449. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
62. Much of discussion last night with Nasser was on generalities which will not be reported in detail in view of similarities with past discussions. Saw him at his home when he was relaxed, extremely friendly, and gave every evidence supreme confidence. I said I glad he was returning Hussein to Washington. Nasser, apparently thinking I had High Dam in mind, replied that things had apparently reached state where no specific, even High Dam, was as important as lack of mutual confidence that had grown up. He aware from various reports that Washington felt he working against our interests outside of Egypt and in conjunction with Soviet Union. Said Harry Kern2 had told him this was the case in Libya where Washington felt he working against continuation Wheelus Field. He wanted me to know that his people were not working for any outside power but only for Egypt. He had been so disturbed by this accusation that he had asked for all messages to and from Libya in past four months, and had himself read all of them that had anything to do with policy matters. There was nothing in these cables however, Foreign Office or otherwise, that could give any substance to our suspicions. He said there was one phrase that he wished Hussein had taken time to locate and that was statement made by Egyptian Ambassador in Libya3 that in his view it was not in Egypt’s interest to see West lose its position in Libya. He personally knew and trusted his Ambassador in Libya. It is true, he said, that Soviet Ambassador in this area4 makes a point of close association with Egyptians and his Ambassador there also on friendly personal terms with Russian.
He then returned to Saudi Arabia. He had heard through one of his own confidants in press that he being blamed for United States difficulties in base negotiations. He had sent King Saud word that he disturbed about this and asked King to be certain none of his advisors gave such impression. He said “I have not been following these negotiations and have not been informed as I have been on Buraimi talks. I knew practically nothing about Dhahran negotiations until yesterday when one of King Saud’s representatives (did not catch name) gave me full briefing.” He went on to state salient [Page 824] features of talks fairly accurately. Nasser said emissary asked for advice at end of briefing and he replied he considered it entirely a matter between Saudi Arabia and United States and that it was really none of his business. He had only explored matter because of reports he was involved. I did not comment.
Nasser said “now I want to tell you something. The Arab world will no longer tolerate colonialism. I am not foolish enough to think that it will tolerate a form of Egyptian colonialism or domination either. Perhaps we have taken a lesson from you, or perhaps we have learned from our own mistakes, such as in the Sudan. Such a policy would not work in the long run. We give our advice when asked by Arab neighboring states, which is admittedly very frequent, but we do not attempt to force others to do other than that which they wish to do. All of our people, including teachers outside Egypt, know that this is my policy.”
As time had come for more specific subjects there was only opportunity to again review for him briefly our views as outlined by Secretary to Hussein.5 General discussion ended with reassertion by him that he guessed he could not help it if people would not take his word for some of these things. Course Egypt had adopted was very simple and clear and perhaps only time could convince West that Egypt not willfully working against its interests, but solely in the interests of people of this area as they themselves saw those interests.