Office of the Historian

78. Message From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Russell) to the Secretary of State1

No. 76
Cairo, February 5, 1956.
1.
I have discussed with … State representatives working with Anderson in Cairo2 implications and questions involved in paras 3 C and D of Anderson’s Feb 3 telegram.3
2.
Consensus is that procedure under 3 D is preferable to that under 3 C; that is, it would be better for Anderson to come out on his next round with set of U.S. suggestions for resolution of various issues and attempt to secure Nasr’s assent or comments on them rather than to come without a plan and attempt to obtain his cooperation in working one out. It is also consensus that, leaving aside acceptability to Nasr of details of those proposals, Nasr would [Page 144] not take any exception to fact we had given study to problems and were making specific suggestions.
3.
If it is decided that Anderson on next round should bring a plan with him, following represents belief here as to what is likely to be absolute minimum Nasr could be induced to accept on territorial question and proposals that might be acceptable to him on other issues:
A.
The critical and most difficult question, of course, is Negev. The only proposition Nasr made in recent conversations with Anderson was that the Negev South of the Dhahiriya–Gaza line be ceded to Egypt. It is believed, however, that the circumstances of this discussion were such as to lead him to propose what was in effect an asking price… . representatives here believe that at this point Nasr is still thinking in terms of general principles of settlement he would accept. This is substantial and militarily defensible territory under Arab sovereignty… . best guess is that with all inducements offered by U.S. Nasr would translate these principles into cession to Egypt of El Azja demilitarized zone and the Negev South of line from southern tip of zone to Ein HPSB (also recvd HKSB) (HOTSE-VA) (170.5–020.3). As matter of tactics Anderson’s first proposal should be less than above. Nasr as part of settlement along foregoing lines might be willing to cede Gaza strip to Israel. It is doubtful that Nasr could be brought to agree to Elath as part of Israel but there would be no harm in attempting sell him on that with suggestion that present main roads running through Israel from Cairo to Amman and Damascus would be open for use by Arabs and road running from Beersheba to Elath similarly open to Israel traffic.
B.
Other territorial provisions might be: (1) Division of other “demilitarized zones” and “no mans lands” created by armistice agreements. (2) Restoration to Arab border villages of a portion of the adjoining farm lands and groves which are now cut off by the armistice demarcation lines. (3) Other alterations of the armistice demarcation lines for such purposes as improvement of communications, access to water supplies, establishment of more rational boundaries, etc.
C.
Refugees: Arab refugees to be offered choice between repatriation on the one hand and resettlement and compensation on the other, with not more than 15,000 refugees to be repatriated per year for five years and 5,000 per year thereafter. Compensation and resettlement to be financed and administered (with assistance from international communities) in such a way as to maximize the appeal of this alternative as compared with that of repatriation. Election of one or the other of the two alternatives to be made within a period of two years after conclusion of a settlement. (This formulation is suggested as a means of meeting both the Israel insistence that the number to be repatriated shall be limited to specific figure and Nasr’s insistence that theoretically at least all refugees should have the right of election.) The refugees repatriated to assume all rights and obligations of Israel citizenship. Israel to renounce the claims which it had advanced against the Arab States for war damages and abandoned Jewish property. No compensation to be claimed on behalf of the Arab refugees for war damages and such items as [Page 145] movable personal property and lost income. Compensation payments to be made to the individual refugees through a quasi-judicial process in a manner to encourage investment in the area and prevention.
D.
Jerusalem: … Creation of international organization responsible for supervision of Holy places and access to them. (3) Passage by U.N. of appropriate resolution recognizing these arrangements.
E.
Termination of state of belligerency: (1) Formal recognition by Arab States and Israel of termination of state of belligerency. (2) Following the termination of the state of belligerency, discontinuance of all measures designed to prevent trade with Israel by non-Arab countries and non-Arab firms and removal of restrictions, other than normal maritime regulations, from all shipping.
F.
Communications arrangements: (1) Israel to accord Jordan free post facilities at Haifa and free access to port. (2) Mutual overflight rights to be granted innocent civil aircraft. (3) Israel to permit restoration or construction across its territory of telecommunications facilities between Arab States.
G.
Unified development of Jordan valley: States affected to agree to proposals for unified development of Jordan valley developed in discussions with Ambassador Johnson.
H.
Guarantee of security. U.S., U.K. and perhaps other nations to offer to enter into formal treaty engagements with Arab States and Israel to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force definitive boundaries established between Arab States and Israel.
4.
… believe that Nasr will want period of six months to prepare Arab public opinion for settlement (probably at least until July 1 in view of the presidential plebiscite on 23 July) there is bare possibility that if settlement could be agreed upon in next two or three weeks, Nasr might agree to announcement before March 15 on theory that he could recoup loss of popularity resulting from announcement before plebiscite date. This is admittedly slight chance but believe we should make greatest effort realize it.
5.
Cairo 1130 Feb 5.
  1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegram—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret.↩
  2. Presumably Burdett and Troxel.↩
  3. Document 72.↩