Office of the Historian

72. Message From Robert B. Anderson to the Department of State1

No. 72
Athens, February 3, 1956.

Russell … and I have today reviewed the progress of this operation with a view to determining our best recommendation for proceeding from this point.

1.
On the Israeli side, BG has stated flatly that he will not spell out the price which Israel will be willing to pay for settlement in the absence of a meeting with Nasr. This meeting he is willing to approach through the establishment of direct contact at a lower level, working up to a meeting of heads of Government. He has discussed in principle the checklist items not in terms of commitments but in terms of their resolution within the context of a settlement to be achieved when the heads of Government meet.
2.
On the Egyptian side, Nasr has stated that it is impossible for him to consider a meeting from the standpoint of his own security, the position of his government, and the attitude of the other Arab States. Such a meeting might become possible when the Arabs are more willing to accept the idea of settlement with Israel. We likely cannot afford this delay. At this time he is considering but has not agreed to low level direct contact. He is influenced considerably by the Abdullah incident.2 He, too has discussed the checklist items, but again not on the basis of commitment, but within the context of a settlement of the territorial and refugee questions which he could announce as an Egyptian victory and which he believes he might make palatable to Egypt and the other Arab States.
3.
This vicious circle suggests questions and courses of action of which the following are examples:
A.
What chance do we have of persuading Nasr to agree on a meeting in the near future in order that BG will spell out his price for settlement and feel that, as the Head of State, he has had a personal opportunity to participate in decisions that ultimately affect his country’s future? It is our view that such a meeting in the near future is most unlikely.
B.
Should the United States now arrive at some decision with reference to the position it will take on the division of the Negev, which decision would be communicated to Nasr conditioned upon his acceptance of a reasonable decision and a reasonable point of view on all other items involved in settlement.
C.
One course of action might then be that I would return to Nasr and endeavor to secure from him a reasonable position on the division of the Negev together with other problems. At this point I could tell Nasr that I would determine from our Government whether or not we could support the position he would take. If we decide that we could support his position we would then endeavor to sell the package settlement to BG. This course of action depends in part upon our evaluation of Nasr’s reliability, together with his reasonableness giving us a fair chance of our selling the package to the IG. It would also involve the decision which our Government would make to deal with the situation in the event that BG did not buy the package and decided to initiate forceful action. At this point we would cease intermediation in its true sense and adopt a policy of putting forth the terms of a settlement, concurred in by Nasr, which we would try to sell to BG.
D.
Another possible course of action might be spelling out what we consider to be the most equitable terms of settlement as between parties who cannot agree and putting appropriate pressures on both sides to accept such a settlement or face the alternatives which we would outline to them. It seems clear that through mere intermediation the parties are not going to agree on terms of settlement.
E.
Whichever course we might pursue, there is the risk that BG will feel compelled to take the terms of proposed settlement to his cabinet. At that time a crisis decision would be made by the IG. The IG will likely regard the context of the mission as changed. We will be regarded as no longer seeking to reconcile belligerents but will have staked our hopes for settlement on convincing the IG to accept a package settlement. BG will likely feel he has been deprived of a right of sovereignty in not personally participating in discussions establishing the terms of settlement. In this context consideration should be given to the cable to the Director of January 29, Para 14 (Message No. 53).3
F.
Another possibility resulting from BG’s refusal could be making public this effort. Even if this is done without attribution, Nasr would immediately disclaim the effort and the possibility of continued secret negotiations would be very slim.
4.
The kinds of decisions which are involved in the next phase in trying to achieve a settlement within a few weeks requires, in our judgment, discussions at the highest level and preparation for the courses of actions which might confront us under the various alternatives.
5.
I am advising both sides that I am returning to Washington but will be returning to this area in a week or so to resume discussions. I now plan to arrive in New York Sunday morning4 and Washington Monday night… . Russell is going to Cairo today in order to assure that discussions which our people are carrying on with Ali Sabry are as productive as possible. He will leave Cairo for Dusseldorf Monday to accompany Hoover back to Washington per Hoover’s schedule.5
6.
Athens 3 February 1630 local hours.
  1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret. The source text bears a notation that Secretary Dulles saw this message.↩
  2. On July 20, 1951, King Abudullah of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was assassinated by a Palestinian Arab on the steps of the El Aksa Mosque in the Temple compound of Jerusalem as he was departing after Friday prayers.↩
  3. Not printed.↩
  4. February 5.↩
  5. Hoover left Düsseldorf at 8:15 p.m., Monday, February 6, for New York, and arrived in New York at 7:15 a.m., February 7.↩