Office of the Historian

41. Message From Robert B. Anderson to the Department of State1

No. 32
Cairo, January 27, 1956.
1.
Our last conversations abroad2 did not contribute substantially new material to further our objectives, but were a continuation of discussions relating to items previously reported. They did express the feeling that Hammarsjkold visits were of little consequence and outlined their own historical positions particularly with reference to the Gaza incident.
2.
An analysis of the respective positions seem to be about as follows:
  • Egypt:
    A.
    There is a desire for a settlement.
    B.
    The essential preoccupation of Nasr relates to his own political position and realization of national aspirations in Egypt and the Arab States where he is concerned with his capabilities.
    C.
    Nasr envisions a considerable time involved in what he refers in … conversations as the “Second Phase”.
    D.
    As to differences between Egypt and Israel, he is concerned first with the Negev, some with some freedom of choice between repatriation and compensation by refugees and finally with minor boundary differences.
    E.
    Problems of the secondary boycott and use of the Suez will work themselves out in the event of the end of hostilities.
    F.
    He is essentially concerned with security and wishes to avoid placing himself either in the position of settlement discussions being known between Nasr and an emissary and even more importantly between Nasr and his opposition.
  • Israel:
    A.
    There is a desire for peaceful settlement.
    B.
    They regard the results of this operation as particularly “Decisive”… . Jerusalem seems to believe they will await the outcome of this op and then make some “Reappraisal” of their position.
    C.
    They are appreciative to some extent of Nasr’s political problems but are not content to envision a long time schedule for establishing the atmosphere Nasr seeks.
    D.
    They are completely preoccupied with the establishment of some kind of direct communication between the two sides. They continuously reiterate that this is essential to their belief in Nasr’s sincerity of purpose. They would like high level communication channels but would accept any level and almost any terms hoping for improvement.
    E.
    They obviously are concerned with time running against them and therefore place great urgency on tangible steps for war [forward?].
    F.
    They continuously emphasize their need of the Negev and deplore our references to maintaining “Flexibility” which they regard as requiring them to surrender a portion of their territory.
    G.
    They bring into each conversation the necessity for arms to offset those received by Egypt and insist that this is a decision which the United States must make alone.
3.
From their respective positions it appears we might at this time hope for the following:
A.
The establishment on both sides of genuine intentions to achieve discernible evidences contributory to easing tensions to be followed by discernible actions themselves.
B.
Unilateral statements of a general nature setting out their sincerity of purpose in working for a settlement and the elimination of border incidents and other activities which would disturb the atmosphere in which settlement might be achievable.
C.
Abstaining from statements and criticisms of respective sides which would increase the possibility of emotional reactions.
D.
Willingness to continue talks with emissary so long as secrecy is maintained.
E.
A sincere effort to avoid incidents with the possibility of refraining from retaliation in the event of an incident if each side will openly punish its own offenders.
F.
The possibility of some level of communication between the sides perhaps engineered by controlled sources.
4.
FYI, although the term “Cease Fire” had been used conversationally and in cables, we have not discussed formal cease fire with either side but only in the context of avoiding border incidents and of refraining from retaliation in the event of an unauthorized incident.
5.
With reference to suggestions in your cables, I find little or no disposition on either side to catalogue items which they will [Page 82] discuss. The complete preoccupation on both sides is with the issues above. We will continue to raise other items for their discussion but with little hope of diverting their attention from those listed.
6.
With reference to your suggestions that the Israelis be told that we believe some concession toward the principle of land contact between Arabs is necessary, I suggest that in view of the fact they already have this impression of our feeling from Ben Gurion’s reference to the term flexibility meaning that Israel would be asked to give up territory, we3 continue to emphasize this point by continuation of this line in order to avoid the Israelis taking a position that we have already determined upon a course of “Enforced Settlement” and thereby incur the possibility of their beginning a reappraisal of their position prematurely.
7.
Will appreciate your comments and suggestions earliest.4
  1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan–March 1956. Part I. Secret.↩
  2. Anderson met with Ben Gurion, Sharett, Kollek, and Herzog at 8:30 p.m. on January 24 and again at 9:30 a.m. on January 25 with Sharett, Kollek, and Herzog. Neither memorandum of conversation is printed. (Ibid., Meetings with Israeli Officials. January 1956–March 1956)↩
  3. At this point in the source text, an unidentified individual inserted “not?”.↩
  4. Infra.↩