419. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1
4. Reference: Embtel 1.2 In Embassy’s opinion, Ben Gurion’s conversation with Burns constitutes (1) assertion of what might be termed “doctrine of reciprocal non–compliance with GAA” under which GOI considers itself morally and legally free to ignore GAA when they are violated by Arabs (cf. Embdes 844, June 283) and (2) reasserts adherence to policy of retaliation against border incidents instigated by Arabs.
Both policies were enunciated in Ben Gurion’s June 19 Knesset speech, complete English version of which only now available to Embassy.
Re (1) above, he said: “This government has announced it is prepared, as before, faithfully to observe GAA to letter and in spirit, but this is also duty of other side. Agreement which is violated by other side is not binding upon us, and we did not say this merely for sake of verbosity”.
Re (2) “another thing we said …4 to UNSYG was that if armistice lines are open to murderers and saboteurs they will not be closed against defenders. It is impossible to permit enemy to terrorize [Page 768] us—an enemy which wants to destroy us by economic blockade and terrorization of population, in order to uproot and shatter our existence. We will not put up with this … I should like to congratulate UNSYG for his success, at least temporarily, in obtaining renewed guarantees from all our neighbors for total and unconditional cease fire and forbiddance of crossing of borders,5 even though I do not believe they will observe their guarantees for very long. We told him under no circumstances, regardless of what those in higher echelons will say, will we submit our country and population to terror of our neighbors. We will stand against them with all our might and main”.
This part of discussion with Burns dealing with border problems may have had practical purpose of putting Jordan on notice such incidents as Qalqiliva risk retaliation by IDF in force.
It may also be preparation before the fact of defense Israel would make to world opinion if Ben Gurion decides to move against Jordan responsive to mounting public pressures generated here by continuing violence and Israel deaths on border.
Furthermore, it is probable GOI watching carefully developments Jordan and wants to be in flexible position ….
Still another motive may be recapture of initiative and maneuverability he feels he lost in concessions to Hammarskjold mission thus far unmatched by Arab concessions, and spurned, as he sees it, by Security Council in its emasculated resolution of June 4.6
Citation of Article 8 obviously not responsive to important internal political pressures. Local public opinion has viewed dormant state of “access” issues with composure for months, if not years. More likely, it reflects renewed determination confront UN at every point with what GOI considers violation of GAA and failure UN to rectify, and is part of widening campaign to demonstrate to world opinion inability of UN to provide durable remedies to complex problems. In Embassy’s view, GOI’s recent invocation of Article 1 against remarks by Arab States, and Canal Zone blockade is related effort.
If Department concurs, I propose to visit Minister Myerson and inquire as to significance and purpose of Ben Gurion’s reported admonitions to Burns concerning both border and Article 8. Depending on reply I could urge caution before taking any precipitate action GOI might later regret. Re Article 8 could suggest renewal of efforts [Page 769] to establish committee therein envisaged as advisable Israeli preliminary any further stand.7
Simultaneously suggest Department may wish to consider advising Embassy Amman to talk to Jordanians, conveying in most suitable manner desirability of exerting maximum control to avert incidents capable of being interpreted by Israelis as violations of cease–fire.
Although Jordan only other country involved this stage, we should not overlook probability GOI will intensify complaints re SS Panagia, which apparently still detained at Suez.8 On balance, believe GOI hopeful Burns will be successful his efforts in Amman to establish order, tranquility, particularly because Israelis regard Egypt as key enemy at this stage.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–356. Secret; Priority. Received at 2:05 p.m. Repeated to Amman, London, Paris, Cairo, Beirut, Jerusalem, and Damascus.↩
- Supra.↩
- Despatch 844 from Tel Aviv reported that the Israelis were increasingly resorting to invoking Article I of the General Armistice Agreements in their disputes with the Arabs. The Israeli thesis was that if the Arabs were not observing the provisions of Article I, then Israel could ignore or formally nullify or refuse to comply with certain clauses of the General Armistice Agreements. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/6–2856)↩
- Ellipses in this paragraph are in the source text.↩
- See Documents 317 and 320.↩
- See Document 376.↩
- Telegram 7 to Tel Aviv, July 4, informed Lawson of approval of his proposal to see Myerson and inquire about possible Israeli military action against Jordan and establishment of fortified settlements in the demilitarized zone. Lawson was instructed to “underline wide repercussions which these activities might have and effect they may have on efforts which US is making to assist Israel in strengthening its security. You should avoid discussion of Article VIII at this stage.” (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–356)↩
- The S.S. Panagia was a Greek vessel detained by the Egyptians when it sought to transit the Suez Canal on a voyage from Haifa to Eilat.↩