Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

430. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv, July 7, 1956—5 p.m.

17. Following is substance my discussion with Foreign Minister Myerson re matters raised Deptel 7.²

Ben Gurion’s warning to Burns:³ I asked her if she did not agree that spate of rumors probably could be traced to Ben Gurion’s talk with Burns which had somehow been interpreted by Arab leaders as threat of Israel aggression. She denied that Prime Minister’s move represented deviation from past policy. It was no more than perfectly logical appeal to highest local UN authority requesting him to make all possible efforts to establish border peace supposed to have been achieved by Hammarskjold Mission in cease–fire agreement. (She remarked that had Israelis chosen to react to border violence other than by appeal to Burns, world would have been sure to point out that he was in Israel, why hadn’t GOI taken its problems to him?) Between April 26 and present, she said, there had been 86 incidents on Jordan border, many of them of no great importance, but nevertheless including Israelis killed and 6 wounded.

When Ben Gurion asked Burns to approach Jordanians to urge restraint, latter agreed, saying he had planned to go to Amman anyway. War scare was inexplicable to her except in terms of screen for internal machinations in Arab world. Arab states bordering Jordan are getting into position to move swiftly, not necessarily in military sense alone, in event of its collapse. Reported movement Iraqi troops to Jordan border may have been at request of Nuwwar seeking to balance threat from Nasser. Build–up of myth of imminent Israel aggression was convenient way to justify military aspects of race for position. Without going into details, Myerson said Selwyn Lloyd had called in Elath on July 4 to express British concern over aggressive Israel posture. It was important for UK to strike such attitude which could be expected to have favorable effect in Amman or Baghdad. To support contention there was no casual relationship between Ben Gurion’s talks with Burns and outbreak of mobilization rumors, she said that on June 28, very day talk with him was held, GOI was already informed Iraqi troops were moving up to Jordanian border, definitely establishing that Arab scheme, whatever it might be, was shaping up well before Israel concern with Jordanian border violence prompted Prime Minister’s appeal to Burns.

(Comment: In my view, war scare can be explained in terms of Arab reaction to Ben Gurion’s warning to Burns with possible exception of reported Iraqi troop movements which, as Myerson insists, appear to have been planned, if not set in motion, before Burns relayed Ben Gurion’s warning to Hussein. But struggle–for–Jordan theory, briefly suggested in Embtel 12,⁴ has apparently become official GOI interpretation.)

Military construction in northern DZ: On my expression of concern over reports of military construction within DZ, Myerson said there had been inconclusive discussion with General Burns of Syrian accusation such construction was underway contrary to GAA. Myerson admitted there was construction work in DZ kibbutzim but it was not military installation and purely defensive. Justification, if any needed, lies in troubled state Israeli borders. Settlers had been encouraged to farm these exposed areas and were entitled to protection. In case of war, they would be first in direct line of attack. They must have some means of self defense until IDF arrives. Under circumstances, Israel could not be expected to rely on goodwill its neighbors for security these citizens. To my questions, especially whether this was not violation of GAA, she replied emphatically that construction was defensive and in her view no violation GAA.

(Comment: As reported in Embtel 9,⁵ I think border kibbutzim are being fortified according to national plan. Defenses under construction are probably similar those described in Embassy Despatch 798, June 11,⁶ for Gaza Strip kibbutzim, suitably modified to meet geographical peculiarities area near Banat Yaacov and their proximity to focal point Jordan River diversion controversy).

Construction activities in El Auja demilitarized zone: In view conflicting reports as to construction underway near Nitzana (Embassy Despatch 827⁷), I did not mention reported establishment kibbutzim in area, but merely said we had had disturbing accounts of new construction there. With unexpected candor she said she assumed I meant new kibbutzim, one of which had been established to be followed by others if Israel wished. When I questioned her as to her views on principle of kibbutzim construction in the DZ, she said she did not think UN was in position to take decision in matter. It was never intended DZ should be barren waste. GAA prohibited military installations. When Israel had set up first kibbutz there, Egypt had protested to UN which had first ruled in Israel’s favor. When Cairo appealed decision, Security Council took question under advisement where it remained to this day. Israelis are constructing kibbutzim to utilize water and advance their colonization plans. Settlements in DZ were no more military than those at Lachish which was also in close proximity to international frontier. In fact, Israel would have very few settlements if it abandoned those near frontiers.

