Office of the Historian

49. Message From Robert B. Anderson to the Secretary of State1

No. 45
Athens, January 29, 1956.
1.
I have been giving much thought your message of 28 January 1956.2 You are doubtlessly already advised of suggestions in my message to Cairo3 after receiving yours. Certainly working out the terms of settlement seems timely now both from circumstances and necessity. I am most concerned with the degree of time and how to best use our efforts over next three weeks.
2.
I am of course agreeable to continuing discussions of kinds mentioned in your previous telegrams. One major difficulty in so doing lies in the fact that Nasser is operating without a staff. Only Zacharia was originally cut in on this operation. Lately Aly Sabry has been told. Zacharia is not informed on the subjects and can only secure info from others. Aly Sabry I am told, fairly knowledgeable.
3.
A second difficulty is that Nasser insists he, Zacharia and Aly Sabry must carry on their regular duties to preserve security. Hence our meetings are at night when the principals come unprepared.
4.
I realize that the problems in your telegrams of 27 January 19564 and 26 January 19565 could be profitably discussed and must be resolved in settlement. While Nasser has said these are secondary problems and present no real difficulty the details must be spelled out. This I have repeatedly tried with Nasser making either a general statement or saying he is not familiar with details.
5.
My concern is whether more progress can be made by returning now to insist on discussing them or returning in 2 to 3 weeks to do so. I have some fear that Nasser might regard the former course as pressure and the effort be counter productive. If we follow the latter course we must certainly keep pressure on the staff work proposed in my message, so Nasser will on my return be able to take a detailed position. Also under existing arrangements progress toward Egyptian positions would be very slow since Egyptians involved are sent with difficulty due to their security arrangements.
6.
I realize the acute situation in Israel and that Israel might conclude its best interest is served to act before Egypt secures important additional military strength. I doubt that high level discussions of the kind mentioned in your telegrams if explained to Israel would deter action within themselves. Israel I believe fears most (A) Not securing arms and (B) An enforced peace that would deprive her of a substantial portion of the Negev.
7.
If Israel concludes she will get no arms or that she faces enforced settlement through loss of a substantial part of the Negev she may reappraise her situation by deciding whether to take drastic action or some act of provocation such as resuming work at Banat Yacov or (which will be most difficult) accepting the decisions.
8.
Again I am inclined to think they will be as much deterred by my telling them I will resume conversation in 2 to 3 weeks as telling them I continue now our discussions aimed at anything other than the two areas of their main concern. They are obsessed with the idea of a direct meeting and unless they believe discussions by others offer prospect of settlement of their major problems they will be little comforted.
9.
I am awaiting reply to my message to Cairo6 … . What I have said does not necessarily represent a final point of view but is my current thinking.
10.
Very likely, unless some other message or circumstance alters my thinking I will proceed to Israel tomorrow7 and then decide whether to return to Cairo now or later. In that event will assure IG that high level discussions will continue on one basis or the other.
11.
Your continued counsel will be appreciated.
  1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Top Secret.↩
  2. A footnote in the source text refers to Document 47.↩
  3. See footnote 4, supra.↩
  4. A footnote in the source text refers to Document 42.↩
  5. A footnote in the source text refers to Document 39.↩
  6. See footnote 4, supra.↩
  7. January 30.↩