Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

71. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv, February 2, 1956—5 p.m.

772. General Burns met earlier this week with Embassy Counselor and Service Attachés² in pursuance of subject Embtel 675³ and Deptel 499.⁴ Consulate General Jerusalem also present. Burns said he desired to set forth his appraisal Egyptian-Israel situation and to raise several questions for Department consideration. He had informally discussed same questions in part with Hammerskjold during latter’s recent visit but did not feel he could set forth matter to UN Secretariat because of danger leaks from that body.

Burns said that in his judgment there was enough danger of war in the area to require immediate decisions by tripartite powers regarding preventive measures or means of intervention if the former failed. As Burns saw situation hostilities could originate from either land invasion or air attack. If the former most probable that initiative would come from Israel; if the latter, from Egypt. As a preventive measure against land action he was thinking of proposing a buffer in the form of United Nations forces to be established in the demilitarized zone and in the Rafah–Khan Yunis area. In view of fact invading forces would have to overrun UN Forces, this would counter any possibility of developing a minor incident on the demarcation line into major hostilities or a staged “casus belli”.

Re possible air attack by Egypt, Burns recognized that Egyptian possession Jet bombers was Israel’s telling argument for being given more arms. He doubted whether Egypt would initiate air action unless she could resist an Israeli counterblow on the ground. He was not certain as to when this point would be reached, it depending on the length of time necessary for Egypt obtain and become efficient with new Czech weapons. Burns said he was unclear as to the form of tripartite intervention against air attack. He raised the question of another radar warning system and possible counterattack on air bases.

Burns concluded by saying that he was aware of his responsibility in the current situation as head of UNTSO but badly needed guidance. He said he would be most grateful any comments the Department could give him discreetly regarding the foregoing, as well as any information regarding such subjects as staff talks or other preparations to prevent wars; and whether prior action of the Security Council would be needed. He inquired about the location of U.S. and UK forces in the Middle East which might be in a position to intervene. Burns said he recognized that there were many political difficulties in trying to set up preventive forces through Security Council action now.

Embassy representatives informed Burns foregoing would be transmitted to Department and that Embassy appraisal situation remained unchanged from that set forth January 3 (Embtel 675). Burns left the impression that he would be greatly relieved if he learned that the problems he mentioned were being actively worked on by the tripartite powers.⁵

Lawson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/2–256. Top Secret. Received at 9:06 a.m., February 3. Repeated on February 10 to London as telegram 4501. (Ibid.)
2. Colonel Leo J. Query, USA; Colonel William B.M. Chase, USA; and Colonel David A. Peterson, USAF.
3. Document 4.
4. Not printed.
5. The Department responded on February 7 that “By now Burns will have seen Eden–Eisenhower communiqué which indicates US–UK–France will be consulting on measures to be taken against aggressor. Basic philosophy remains that in event NE aggression three powers will make every effort act through appropriate UN organs.” (Telegram 547 to Tel Aviv; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/2–256)