(Comment: While Myerson’s statement admits presence of at least one new kibbutz in DZ, I am not sure she knows whether any new settlements in south are actually in DZ or merely near it. At any rate, it is clear enough she considers Israel has right to establish them there as GOI deems necessary.)

Balance of our hour and quarter conversation was largely occupied her recital Israel views long familiar to Department on inexplicability US and Western refusal to arm Israel to balance Egypt’s growing might; Nasser’s ambitions; and speculation Soviet motives, this time as reflected in Shepilov tour.

I might note two items:

(1) To my question, she said Iraq as a neighbor might be worse but at most no better than Jordan despite latter’s uncertain precarious state. Iraq had attacked Israel with great force in 1948, she had refused to sign GAA and is technically still in state of war with Israel. GAA might not be most perfect institution yet devised, but it was a contractual relationship providing legal frame of reference for relations with Jordan which would not exist with Iraq.

(Embassy does not exclude possibility that if Arab states begin process partition Jordan, Israel may proceed take over West Bank in self–defense. Press here already hinting Arab troop movement into Jordan would nullify GAA. Alternatively, Israelis might invoke “rights” under article VIII as basis their troop movement into West Jordan collaterally with entrance Iraqi or other Arab troops into East Jordan.)

(2) Re US refusal to supply arms to Israel, Myerson developed extensively theme that I think she probably exploits effectively with American visitors that attitudes of Arab enemies and Soviet bloc toward Israel were perfectly comprehensible while attitudes of Israel’s friends, notably US, were beyond understanding. Manner in which US denied arms to Israel yet seemed unable to resist desires of Arab States, left Israelis with feeling that they were suffering more than abandonment—that frightening force was attacking very fabric heretofore strong Israel–American relationship.

Conclusion: While conjunction of Ben Gurion’s warning to Jordan, via Burns, with increasing complaints para–military activities in demilitarized zones can be read by some as a departure from Israel foreign policy following naturally on Ben Gurion’s dismissal of Sharett, I question this had that much significance, at least initially.

I think Ben Gurion meant to jolt Jordanians with warning stiff enough to persuade them to tighten border controls or risk serious consequences. It is possible he under–estimated impact move would have, not only on Jordanians but other Arab States, who apparently have interpreted his implied warning of retaliation as a threat of military invasion.

Myerson seemed so genuinely grateful when I told her that our démarche was not only to Israel but also to Amman (Deptel 13 to Amman⁸ repeated Tel Aviv 12) that I think it likely she is surprised at Pandora’s box they seem to have opened with move that was not meant to bring about Jordan’s dissolution or mobilization other Arab armies. Principal danger now seems to be that nervousness on both sides of frontiers could set off explosion, neither wanted nor anticipated at this moment by any party.

Lawson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–756. Secret; Priority. Received at 10:23 a.m., July 8. Repeated priority to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, London, and Paris.
2. See footnote 7, Document 419.
3. See Documents 417 and 418.
4. The Embassy in Tel Aviv reported in telegram 12, July 5, that wire service and radio reports from the Arab capitals alleged that the Israelis were massing troops on Jordan’s borders. The Embassy indicated, however, that it had no evidence of any unusual Israeli troop and vehicle movements. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–556)
5. Not printed. (Ibid)
6. Not printed. (Ibid., 674.84A/6–1156)
7. Not printed. (Ibid., 869.181/6–2256) The reference is evidently in error, since despatch 827 from Tel Aviv deals with an unrelated matter.
8. The Department instructed the Embassy in Amman in telegram 13, July 5, to inform King Hussein and other Jordanian officials, when appropriate, that the United States hoped that Jordan would not provoke the Israelis. (Ibid., 684A.85/7–556)