this problem could be handled. Meanwhile Egypt might find everything stalled to her embarrassment. Kaissuny responded “in such event I guess we would accept the aides-mémoire”. (This remark was made in great confidence and should not be quoted.)
- Source: Department of state, Central Files, 874.2614/2–1056. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Received at 4:45 a.m. February 11. Repeated to London.↩
- Reference is presumably to differences over the text of Nasser’s proposed letter to the IBRD that are discussed in this telegram.↩
- For the original text of the aides-mémoire and for the recommended textual changes, see telegram 1282, vol. XIV, p. 868, and Document 58 herein.↩
- Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/2–1056)↩
- E.R. Clark, attorney for International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.↩