Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

90. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 10, 1956¹

Washington, February 10, 1956

SUBJECT

• The Problem of Israel’s Security

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
• Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Embassy of Israel
• NE—Fraser Wilkins

The Secretary said that he had always felt that he was on close working terms with the representatives of Israel and wished to continue to work together with them. He realized that the present period was considered by Israel as critical and he also believed that the basic purpose was to work for the future of Israel, which was now imperiled as it never had been before. The Secretary realized that the Israel representatives did not agree that Israel’s request for arms should be held up. The case was not, in the Secretary’s opinion, quite so clear cut. There were steps which the U.S. might take other than to supply Israel with arms. In considering this matter it was necessary for the U.S. to balance the gain against the loss for the action in question. In saying this, the Secretary did not wish to exclude the supplying of arms to Israel by the U.S. He did not wish to agree to the request if it would leave Israel weaker or if it would increase the risk of war in the Near East. The Israel representatives have their own judgment regarding the situation, the U.S. had its own judgment. Meanwhile we were trying to work in harmony with Israel for the ends which we had in common.

Ambassador Eban said that the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Israel and other Israel officials were extremely anxious regarding the present situation. They had read the Secretary’s letter of February 6 to a number of Congressmen with interest.² They attached full weight to the Secretary’s remarks regarding the preservation of Israel. They believed, however, that the present situation was tragic and poignant. There was a growing disparity in the armed strength of Israel and Egypt. Egypt was becoming clearly superior in the air. Egypt might, in the near future, be unable to resist the impulse to create havoc in Israel by air attack. According to a Feb. 1st issue of an Egyptian paper which contained official RCC views, Egyptian arms were now being concentrated on Egypt’s frontier with Israel. Egypt was clearly benefiting from the military aid supplied by the Soviet Union. According to the press, Egypt was also receiving economic and financial aid from the U.S. for the High Aswan Dam. Mr. Eban realized it was a matter of judgment whether it had been wise to offer economic and financial aid to Egypt without recompense. It might have been hoped, however, that Egypt might have been persuaded to agree to non-belligerency or to give up the present economic blockade by the Arab states. It seemed to him the error made at the time of the Suez Agreement between the U.K. and Egypt had now been repeated. Meanwhile, Israel’s efforts to strengthen itself through the purchase of arms from the U.S. continued in the state of paralysis. He had noted the Secretary’s reference in his letter of Feb. 6 to the belief that the security of states in the Near East could not rest upon arms alone and that the possession of equal or superior arms was not the only deterrent to aggression. In this respect he wished to say that Israel did not believe that the U.S., U.K. and France, the Tripartite Powers under their Declaration of May 25, 1950, could offer any type of security guarantee which would represent a satisfactory alternative to the receipt of armament itself. Even if we had an iron-clad security guarantee, Israel would still need the forty-eight F–86 aircraft which had been requested. Israel would need defensive arms in order to bear the first brunt of Arab attack. Mr. Eban noted that other countries, even with security guarantees, had arms and he cited the NATO countries and the sad state of Poland which had had glittering security guarantees but no arms in 1939. Israel was a narrow country in which all targets were but twelve minutes away from Arab airfields. Israel’s Arab neighbors were well aware of these facts and realized that external intervention would be too late. Israel was naked and exposed. In addition, Ambassador Eban continued, the issue of conscience arose. He did not believe the U.S. would now want Israel’s hands held behind its back. The U.S. would not wish the shadows of war over Israel’s peaceful homes.

In conclusion, he wished to refer to the effect of further delay in Israel’s application for arms. The question of defense was now, to an increasing extent, preoccupying every level of the Israel Government to the exclusion of other important matters. The Arabs, he believed, were astonished and shocked that the U.S. delayed for five months. From this delay they drew unhealthy conclusions. Other countries, such as France and Canada, were beginning to ask “what is the U.S. doing? If it does not supply arms why should we do it alone?” The French, for example, would be reluctant to step out in front by supplying arms to Israel because of French relations with Algeria.

Ambassador Eban added that, from the Israel point of view, there were no prospects of settlement between Israel and the Arab states at this time. They believed that Egypt was delaying its response, that we were merely at the beginning of a long process of negotiations. The present imbalance between Israel and Egypt, which was growing, clearly vitiated the prospect of settlement. The Israel attitude regarding current moves between the Tripartite Powers under the Declaration of 1950 had been positive. The Arab attitude, on the other hand, had been negative. The Arabs now preferred the present situation because they had a one-way street in the UN since they could count on Russian support there. Israel had the right under Article 51,³ Ambassador Eban continued, to defend itself. There was no reason why the U.S. could not help. The contractual principle was important. However, Israel did not believe such security arrangements should take the place of arms. Arms were the only real assurance.

Ambassador Eban said that the U.S. had the right to form its own judgment and make its own decision. It also had a duty to let Israel know where the U.S. stood. Israel wished to know whether the U.S. was merely delaying or planned to reject its arms request and to inquire regarding the prospects.

The Secretary said that he did not feel entirely discouraged by the present talks which had taken place in Israel and in Egypt although a quick solution might not be in sight. He added that he planned to spend the better part of the day tomorrow studying the present situation. He was glad to have had this talk before the study commenced. He realized that the Israelis had a sense of frustration because of the delays. However, from our own point of view, we had to be guided by events as we see them and as they were developing from day to day. The Secretary believed we had substantially decreased the risk of attack. An up-turn had taken place a few months ago. A very different course might have developed. We continued to work for an outcome which would be peaceful and preserve Israel in all its essentials. He believed that we had been able to progress because we had not thus far supplied Israel with arms. He was profoundly convinced that Israel had no future if it continued indefinitely as an embattled state surrounded by hostile forces. Israel had no future without a settlement with its neighbors. He strongly believed that Israel should not jeopardize present prospects for a momentary respite which arms might give. He thought that perhaps intermediate steps might be found to strengthen Israel militarily without causing an Arab reaction which would bar development of friendly relations. It would be a close judgment which would not lightly be reached. The Secretary said he would weigh the judgment carefully.

The Secretary said he wished to discuss an extraneous matter. He did not know what political pressures were now being brought to bear within the U.S. He wished to observe, however, that they would be counter-productive if they took place. Developments might reach a crisis stage within the next eleven months. The Secretary believed the situation might better be handled to the advantage of all if it was not involved in American politics.

Ambassador Eban responded that he could not comment on the Secretary’s remarks as they were not within his jurisdiction. He wished to observe that there existed a universal feeling about Israel over which Israel officials could not have complete control.

Ambassador Eban also wished to comment that the Secretary had said “the preservation of Israel” in his letter of Feb. 6, whereas today he had said “the preservation of Israel in all its essentials.” He hoped it was the former. He also noted that the Secretary had referred to intermediate steps which might be found to strengthen Israel militarily. Ambassador Eban believed the prospects for peace would not be jeopardized by the supplying of radar. He hoped that he could have a further discussion with the Secretary next week⁴ and if one item could be shipped it would be helpful. He mentioned the possibility of French shipment of twelve Mysteres. The Secretary said he would put all these suggestions into the hopper and think them over.⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5/2–1056. Confidential. Drafted by Wilkins.
2. For text of Secretary Dulles’ letter, see Department of state Bulletin, February 20, 1956, p. 285.
3. Reference is to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. For text, see 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031.
4. Dulles did not meet again with Eban until March 2. See Document 151.
5. On February 14, the Department transmitted, in circular telegram 550, a summary of this conversation to Tel Aviv, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, Paris, and Rome. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/ 2–1456)